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THE TWO TRADITIONS, ECCLESIASTICAL  
AND SCIENTIFIC.

I PROPOSE to treat in this paper two views of Tradition ; one of them very old, the other comparatively new. The old view is ecclesiastical, the new view is scientific. The old view is that which commonly goes by the name of Tradition in theological discussion. The new view has not yet received the name, but on etymological grounds might fairly claim it. I shall have to begin with some very familiar and elementary statements, but trust that the subject may develop, as I proceed, into phases more provocative of thought.

The ecclesiastical view of Tradition is easily stated ; and, admitting its premises, is easy of comprehension. The word *Tradition* has a very definite meaning in religious history. It may not always be easy to define the contents of Tradition. To show the real origin of this or that doctrine or practice which is said to belong to Tradition, or to trace the changes which may occur in such doctrine or practice in historical religion, and to assign the right cause for the change, may be a difficult problem. But the word *Tradition* itself stands for a much simpler and more uniform conception than is usual with

words which have figured so largely in the history of religion. The conception in Christendom comes from Judaism; and, among the Jews, Tradition meant the unwritten law of God. As Jehovah on Mt. Sinai was believed by the Jew to have directed Moses to write down certain things for a rule to the people of Israel, which made the *written law* of belief and duty, so it was believed that Jehovah had committed certain other things to Moses orally; that Moses had repeated these things to the elders who helped him in his office; that these elders had delivered them, also by word of mouth, to their official successors, and these, again, to theirs; and that thus a body of divine precepts had been handed down intact from one generation of Hebrew history to another, making the *unwritten law* of Jewish doctrine and practice. And the orthodox Jew regarded both of these rules,—the written law and the unwritten law, Scripture and Tradition,—as authoritative. The Traditions themselves finally became written in the Talmud.

The Roman Catholic doctrine of Tradition in Christian history is precisely like this of the Jews, except that Jesus and his apostles are put in the place of Moses and the elders. The Roman Catholic believes not only that the New Testament was written by divine inspiration to be a guide to the Christian Church, but that this guidance was supplemented by certain oral precepts, transmitted originally from Jesus and his apostles, and remaining now in the Church as uncorrupted and as binding as the written record. Like the Jew, the Romanist holds to the divine authority of both Scripture and Tradition.

Of course, the liability is great that any doctrine or rite which is thus committed to oral tradition alone for preservation will become corrupted, and lose in time its original form; also that beliefs and ceremonies which may spring up and grow in religious history, one hardly knows how or whence, and which find no authority in the written law, may be referred very safely for their right to exist to this source of Tradition, the authenticity of which cannot easily be put to a test. The Roman Catholic meets this difficulty by alleging the continued supernatural inspiration of the Church. The Christian Church, he claims,—by which he means his own section of it,—is saved from all corrupting influences by its own divine nature; and the



sacred trusts of doctrine and ordinance committed to its keeping by the oral precepts of the first apostles are preserved in their original integrity by the gift of the Holy Spirit, which miraculously enlightens the rulers of the Church in every age. In our own time this claim has been more closely defined, and practically made more simple, though at the expense of its rationality, by the proclamation that the Pope represents this miraculous enlightenment of the Church, and is officially clothed with infallibility.

But it is impossible that such a claim as this should be assented to by people who have once learned accurately to observe the facts of human society and history, and to use their reason upon them. As soon as and wherever thought is awakened, the claim will be questioned. The Jews never went to the extent of this modern Roman Catholic statement in behalf of the authority of Tradition; yet some of the more thoughtful and cultivated among them before the time of Jesus were wont to complain of their brethren for making too much account of Tradition in their teaching and practices. These objectors asserted that, under cover of regard for the oral law, many and gross corruptions were creeping into the faith of Israel. Notably the Sadducees made this complaint. They charged the Pharisees, who represented the mass of the people, with allowing and encouraging, under shelter of the authority of Tradition, doctrines and customs which had no vestige of foundation in the original religion as promulgated by Moses; and which, in truth, were imbibed from Persia during the period of Israel's captivity there, or had crept in from other foreign faiths. So, too, after some ten or twelve centuries of Christian history, it began to be queried whether some things were not being proclaimed and believed as Christian truth, on the authority of Tradition, whose real source might be found in Pagan religions or in the infirmities of human ignorance and passion. And no very deep learning nor preternaturally sharp eyes were required, but only the strong common sense and preponderance of reason over sentiment which characterized the Teutonic mind, to detect that these human infirmities, though clothed in saintliest robes and elevated to thrones of absolute power, were far from being saved from their natural human

consequences by any overshadowing protection of the Divine Spirit. Hence Luther and the Reformation, and the formal abolition of Tradition in Protestant Christendom as a source and channel of spiritual truth.

But Protestant Christianity also has its definition of Tradition, as well as the thing itself. Protestant theologians do not much use the word, regarding it rather as damaged phraseology. Nevertheless they claim that on Tradition rightly understood all true religion has been founded. The ordinary Protestant position is that Tradition was limited to the primitive divine act by which all necessary spiritual truth was delivered over to certain persons specially chosen and prepared to receive it, these persons writing it all down in so-called sacred books, and leaving nothing that was important to the uncertain medium of oral repetition. A well known Protestant author, of recognized authority, expresses it thus: "Primarily, Tradition stands for a doctrine first delivered by speech from God, and afterwards written in his book for the use of the Church." And, on the most important point, this agrees with the Roman Catholic definition; the point, namely, where the origin of religious truth is touched. Both Protestantism and Catholicism make Tradition the starting-point of revealed religion. They alike regard all true religion as the product of a certain supernatural act, by which the Almighty directly and personally gave to man a set of doctrines to be believed, and a code of duties to be performed. And this statement expresses the central idea in the ecclesiastical view of Tradition. Some such belief as this will be found in the ecclesiasticism of all the important faiths of the world. The Catholic definition of Tradition in Christendom, and the Pharisaic in Judaism, with their special recognition of the oral channel as well as the written message, are but different phases in the development of this one primary conception. The main and controlling thought is that religious truth is primarily given outright and complete to mankind, by a few very definite supernatural transactions between an Almighty Being and certain human beings whom he has chosen as media of communication: this truth, thus miraculously handed over to man from his Creator,

is then preserved,—either by book, or orally, or both,—as the perfect rule of faith and duty for the human race.

If what I have said thus far seems familiar and common-place, it is because I have tried faithfully to present the ordinary ecclesiastical view of Tradition,—a presentation that was a necessary condition for a clear development of the course of thought which I have in mind.

But this simple idea, natural to a childlike state of human intelligence, of resting religious faith wholly on one or two alleged historical transactions of a miraculous nature in the distant past, has not been permitted to pass unquestioned in any religion. In these latter times, and in Christendom especially, the idea has been vigorously attacked. It is objected that such a theory of the origin and authority of religious truth removes the Divine Power far away from present scenes of human life, and makes religion now a second-hand affair; that it compels the worship of the letter, and imprisons the religious sentiment in technical forms; that it requires people to observe where the Almighty *has been* rather than where he *is*, and to adore a memory more than a living Presence. It is claimed that Creative Power must be as near the earth to-day as it ever was; that a Being conceived as infinite and omnipresent cannot also be logically conceived as coming to and going away from the world, but must be ever immanent in Nature and man,—the Law of Nature's laws, the continued sustenance of every normal energy of the human mind; that Inspiration is not local, intermittent, supernatural, but constant, natural, universal; and that somewhat of genuine truth and faith has been possessed by every race and nation of the human family. In fine, instead of this traditional religion preserved through a book, or a church, or a ceremony, the counter proposition has been maintained that every man by himself stands in the attitude of immediate communication with Divine Power, and draws therefrom, through his natural faculties of intelligence, conscience, and spiritual aspiration, the moral and mental nutriment by which he lives now and is forever to live; and that, therefore, for the authority of tradition, however vouched for, as a basis of religion, must be substituted the authority of human consciousness,—or, in other words, the aggregated

authority of individual reason, intuition, conscience; that these, enlightened to the best of each man's ability, offer the requisite guide in all matters of belief and duty: the revealed word of God for each human being is to be listened for in the utterances of his own soul. This we shall recognize as the teaching of the Intuitionist, or Transcendental, philosophy as applied to religion, in opposition to the doctrine of Tradition as ecclesiastically defined.

And now Science appears, propounding a new doctrine of Tradition; a kind of tradition very different from that which the ecclesiastical word stands for,—in fact, wholly undermining its chief assumptions; yet, on the other hand, crossing some of the theological affirmations of the Intuitionist philosophy, and taking such a position with regard to the two sets of conclusions respectively drawn from the ecclesiastical idea of Tradition and from the philosophical idea of Intuition as eventually, perhaps, to effect a reconciliation between them in their application to religious problems.

How, then, shall we state the scientific doctrine of Tradition? Is it that man was instantaneously created, with the form, features, appearance, organs which his body presents in the advanced state of civilization where we observe him to-day, and that then, by special creative act, there was breathed into this body, as a receptacle prepared for it, a living soul, endowed with all the faculties of thought, affection, and will, such as we are now familiar with in human beings? By no means. Nor again that at special and critical times the Creator chose certain individuals out of the human race, and by exceptional and supernatural means made them the depositary of his thoughts and wishes concerning mankind,—decanting, as it were, into a few finite minds a set of theological ideas and religious precepts, with the injunction that these elect individuals were to pour out the miraculous gift in turn into some common receptacle for the benefit of their fellow-men. The scientific doctrine of Tradition, of course, is not so crudely mythological as this. It points us back to no such definite personal transaction, but takes us into the region of slowly operating, far-reaching, and subtly penetrating natural law. Yet it holds much more closely than the common ecclesiastical view of

Tradition to the etymological significance of the word. The doctrine is that each generation of men hands over to its successor, by natural ways, the consolidated results of its own experience,—passing on to the common mental property of the race whatever of accumulation it has added, of thought, affection, moral sensibility, practical power, and beneficence, to the vital stock of human society; having inherited from the preceding generation a certain amount of the same kind of stock to begin with. The process is like capital invested in trade, or money at interest. Each generation, if faithful to its trust, increases the capital which it received from its predecessor in the various kinds of knowledge open to human capacity, and in their application to human welfare; and hands down, therefore, to the generation that inherits its possessions, not only the original capital, but the income from the wise use of it added.

And the original capital of all, that sum of resources with which primitive man began business on this planet, the mental, moral, religious sensibility, or capacity for sensibility, which the first human beings are supposed to have possessed,—does the new Science resort to the ecclesiastical idea of Tradition to account for that? Does it assume that this primary mental and moral outfit was transferred outright to man in full efficiency by Creative will? Again, by no means. The new scientific view simply follows back this same idea,—that each generation begins as the product of preceding generations, and ends by the natural transmission of its own achievements to form the next generation,—and applies the conception there at the initial point of the human race. The claim is vigorously maintained by not a few of the most eminent living scientists,—indeed, we may almost say that it is established,—that the faculties possessed by the first beings that could be called human were not such as to require an act of miraculous infiltration of divine power to account for them, but were the evident result of the life and accumulating experience of thousands upon thousands of generations of beings for innumerable cycles of previous ages; that, in fact, all previous processes and energies of the universe (so far as they come within the limits of human knowledge), with their countless forms of organic life and activity,—species following upon species, and

through a natural process of differentiation and selection improving constantly by experience,—culminated in the mental and moral consciousness of man; that man, therefore, in his first appearance on the earth is himself the creature of tradition, having a genealogy that runs back through all phases of animal, and even of vegetable, life prior to him, and in the contents of his being holding the product of a force that began its career at a past era so remote as to be beyond all human power of measurement or comprehension.

This doctrine denies that any insuperable line of demarcation can be drawn between primitive man and the highest order of animals before him. It claims that there was no space, no gap, which Tradition had to leap by a miracle. No other tradition was required than that established in the natural law of transmission and inheritance. The difference between the highest civilized races of mankind to-day and the lowest existing savages is scarcely less than the difference between the lowest savages and the highest order of the brute creation. And the primeval men, according to this doctrine, were in a savage state, and doubtless lower than any existing savages. But there are tribes of savages now existing who manifest great dulness of mental and moral perception. Hence, it were absurd to suppose that the primitive human race was endowed with the same mental and moral ideas, or even sensibilities, that are manifest in civilized society in the nineteenth century. These ideas and sensibilities, even those moral and religious perceptions which we to-day call intuitions, are, this scientific doctrine alleges, the product of the accumulated and often bitter experience of the human race; and the beginnings of them, in that distant past which we cannot measure, are the product of the accumulated experience of races before the human. As Herbert Spencer expresses it: "The experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition,—certain emotions corresponding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the *individual* experiences of utility." And Mr. Darwin, in "The Descent of

Man," sets himself confidently to the task of showing by the most patient and frank elaboration of evidence, that "there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties," but that a legitimate mental relationship, through laws of natural physical descent, exists between the two; and that the human moral sense was gradually developed by natural inheritance and growth in the same way, its origin being "social sympathy," which is characteristic of the higher animal orders as well as of man. He says it is probable "that any animal whatever, endowed with well marked social instincts, would inevitably require a moral sense, or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man." He traces religious beliefs and sentiments back by the same method, and conjectures for them a similar germination; finds something akin to the sentiment of worship in the adoration of the dog for his master; and sums up the whole argument in defining instinct and intuition by the exceedingly felicitous phrase, "inherited habit."

In this phrase, which is itself an argument, we have a concise statement of the scientific doctrine of Tradition. It carries us back to no specific, complete, full-rounded revelation of truth at some definite moment of time, gives us no picture of Infinite Being imparting by one act conscious perceptions of truth and right to the finite mind of man; but it directs us backward through the clear or tangled ways of human history, beyond the road of all recognized history and the era of all so-called Sacred Books, to a revelation that began in the first rude monosyllabic stammerings of the beings in whose intelligence first dawned the sense of the word *ought*, and whose consciousness first thrilled with the impulse of adoration before some unseen Power; ay, back of that remote era, to the strivings of Nature upward, through manifold forms of organism and tentative experiments of life, to reach the point where these stammerings became possible; and thence forward, following the revelation—the light of Truth and Social Order and Virtue—as it has spread and increased by natural process from lower forms of humanity to higher, through successive races, religions, migrations, civilizations, literatures, and through all the ages,



primeval and historic, down to this point of time in the nineteenth century and to these familiar phases of moral, religious, and social life amidst which we are living to-day.

This, then, is what may be well called the Scientific view of Tradition. And what shall we say now of its bearing on questions of ethical and religious philosophy, and especially in regard to certain widely prevailing theological conceptions in Christendom? First, we may say that the view agrees with the ecclesiastical doctrine of Tradition in this particular,—that it lays special and great emphasis upon the past for what man is at present as an intellectual and moral being. But it differs fundamentally from the ecclesiastical doctrine in respect to the mode in which the past preserves authority over the present. Ecclesiasticism teaches that there is a separate and supernatural channel, external as it were to the ordinary and natural course of human development, through which certain truths, miraculously revealed to man at the outset of his career, have since been transmitted. Science teaches that the transmission and origin of such truths is *internal*,—that these truths, or beliefs, are involved in the natural organism and development of the race itself, and become apparent in the ordinary unfoldings of human history. This scientific view, again, agrees with the intuitional philosophy—in opposition to the ecclesiastical view of Tradition—in recognizing the present declarations of human intelligence in matters of truth and duty as more authoritative than any alleged revelation at a definite era in the past can possibly be,—since the intelligence embodied in the highest human races to-day has beneath it the accumulated wisdom of all the past. But it also differs from the usual interpretations of the intuitional philosophy in that it goes back of the intuitions to account for them,—claiming ability to prove that, instead of being the direct gift or immediate manifestation of an external Creative Power, they are the gradually consolidated product of an experience extending back into an infinite antiquity: not so much, therefore, the immediate voice of a personal Deity in each individual soul, as the condensed lesson of a vast and august series of efforts of the Creative Energy. Now, since the scientific view of Tradition has points of unity with both the intuitional and the ecclesiastical schools of



religious thought, while on other points it opposes both, one of its excellent effects may be, assuming that its truth will be established, to furnish a basis of reconciliation between these two antagonistic parties. It may in time lead the ecclesiastical traditionalists to abandon their superfluous theory of a supernatural and exclusive channel for the reception and transmission of divine instruction for mankind, and to adopt instead the natural courses, through which perceptions of truth and right have been acquired and transmitted, as the legitimate and all-sufficient mode of divine revelation. And, on the other hand, it may lead the intuitionists to regard as more important than they have been wont to do the accumulated teachings of the past, or the general mental and moral sense of the most developed portions of the human race, as a means of verifying present theories and declarations which may be put forth on the alleged authority of individual personal consciousness and inward vision.

And here is a point which may well detain us for a moment, since it touches some questions of immediate practical interest. The point is that the deliverances of *individual* consciousness must be able to show a connection with the *general* human consciousness, in order to legitimate their validity. All researches into the phenomena of history are daily bringing additional proof of close organic relationship between individual man and universal man. From every direction the facts multiply, disclosing the subtle threads of the natural lineage which connects the beliefs, thought, customs, language, institutions of the modern civilized world with the farthest antiquity of the race. Thus the materials of all past human experience go to the making of the mental and moral intelligence of the present age, and produce a certain average of mental and moral sensibility, or certain common elements of mental and moral sentiment: and these common elements must appear in the action of every individual mind, whatever else it may possess, or else that mind testifies against itself as having lost by some mental derangement healthy relationship with its kind. And here is a test by which individual vagaries and idiosyncrasies may be discriminated from the genuine human consciousness; a test by which we may detect when personal conceit, or

ambition, or passion, or a disordered imagination usurps the place of a real deliverance of truth. The light of consciousness may flame up higher and brighter in certain individuals than it does in the ordinary level of humanity; but it must have beneath it for fuel, and flame up from, the same elements of mental and moral perception that have become the common property of surrounding mankind: else it is an *ignis fatuus*, a delusive taper, which, having no permanent and substantial source of sustenance, must soon expire. The genuine "Inner Light," to use the fine Quaker phrase, must be lighted from the substance of the common reason and the common conscience, with whatever exceptional brilliancy it may in some instances shine. In other words, however much consciousness may be refined in some persons to nicer sensibility and clearer perception, producing the sage and the genius, yet it must to a certain extent harmonize with the public intelligence and the public conscience, because of the mental and moral solidarity of the race. The New Testament saying, that "no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation," suggests a larger truth than it utters; namely, that the Infinite does not impart itself on any principle of monopoly, and that no private soul can set up a claim to have an exclusive revelation of the Divine Mind. The revelation, to be valid, must prove its hereditary relationship with universal truth. To this test we must bring all claims that may be made to a knowledge of truth on the ground of individual consciousness.

And in this test a mental safeguard is furnished against the danger that the cry of some exaggerated personal fancy or disordered imagination may be taken for the veritable voice of truth. A peril of this sort vitiates the sectarian interpretation of the noble Quaker doctrine of the "Inner Light," as also the *daimon* of Socrates, the visions of Swedenborg, the ecstasy of the Mystics, and the modern spiritualistic claim of possession and inspiration by the spirits of the departed. Whenever the doctrine of the "Inner Light," or of intuitive consciousness, has led individuals to claim the power of personal prophecy and vision, disconnected from all evidence of facts and grounds of reason; or has impelled zealous devotees to walk naked through the streets to testify to the Lord's displeasure

against the people's sin of extravagance and luxury; or has inculcated the belief that an edifying ministry may be sustained without learning, thought, or culture, on the ground that the Divine Spirit, or the spirits of dead men, will suggest both thoughts and words at the time of utterance; or has taken the form of a claim to have received a complete volume of revelations directly from God, like the book of Mormon,—we may be pretty sure that the mind in which such beliefs and impulses are generated has in some way lost healthy connection with the common mental stock of mankind, and that the real inner light of personal consciousness has been eclipsed by a cloud of intellectual delusion.

And the same test is a moral safeguard, too, against the danger that the doctrine of following individual reason and conscience may be pushed to an *extreme individualism*, under cover of which a claim may be set up for the vicious indulgence of personal passion and desire. For, just as certain mental aberrations from a certain standard of intelligence are intellectual lunacy against which society protects itself, so any gross departures from a certain common moral standard, which the aggregate of human experience thus far has established as the line of social ethics, are to be treated as moral lunacy. Whenever, under the plea of free reason and free conscience, the pursuit of individual impulse leads beyond this line, the inquiry is in order whether it is reason and conscience, or only disordered and selfish passion, that holds the guiding rein. Wherever reason and conscience really guide, there is necessarily recognition of the relation of the individual, not only to his own objects and impulses, but to the human race as a whole; and for every personal right that is claimed, a corresponding duty towards society is acknowledged.

So much for the modifications which this scientific view of Tradition might effect in the practical application of the philosophy of intuition, and for the restraints it might throw around the doctrine of individual liberty. It should be added, however, that they are not modifications that would invalidate, or restraints that would hinder, the peculiar services for humanity rendered by the great seers, sages, and geniuses,—the men who, like Moses, Sakya Muni, Jesus, Luther, Dante, Shakspeare,

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appear to stand so high above their contemporaries as to gaze at truth with clearer vision, and who speak or act with a power that visibly lifts mankind upward to a higher level of life. Even scientific men have visions, or catch glimpses, of great principles and laws of Nature long before they are able logically, or experimentally, to authenticate them. But these previsions of truth have their origin in some suggestion made by a fact already authenticated, and so meet the required test: which, whether in the domain of physical or religious science, is that the new truth shall have natural and valid relationship with the old; that the personal proclamation shall not be put forth on authority exclusively personal and special, but shall be based on grounds that are common to speaker and hearer,—the personal proclaimer only making a finer and clearer revelation of what is already in many hearts. There has been but one Shakspeare in human history. Yet no name in literature is so universal; no author combines so many interests of our common humanity. It is claimed in Christendom that Jesus occupied an entirely exceptional position as a teacher of religion,—that he received his truths direct from heaven, and had thence also special endorsement of his right to teach them. But the common people had little difficulty in comprehending him,—not so much, indeed, as the learned,—and, we are told, “heard him gladly.” And this was really a more genuine credential of the authority which went with his teachings, and which has preserved them to this day, than any miracles which he is alleged to have performed.

It is to be observed, too, that what is here said of the weakness of the claims which are made for special personal revelations will apply equally well to the claims which ecclesiasticism sets up for the authority of all its traditions; for these traditions, it is maintained, had their origin in a specific revelation through supernaturally illuminated personal vision, the things thus seen having been then committed to oral transmission or to scripture. The test that sets aside the claims of Mormonism and of the Oneida Community to-day, sets aside no less all irrational and immoral doctrines and customs that may appeal to the Bible, or the Koran, or the Vedas, for their right to exist. The only safe place of trust is to be found

in this gradually developing moral intelligence of the race,—which pronounces at any time its clearest voice in the communities where civilization has reached the point of highest elevation, and which in the course of human progress comes to sit in judgment on the ancient prophets and bibles themselves, with authority to sift all their teachings and to revise all traditions.

But this scientific view of Tradition—now commonly styled the doctrine of Evolution—starts questions that concern religious and moral faith more vitally than any we have yet considered. The objection that the dignity of the human race is assailed, if man be thus linked in natural kinship with the brute animals, is becoming antiquated, and needs no consideration. To ridicule the theory, and oppose those who hold it with theological abuse, neither intimidates scientific men nor abolishes the facts upon which they claim that the theory rests. To ask if you want a monkey for an ancestor may raise a laugh among the bystanders; but science is not answered by a laugh, and does not consult the caprice of human wishes so much as the purport of Nature's facts. But even if it were a question of the dignity of the human race, it might be replied that it is better to have risen from an ape than, according to the popular theological theory, to have fallen from an angel. It is more honorable to be climbing up than slipping down. And there are species of animals with whom we might more proudly claim cousinship than with some specimens of mankind. But this concern lest human dignity is to suffer from any earnestly advocated theory of science is puerile. Graver questions demand attention.

Suppose this scientific view to be true; suppose man, as we find him in civilized society to-day, with all his beliefs, faiths, moralities, humanities, arts, sciences, power, to be only a natural and gradually evolved product of the accumulated experiments of certain organic forces that have been acting upon each other from the beginning of time to the present moment: how is this to affect the common belief in God, the common belief in an immutable moral law, the common belief in conscience as the human representative of that law, the common belief in intuitive perceptions as representing absolute realities,



the common belief in humanity as in direct communication with Divinity and under divine guidance? Here are questions that go to the centre of things. They are questions that must be met with all candor and seriousness. But, in the limits of a magazine article, the answers are to be suggested rather than elaborated to completeness.

First, as to belief in God. It seems inevitable that this new scientific view of creation and of man's relation to the universe in which he lives,—that any scientific view of the matter which stands a chance of being rationally justified,—should very essentially modify the conception of Deity as it has been ecclesiastically taught in Christendom. It must, as it becomes accepted, very materially change the popular idea of the external relation which Deity holds to the universe. It must revolutionize the entire ecclesiastical theory of the method of Divine Providence. It must, in time, wholly eradicate the mechanical view of the creation and regulation of the world,—the view that represents Almighty Power as embodied in a vast individual being, patterned after the form of man, only inconceivably greater, having an existence distinctly separate from the universe, and making the world in a definite period of time and superintending its movements from the outside, as a man might make and watch over a machine. This whole conception, with all its kindred and allied notions, must be relegated to the regions of mythology.

But when we have said this, have we not said all? "All, indeed," many might be disposed to answer, "and enough to leave only atheism." But to modify the conception we may have of a being is not to abandon all belief in the being. To eradicate one form of idea is not necessarily to eradicate the substance of thought for which the idea was meant to stand. To change our theory of the method by which power may manifest itself is not to say there is no power at all. And whatever theory science may establish concerning the creation and sustenance of the universe, it does not and cannot get rid of the central substance of what mankind have meant to signify through the word *Deity* and its cognate terms in different languages and religions. Science and culture are ever modifying and refining the form of the thought, but the vital



germ of the thought remains. So, let science now trace the universe back through a system of evolving forces as far as it may, it must necessarily come somewhere to a force that resists its analysis. Scientific men admit this necessity, and, if they claim to be philosophers also, are apt to call this boundless region of powers and possibilities beyond their present search, "The Unknowable." But "The Unknown" would be a more accurate form of expression; for human thought is continually pushing its explorations into this vast land of shadows, and translating its unknown possibilities into facts of positive knowledge,—proving that behind any present boundary of the Unknown there is always power and being. Yet we cannot conceive that finite mind can ever come to the end of this region of the Unknown and be able to say there is nothing beyond, and therefore no possibilities of further knowledge. To the finite mind, let it advance in knowledge as far as it may, there must ever remain a Beyond unexplored, unlimited, infinite. And we can no more conceive of this infinite Beyond as merely blank space and time than we can conceive of it as sheer nothingness. In it we know, as well as we know any thing that our eyes cannot see nor hands touch, there must be somewhat of existence and power. Up to it we trace clearly the threads of creating, sustaining, vitalizing forces which our knowledge grasps, and we keep tracing them farther and farther as fresh knowledge pushes back continually the boundary of the Unknown. What then? Do these threads suddenly cease at that movable line? Such a supposition were as absurd as to declare that a rivulet ceases at the point where impenetrable thickets make it impossible for us further to follow back its course. We know that the Nile has a source, though we may not be able to find it. So we know that these threads of organic, formative energy, which science traces through the wondrous phenomena of the universe, run back behind the veil of human ignorance to sources of power and life whose existence must be admitted, though not revealed. And we know more. We know somewhat of the nature of these hidden sources of the universe. What is in the issue must be, at least potentially, in the source. The *elements* of being must be akin on both sides of the veil.

But there is one secret which science, with all its research,

never fathoms. The primal impulse with which things began yields to no experiments nor discoveries. This remains as much a mystery to-day as in the days of Pythagoras or of the writer of Genesis. Science follows the illuminated lines of natural laws and forces close up to the bounds of the great Mystery; and peers with awe into its depths, but never uncurtains it. Scientific men can trace the ways and by-ways of development in the world's phenomena; may be able to tell us clearly how this form has come from that, and that species from another, and how one chain of power binds all the phenomena together,—but the original power itself, the evolving, developing force, the directive agency, the formative principle, or whatever other name be given to it, eludes all search, though it must always be assumed. Who will venture to say, then, that this scientific theory of creation is atheistic; since it only comes, after its long journey, to the old Scriptural text, "Touching the Almighty we cannot find Him out"? Yet the Secret Power, Cause within cause, Force behind all laws, Motor within all movement, is necessarily assumed to exist; and the universe is somehow its work, and held within its grasp to-day! And is there not at least as much reverence in this silent recognition of Infinite Being, and patient devoted study of its ways and purposes,—though confessing that the finite mind cannot comprehend it in the entirety of its power,—as in the claim that mankind has received a definite revelation of the whole scheme and plan of creation as conceived by an Infinite Mind, and possesses a knowledge of religious and moral truth sufficient for all possible human needs for all time?

Secondly, does this new scientific view imperil the authority of conscience and moral law? I answer that, though it should be proved that conscience is a faculty which has been gradually acquired under the pressure of social experience; that moral intuitions are inherited habits of judgment into which mankind has slowly grown; that our perceptions of right and wrong, our sense of duty, our obligations of honor and virtue, are all the product of the laboriously accumulated and transmitted knowledge of things as they have been found to serve individual utility under the rough discipline of millions of generations of animated existence,—still it would not follow that the validity

of these intuitions and perceptions were disproved or even assailed. Nor is such a result claimed by any noted scientists. To account for the moral intuitions in a natural way is not to deny them. To say that intuition is "inherited habit" is not to say that intuition does not exist. It would not even follow that all the elements of these intuitions come from outward experience, and that nothing has been furnished from the mind itself, or from the *organizing* principle in animated existence as distinguished from the environment. The principle of utility may have been the practical agency for evolving the moral sense, and yet not account for the primal seed of the moral sense. Let it be admitted that all races and classes of mankind do not possess the same degree of moral sensibility; grant that there are savages who have little or no perception of the Golden Rule as a guide of life, and whose moral nature seems scarcely above that of the highest brutes,—still it is certain that, as civilization proceeds and men advance in general intelligence and culture, there is, whatever be the varieties of race or the differences in outward condition and experience, a convergence towards unity of moral perception. Whence come this common drift and direction, this steady aim within the evolving action?—this progress in the process? How happens it that the principle of utility, operating in the midst of such various and even contradictory conditions, brings out at last substantially the same result? Whence the fact that men everywhere, arriving at a certain stage of mental development, come essentially to the same moral intuitions? Can we answer these questions without admitting that there is something in the organizing, evolving power which determines moral direction and sets the process definitely towards a goal? To account for the moral facts in human history, must we not claim that there was that in the germinal essence whence all things have sprung which guided the grand process upward to a definite result,—just as there is that in the elm-seed which, amidst whatever conditions of environment, determines the product into an elm-tree, and never an oak, or any thing but an elm?

If it be objected that the facts do not indicate moral unity,—that in reality there is great difference in the moral standards of different races and communities even when tolerably cultivated,

the people of one country sometimes regarding actions as right and praiseworthy which the people of another country will condemn as wrong,—the reply is ready, that differences of this kind occur in the *application* of moral principles and convictions rather than in the principles and convictions themselves. Men may agree, for instance, that there is such a thing as justice, and define it in the same way, and alike declare its authority over human conduct, and yet differ as to what particular course of conduct justice might require in a given case. And these differences in respect to the application of moral principles are precisely such as we might expect would be produced by different sets of external conditions. But amidst all these differences there is essential agreement on the principles themselves; and this is the kind of moral unity that concerns the question under discussion. Take the nations that have risen to a civilization adequate to the production of a literature, and they show a wonderful unity in the elements of moral sentiment, and a growing unity as mental enlightenment has increased and become more general. Consider the great historical religions of mankind. With all their differences of custom and belief, and wide variety of educational discipline from outward circumstances, there is among them a startling harmony of ethical statement. We may read in them all essentially the same precepts in behalf of truthfulness, kindness, justice, purity. Is it possible that these precepts, and the moral sense of obligation involved in each of them, have been wrought out solely by the principle of serving individual utility, with no determining moral germ at the outset upon which this principle has acted? Has the principle of utility, with no essential moral distinctions or purposes as a foundation to begin upon, by mere accident or caprice amidst the heterogeneous conditions of human development, determined that certain classes of actions shall be called virtuous or just or honorable; and upon this wholly factitious and arbitrary ground finally built up a complete ethical system for mankind? Moreover, whence comes the power to distinguish between a lower and higher utility, and to choose the latter, though distant and uncertain, in preference to the former, which may be sure and close at hand? And whence the obligation that

men often feel to serve others' welfare rather than their own,—to sacrifice, indeed, individual utility to universal good? By what metamorphosis can the selfish principle of serving individual utility ever be transformed into an act of genuine self-sacrifice? Can selfishness beget the love that utterly forgets and abandons self? If not, must not Love, Good-will, have been in some way involved in the developing process of the world from the beginning? Whence comes it that the Golden Rule has been independently reached, and uttered in nearly the same form, in three different quarters of the globe and among as many different nations and religions? Whence comes it but from the fact that the principle of beneficence, or the principle of the Golden Rule, is one of the original germs of mind itself,—that it is an inherent element in the very substance of that Power which becomes manifest in the developing process of the universe,—that it was first involved and hence has been evolved? The Golden Rule comes whenever and wherever man attains to any good degree of enlightenment, because the seed of it is in his nature; or, to go farther back, because the seed of it was in the germinal substance out of which man's nature has been developed: in protoplasm, or whatever else was the primal germ-world whence all finite things started on their career.

And it argues nothing against the validity of this or any moral perception, to show that it does not appear until certain conditions of development are presented. The important question is, Does it appear at all? Is it there? And the fact that under such variety of environment, amidst such differences of external conditions and experience, men do in time develop substantially the same moral perceptions, come to the same sense of the binding obligations of virtue, reach the same convictions of the moral beauty of beneficence, show the same admiration for acts of brave honesty and self-sacrifice, is the strongest possible proof that these moral convictions and intuitions—and the same may be said of intuitions with regard to intellectual truths—represent immutable distinctions and realities. They are what they are, and could not have been otherwise than they are, because they are the very substance of that eternal power which science traces back by the pathway of wondrous phenomena to the secret places of more wondrous Mystery, and which is signified by the word

Divinity; unfolding itself, revealing its own essence and nature, in the consciousness of humanity. Thus the validity of conscience and of the moral sentiments in general, so far from being endangered by the new science, is strengthened; since their authority, instead of being left to the uncertain dependence of special personal revelation, transmitted by corruptible scripture or tradition, is established ineradicably in the nature of things.

Thirdly and finally, how must this new scientific view of the universe affect our personal relations to this Infinite Power? If this view be true, what becomes of the doctrine of Providential care and love? Doubtless, if this view be substantiated, since it must greatly modify the commonly accepted conception of Deity, it must also correspondingly modify the common idea of personal relation between him and human beings. But the relation is not necessarily on this account the less real or the less spiritually productive and satisfying. The popular theological view represents Deity as enthroned in the heavens, and as thence watching over the members of the human family with sovereign majesty or paternal solicitude, and communicating with them, through the vast intervening spaces, by the mysterious supernatural agency of his spirit. But suppose, in place of this conception, anthropomorphic and crude, we conceive of our relations to Deity as wholly internal and natural; suppose that we believe literally with Paul, that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being,"—does that make our personal relations to him any the less close and vital? The divine influence certainly is as real, if, instead of conceiving it as passing by some miraculous process through the air, we believe that it comes into our being through our natural faculties and intuitions: and these faculties and intuitions themselves are none the less the work and product of divine power, though the power has been by so long a way working up to them, than if they were the immediate creation and endowment by the Almighty for each individual soul. The thought, indeed, is intellectually and morally ennobling, that man is the culmination and crown of this vast process of the ages,—that the creative energy, which has been working its way slowly and patiently from the simplest beginnings up through manifold forms of organism and life, comes to consciousness of itself in the mental and moral being of man; and

henceforth has in him a self-directive organizer of its purposes and fulfiller of its aims: a son, who carries on his manly brow the marks of his wondrous parentage.

Nor is the power any the less near or present because of the long road by which it has been travelling. Niagara loses nothing of its stupendous mightiness, though we may trace the majestic volume of its waters back to the rills in the far-off mountains where came the first bubbles from the soil, and though the precipice itself may have been in slow process of forging for ages under the Titanic forces of Nature. The power is present and in it all the same. A rose is as sweet and beautiful, though we know it to be the organized essences of elements that have been gradually drawn from surrounding air and water and earth and the distant sun, as it would be if it were a sudden apparition in our gardens from the skies.

Will the theological critics object, however, that they miss the Father's face; that here, indeed, is order, law, majesty, beauty perchance, but no personal Providence, no paternal Heart? It is much, certainly, to see a father's face. But do we rationally expect ever to be able to localize the Infinite Father's face? Must we not be content to see its smile in the features of the universe and in the face of humanity; in the faces of our own fathers and mothers; in the lives of the good and brave; in the love of the friend at our side? Surely, it is not to remove us beyond the reach of a paternal Providence, when we believe that the providence and the paternity, the wise foresight and the loving heart, are inwrought into the very law and life of the world wherein we daily share! It is the divine energy, springing in its finite manifestations, we know not whence nor how, from the primal fount of Being, which, thus working through the ages and through all the anterior forms of existence, makes the very substance of the life that is ours to-day. Far away from God? Rather are we so close to him that we cannot see him apart from ourselves! In his light we see light. By his love our hearts are warmed and thrilled with manifold forms of human love. In our consciences we feel the pulse-beats of his eternal rectitude. Coldly separate and distant? Oh, no! Rather do we stand in the very current of his living energies;



and day by day, more literally than the old Hebrew poet thought, he maketh us "drink of the river of his pleasures."

WILLIAM J. POTTER.

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TO BENEDICT SPINOZA.

O PURE as Christ, as deeply-souled !  
Whose life an alder-shaded stream,  
Hid from the broad day's garish beam,  
In hush of thought un murmuring rolled.

Thou outcast of an outcast race !  
From loyalty to truth no lure  
Thy step could turn,—its path obscure  
Content with even tread to pace.

With surer foot who could have scaled  
The vulgar heights? Conformist,—thee  
With loud acclaim and jubilee  
Rabbles and rabbins would have hailed.

With tardy recognition now  
Memorial honors thee await,  
There, where on earth thine humble fate  
Thou didst accept with placid brow.

B. W. BALL.



## PRACTICAL SOCIALISM IN GERMANY.

## I.

GERMANY, which is now considered the first power of Europe, so far as military and political forces are concerned, was, within the memory of men that have not yet reached the noonday of their life, hardly more than a geographical term, or an aggregation of states, constitutions, laws, customs, and tendencies which no mortal could hope to understand, a chaos which no common reason could hope to change into any thing like cosmos or respectable organization. It is well known that the popular revolution of 1848 attempted this task, and failed so completely that even excellent men, prominently connected with the movement, are now in the habit of smiling whenever they recount their early struggles for German unity and political progress in their native country. It is known at the same time that "blood and iron," as Prince Bismarck once called it by way of accidental allusion, accomplished in 1864, in 1866, and in 1870, at a geometric ratio, what was considered, before his advent, a mere ideal and an idealistic dream; although all Germany had dreamed it ever since Barbarossa disappeared from the sight of man, sleeping, as a beautiful legend expresses it, in the Kyffhäuser, while Germany is powerless, but ready to return when his empire shall revive and attain to its righteous destiny.

The prophecy has been realized. On the first day of 1871, all Germany, with the single exception of the German provinces under Austrian and Swiss sovereignty, to which might be added the Germans along the Russian Baltic up to St. Petersburg, and the millions of Germans scattered among foreign and distant nations, was officially and constitutionally united into the German Empire; and eighteen days later the King of Prussia

assumed, at the request of all German governments,—the latter led by the King of Bavaria,—the title, office, rank, and prerogatives of an hereditary emperor. Thus the sentiment, which always longs to behold leadership personified, which believes in European leadership, and up to that time had venerated the third Napoleon, transferred its feelings of mighty and magnificent empire to the victor of Sedan, never doubting that the peace of Europe was henceforth depending upon the interests and intentions of Berlin. It is not useless to say that such a feeling, however general it may be, is not justified either in reason or in political facts; and that Germany viewed from without is one thing, and viewed from within is another. Hence her greatest soldier, Count Moltke, significantly told the German Parliament that the new Empire, although a great fact and a greater factor in the public polity of Europe, was not much liked abroad, was still less loved, and would for years to come meet nothing but unfriendly and hostile considerations in foreign countries. This confession was made during a discussion of the military budget, and yet tells but half the truth, in so far as it refers only to the international, and not to the internal and domestic, state of Germany. It is a singular fact, yet true beyond all doubt, that Germany is not a popular country, and that other nations admire it far less, and oppose it far more, than they did France and even Italy or Spain, while these were the leaders of Europe. England, on the other hand, is perhaps not much less disliked among the people of the earth.

It would be worthy of special investigation to ascertain the causes of this fact; all the more because it has great influence upon the policy and particular progress of these Germanic empires. England might be supposed to be everywhere a messenger of peace and prosperity, chiefly through her commerce; and it might be expected that Germany would receive a fair amount of heartfelt homage and true devotion, since the rising minds of all nations are flocking to her universities to learn truth, and to her literature to learn wisdom. Yet such is not the fact; the foreign student, the studious traveller, and the travelling resident remains, in the very heart of Germany and German culture, a cool and critical observer; he thinks his francs, dollars, and guineas

there spent a full equivalent of what he carries home; he remains a stranger to German life, and the domestic polity of Germany remains to him a profound secret,—a mystery or something worse. This is to a certain extent due, perhaps, to the difficulty which almost all foreigners experience in merely learning the language of Germany. For such help as they receive from the general grammar and dictionary is utterly inadequate, and superior only to the little histories and handbooks that pretend to explain the growth and culture of contemporary Germany. With what amazement do Germans read the scores of outlandish books which undertake to explain the social state of their country; and how bewildered they are whenever they see that their own attempts at enlightening foreigners are neither appreciated nor even understood, or rather not relished, because they are not comprehensible!

Who knows the statistics of Germany? Who knows the Constitution of Germany? Who knows the social organism of Germany? What foreigner is not amazed, if he is told authoritatively that Germany is an industrial rather than an agricultural country; and what American is not surprised, when he compares the growth of German towns with that of cities in the United States? What foreigner doubts that the military establishment of Germany is her greatest calamity, and that her only salvation lies in the use of the plough and the steam-engine, in the glories of jury trial and free speech, in the government of the people by the people themselves, in the speedy separation of Church and State, in local and provincial self-government, in the limitation of the imperial prerogative, in the blessings of parliamentary power; and in a general return from the sword to the quill, and from the quill that writes metaphysical systems to the more modern steel pen that writes good newspapers and practical wisdom, or to the golden pen that writes up cash books and commercial ledgers in elephant folio? No wonder that almost every revelation of domestic Germany (as represented in the non-German press) should look like a symptom of social disorganization, and that the majority of foreigners should lack faith in the destinies of the youthful Empire, if a minority at home professes faith only in that which means deep, radical, and permanent change.

Such a revelation was the late parliamentary election. It is here proposed to discuss briefly a domestic movement which is plainly hostile to the Empire and to German society, and to recount the counter-movement of the national government. The movement of general society it is not necessary to describe in detail as long as it is firmly united with that of the government in all its departments, while the general conclusion may be safely left to the thoughtful reader.

## II.

While the Germans call it social-democracy, or democratic socialism, the movement here referred to may be described in one word as socialism, perhaps as German socialism, although it is very difficult to see much substantial or any essential difference between the socialist on the right bank of the Rhine and his progenitor and prototype who lives not very far from the left side of the German river. This movement is partly theoretical, partly practical; the latter only being of general interest and, to Germany, of some importance. For there is no doubt that the Imperial Government will have to fight what Prince Bismarck calls the red internationalists, now that the struggle with the black internationalists—the Jesuits, Papists, and Romanists—is apparently coming to an end satisfactory in the opinion of German authorities. While it was necessary in the memorable battle against Rome to distinguish carefully between legitimate theology and illegal political action on the part of the Roman bishops, between religion and civil life, between Catholic Christians and un-Christian, revolutionary acts, there is no doubt that the socialists will have to be met *in toto* and as a unit, although they are divided into a great many factions, schools, and parties, all of which fight each other about as much as they oppose the established government. There is no doubt that the general association of German workingmen (*der allgemeine deutsche Arbeiterverein*) does not wish to be mistaken for the party of social-democratic workingmen (*die sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*); and it may be readily admitted that most of the forty or fifty newspapers conducted in the interest of German socialism utter different

complaints, and propose different remedies, if they do not preach a different kind of new gospel. Nevertheless, it is safe to consider them as substantially united, both theoretically and practically; practically, because they agree in their hostility to the Empire as now organized; theoretically, because they found their destructive and constructive plans upon the same kind of political and social philosophy. This philosophy, on the other hand, is nothing else than a mild and somewhat softened reproduction of French thought; of Cabet and Babeuf, of St. Simon and Fourier, of Louis Blanc, and, above all, of P. J. Proudhon. It is not proposed to realize all that these thinkers have dreamed of, and still less to use all the methods which they have proposed; but without them, it is entirely safe to say, there would be no such socialism in Germany as there is now: and he who has mastered Proudhon and is able to meet him, has mastered and may safely face the socialism of contemporary Germany. The full evidence for so sweeping a statement as this,—an assertion that will be assailed by most of the German socialists,—must be reserved for another occasion. A just amazement, however, may be here expressed at the slender contributions of German literature to social philosophy and political economy, in so far as these sciences are not metaphysical, but historical and practical. For in this respect the German mind has not been equal in fertility to either France or England, and the few names that are truly eminent can be easily counted on the fingers. In fact, such men as Roscher, now the leading name among political economists in Germany; Stein, the principal adversary of socialism; Schulze-Delitzsch, the father of coöperative association in Germany; Lassalle, the chief agitator of the socialists; and Marx, the principal guide in the warfare of "labor against capital,"—are solitary names, significant in their loneliness, and vivid reminders of what might have been, if Germany had given to the interests of the body half as much attention as she has given to the mind and to more distant affairs.

Nevertheless, it must be said that the German socialists, if they have mentally and theoretically fallen short of their French models, have practically been much more circumspect, prudent, and temperate. And this is greatly due to a large class of cultivated university teachers, who are giving their attention to

social and economic science, so-called *Kathedersozialisten*,—many of them men who unite philosophic insight with the most vivid feeling for the poor and struggling classes. These modest men, most of them poor and struggling themselves, are usually quite trustworthy in whatever they present; they are maintaining at the same time the historic glories of all the great universities of the European continent, in being the watchmen of truth and the champions of popular rights. For in Germany, perhaps more than in any other country, liberal learning, so aristocratic in itself, has at all times been in deep sympathy with the common people.

The eventful years in the history of practical socialism in Germany are 1848, 1863, 1871, and 1877,—the revolution, Lassalle, the foundation of the Empire, and the election to the third German Parliament. In more senses than one all these periods are barely preliminary, and the first great crisis can be expected to occur only when Prince Bismarck, assisted by Count Eulenburg, shall undertake a struggle similar to that which he has just carried on with the help of Falk, the Prussian minister of churches and schools, against the Roman establishment.

The central figure of German socialism before 1848 is Wilhelm Weitling, born in 1808 at Magdeburg, by profession a tailor; who became acquainted with the new faith at Paris, and thence turned to Switzerland, in order to promulgate and expand his doctrines among the German mechanics of the republic. While his "Gospel for Poor Sinners"<sup>1</sup> was going through the press, he was arrested at Zurich, in November, 1843, and exiled in 1845. Later, he came to this country, and died in comparative obscurity. He excited great attention in Germany, particularly by his works entitled, "Guarantees of Harmony and Liberty,"<sup>2</sup> and "Humanity as it is, and as it should be."<sup>3</sup>

Precisely as Weitling received his impulses at Paris, so did the German revolution of 1848 originate in the French capital,—a city without which modern Germany would lack some

<sup>1</sup> "Das Evangelium des armen Sünders," Berne.

<sup>2</sup> "Garantien der Harmonie und Freiheit," Visey, 1842.

<sup>3</sup> "Die Menschheit, wie sie ist und wie sie sein sollte," second edition, Berne, 1845.

of its most valuable possessions. This statement will be distasteful to many German conservatives and to the vast number of "*Franzosenfresser*" that have flourished in Germany ever since the time of the first Napoleon, and culminated in the late Wolfgang Menzel. Nevertheless, it is true that Germany has received more genuine good from France than she has given, and that no German history is complete without frequent recurrence to French influences. This applies emphatically to the revolution of 1848,—a forerunner of 1866 and 1871,—although it proved to be, for the time, a complete and ruinous failure. Nevertheless, modern Germany cannot be understood without it, and it is a matter of regret that no adequate history of it has as yet been written. The "fundamental rights of the German people," as then proclaimed by the representatives of the popular delegates, are of historical interest, those referring to the social status being as follows: 1, recognition of the full, free, and sacred rights in physical and mental property, including the right to sell and divide estates, and the abolition of forced labor as connected with real property; 2, the rights of free labor, and the full utilization of all kinds of work, including the freedom of settlement throughout the country, the freedom of emigration, and the freedom of peaceful coalition; 3, absolute freedom of the common schools; 4, municipal self-government, with public discussions and regular budgets.<sup>1</sup> The progress of socialism proper was very slight and insignificant; but the agitation by means of clubs, societies, and associations, most of them specially devoted to economic discussion, made immense progress and prepared the soil for the extraordinary activity of Ferdinand Lassalle. This remarkable man devoted himself to the problems of socialism for little more than two years only; yet so eminent are his talents, so prominent his services, and so important the results of his life, that a more careful notice of him is unavoidable.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Haym, "*Die deutsche Nationalversammlung*," (3 vols., Berlin and Frankfurt, 1848-50), and Jürgens, "*Geschichte des deutschen Verfassungswerks*," (2 vols., Brunswick, 1850-56).

<sup>2</sup> On Lassalle's life see B. Becker, "*Enthüllungen über das tragische Lebensende Ferdinand Lassalles*," and an exceedingly spirited essay on the same subject by George Brandes, the latter just published.



## III.

Ferdinand Lassalle was born April 11, 1825, at Breslau, of wealthy parents (Jews), and first intended to succeed his father as a merchant. He attended a classical school in his native city; in 1840 he went to Leipsic to visit the commercial school there, but, after a year or two, decided to devote himself to law and philosophy. After due preparation under private tutors he was admitted to the university of Breslau in 1842, and two years later he joined the university of the Prussian capital, chiefly attracted by the philosophy of Hegel, which was there cultivated by a number of spirited men, most of whom had been sitting under the great master himself. Hinrichs and Hotho lectured upon art and æsthetics, Michelet discoursed ethics, Gans taught philosophical jurisprudence, and all of them followed strictly the methods of Hegel's fundamental work,—his logic. From Berlin Lassalle went to Paris, where he became very intimate with Heine, who recommended him to Varnhagen von Ense in the following terms:—

"My friend Lassalle, who will hand you this note, is a young man of the most excellent talents. With the most thorough learning, with vast and comprehensive information on all subjects, with extraordinary penetration, with an unusual wealth of language, he unites an energy of will and a readiness of action that are simply astonishing," etc. (See Heine's letter to Varnhagen, January 3, 1846.)

Lassalle was then twenty years old. A German poet, who saw him but once at a concert, says of him,—

"He looked all defiance; but on his brow there rested such energies as would justify the expectation that he might conquer a throne."

Even at this time, chiefly devoted to classical and transcendental pursuits, Lassalle dressed like a dandy, lived in sumptuous apartments, and gave little dinner parties of the most exquisite character. His leisure was devoted to a work in two volumes, "*Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunkeln von Ephesos*;" but it was printed only in 1858, because its author got deeply entangled in one of the *causes célèbres* of the day. He had met in 1845 the Countess Hatzfeldt, by birth a princess, then in litigation with her husband on account of some property. The latter was suspected of an arrangement by which



his second son was to lose the benefit of an estate to the baroness Meyendorff. Lassalle, already intimate with the princess, and deeply interested in her petition for a divorce, tried to prevent the design of the Count, and, with two gentlemen, waited upon the baroness at a hotel in Cologne to read the document in question. His friends managed to make away with a casket containing the deed and other valuables; and one of them, a young lawyer, was punished for the crime, while Oppenheim and Lassalle were fully acquitted. On the 11th of August, 1848, Lassalle defended himself before the court at Cologne in an oration, the like of which a German jury is not in the habit of hearing. Suddenly interrupting his defence, he said:—

"The family was silent; but it is written that the stones shall speak, if man be silent. Where all the rights of man are offended, where the voice of consanguinity is hushed, and a helpless being is deserted by all natural protectors, there rises of justice the first and last friend of man—man. My eye, gentlemen, has always dwelt on questions of general interest, and I might have paused before I used all my talents for the relief of an individual misfortune,—before I interrupted my career for many years to come,—although it is heartrending to a gentleman who has a heart himself, to see a fellow-being that he believes to be true and noble perish without help by mere brute force in the midst of our civilization. But I saw general principles involved in this particular affair. I knew that the princess was sacrificed by her own rank; I knew that only the overweening immorality of a peer and millionaire could risk such misdeeds, such outrages upon moral society." (See Lassalle's *Vertheidigungsrede* of August 11, 1848.)

Shortly after Lassalle had learned of the privations endured by the princess, he challenged the Count, and when the latter ridiculed "that Jewish imp," Lassalle vowed revenge. Before thirty-six courts he appeared as the lady's defender; nine years he prosecuted and persecuted the Count, until at last a compromise was forced upon him in April, 1854, by which the lady received full possession of her princely fortune, while Lassalle, having used up his income mainly in this suit, received an annual stipend that enabled him to consult only his tastes and not his necessities. He published his work on Heraclitus, and immediately afterwards commenced his second and greatest literary work, "*Das System der erworbenen Rechtz*" (2 volumes, Leipsic, 1861).

But he was frequently interrupted in these theoretical studies by more practical duties, usually those of defending himself before some court in cases of political prosecution. In 1848 he was arrested at Düsseldorf as one of the republican leaders in the revolution; the jury, however, acquitted him, although he opened his defence with the confession that he was a revolutionist on principle; yet, as a matter of practical expediency, he would condescend to step down to the level of the attorney-general, so as to be able to show him his inconsistency and the impertinence of his prosecution. And, as if to make mockery complete, he interprets his dictum, "a revolutionist on principle," by adding that a man does not make his way through Greek philosophy and Roman law, through all departments of history and political economy, to put the burning torch into the hands of the mob; that he draws the foundations of law and equity from reason, while his opponents find it nowhere but in the throat of the cannon. They have hundreds of guns and thousands of soldiers,—those are their reasons, and impressive ones such as everybody understands! The fight against these Lassalle could not undertake single-handed. Hence he turned, reluctantly it is safe to say, to the lower and un congenial strata of society for help. For

*"Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo."*

Lassalle died August 31, 1864; his connection with the socialist movement commenced April 12, 1862, when he delivered in Berlin, before a society of mechanics, an address entitled, "The special connection between the present age and the idea of the workingman's estate."<sup>1</sup> He stated that during the middle age real property was the exclusive basis of all rights; since the French revolution of 1789, capital had taken its place; the revolution of 1848 wanted to make labor the sole basis of political and social rights, because labor is the only producer of values. The laboring class is not a mere estate, but represents the whole people, and therefore is entirely free from clannish sentiments. Hence, the commonwealth must cease to be a mere

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<sup>1</sup>"*Ueber den besondern Zusammenhang der gegenwärtigen Geschicht periode mit der Idee des Arbeiterstandes.*" (Zurich, 1863).

contrivance for the protection of life and property, and become an organism which shall enable its individual members to attain to a degree of culture, power, and freedom which they could never reach if left to themselves. This little pamphlet brought another suit upon him, but enabled him at the same time to expand his doctrines before the court and in print; it caused universal attention among the laboring classes, and became the first gospel of orthodox socialism in Germany. On May 24, 1863, the "General Association of German Workingmen"<sup>1</sup> was founded; Lassalle was chosen its president for five years, and henceforth socialism was one of the active factors in the domestic polity of Germany. Up to that time Schulze-Delitzsch, a man of extraordinary merits, had been the hero of the workingman, and of general value chiefly by the foundation of many hundreds of coöperative shops, in which the poor could learn the important and useful lesson of legitimate self-help. Induced by other congresses of all kinds, such as had been the fashion in Germany since 1848, it was proposed in the autumn of 1862 to have a general "congress of workmen." While the preparations for this were going on, chiefly at Leipsic, where a central committee was in session, and while Schulze-Delitzsch counselled moderation and caution, Lassalle delivered the oration already mentioned; the court brought his name to the attention of the Leipsic committee, and Lassalle was at once requested to express his views upon their purpose, and to assist them in any way that he might deem best. He published an answer in 1863, and commenced at once a remarkable series of agitations in Leipsic, Frankfort-on-the-Main, and other places; he produced an immediate rupture among the followers of Schulze-Delitzsch, published a number of his speeches and essays, and was on the point of consolidating a vast army of socialists, when his life came to a sudden end. In the summer of 1864, while at Rigi-Kaltbad, he met a young lady, Helene von Dönniges, the daughter of a Bavarian diplomatist whom he had known in Berlin. The young lady was engaged to be married to Baron Rakowitz, but soon consented to prefer Lassalle. Her parents objected; Lassalle was dismissed, and in

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<sup>1</sup> "*Der allgemeine deutsche Arbeiterverein.*"

consequence challenged the baron, who wounded him at the first shot. The great agitator died three days later; the princess Hatzfeldt took his body to Germany, and he was buried by the side of his father in the Jewish cemetery of Breslau. But his work lasted and has increased to the present day.

#### IV.

Like all socialists, Lassalle is great and generally correct in his merciless critique of actual society and the economic theorems popularly accepted as infallibly true. And if he does not say any thing new, or superior to what Proudhon, Blanc, Marx, and Owen, have said before him, it is yet worth while to read his terse descriptions, and to learn from him how miserable is the life of a great many human beings to whom we are indebted for many of our comforts. His graphic accounts of society, however, are as one-sided as his economic theories. The latter he states thus :—

“The iron law of economy which, under the present system of demand and supply, determines the amount of wages, is this: all wages, on the average, are limited by the amount required for mere existence and for propagation. The amount required for existence is different in different localities. If labor gets a little more, the people are prosperous; they are poor, if it gets a little less. The fact that labor is paid to-day better than it was a hundred years ago does not prove that it is now paid sufficiently. In fact, it is underpaid as a result of the despotism exercised by capital. Hence the laborer himself must own or control capital, if he wants to rise from his slough of despair, or if he wants to get the full benefit of his work. The best way to make him a capitalist and independent is not to be found in the trades-union or in the coöperative store, but in productive associations, whose credit and capital is to be guaranteed by government. In order to control government, nothing is required but manhood suffrage, by means of which the laboring class will forthwith obtain the majority in the legislature.”

That these doctrines, particularly as presented by Lassalle, an unusually forcible and elegant speaker, should prove attractive to those whom he intended to benefit, is not very wonderful. Did he not tell the workingmen in his very first address (April 12, 1862): “You are the granite rock on which must be reared the church of the present day”? Nevertheless, he was not satisfied with his practical success. In 1864 he wrote to his plenipotentiary :—

"I am tired to death; I am overworked, overburdened in the most terrible degree. The deep and painful disappointment, the gnawing, hidden chagrin, which the carelessness and apathy of the working class, taken as a whole, causes me, is too much even for me. Nevertheless, I shall not drop the standard as long as there is a gleam of hope left on the political horizon. Our association now counts three thousand members; that tells every thing. Who would have thought of such faintness and coldness? All this will not change until certain political events shall happen that will stir up the masses. And they may happen before long. Till then we must keep up as well as may be."

These events did happen, and but a few months after Lassalle had written the preceding lines. He was one of the very few men in Germany who understood the full bearing of the Danish war; who knew that the success of Prussia in Sleswick was unquestionable; that Austria then would be forced out of the German Confederation; that Prussia in consequence would be the leader of Germany, and that Germany itself would soon be firmly united. That the progress of these events would bring the much-coveted right of general suffrage was a matter of course, and Lassalle firmly believed that that was equal to a general control of government by the working-man. His friends and followers agreed with him, and mathematical computation came to their full support. But the trouble is that a vote is not merely a mathematical abstraction, and that voters have other qualities than those appreciated in arithmetic. Hence all socialists were grievously disappointed when the constitution of the North-German Confederation, proclaimed April 17, 1867, without any hesitation established universal suffrage, and yet found itself justified in the expectation that even in this way a loyal and law-abiding majority could be obtained for the parliament. This grief came to a public demonstration when the general committee of the "*sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*," then at Brunswick, issued a manifesto on September 5, 1870, immediately after the battle of Sedan, by which a continuation of the war was to be prevented. This manifesto, which proposed a general rise of the working classes, was a direct answer to the republican declaration made the day before in Paris. The signers of the manifesto were promptly interned at Lötzen, and serious inconvenience was prevented, although it is well known that most socialists in Germany agree with the French ultras

much better than with their own government and with the majority of their countrymen. Their hostility against Moltke, Bismarck, and the Emperor,—against the Empire itself,—is as evident as it is nefarious and treacherous.

The election for the third parliament,—each parliament lasting for three years,—took place January 10, 1877. The opposition during the first and second parliaments came in the main from the Catholic party, technically known as the “centre,” and caused the enactment of a number of laws by which the national legislature can very well afford to be judged. The socialists had a few representatives from the beginning, and have now elected thirteen or fourteen, fifteen members being required for the proposal of a new bill. The parliament itself consists of about four hundred members. That a handful of socialists cannot do much among such a number is quite evident; the evidence becomes absolute if the quality of the members is taken into consideration, or if the debates are read in which the socialists take part. Their party, however, cannot be left entirely unconsidered, even if the German parliament and its constituency should do what it is entirely unwilling to do,—let things go as they please.

For the late election the Empire was divided into three hundred and ninety-seven electoral districts, in which there were 8,523,446 registered voters. Of these, however, only about sixty per cent. went to the polls, the opposition appearing in unusual strength, while the socialists appeared in full force. The opposition polled the following votes:—

The Centre (Catholics,)	1,368,820
The Party of Progress,	447,599
The Socialists,	351,952
The Poles,	198,412
The Particularists,	137,757
The opposition in full,	2,504,540

This, however, is not an opposition in the English or American sense; *i. e.*, a conservative opposition which means to support the constitution, and is merely opposed to the actual administration. It is ultimately a revolutionary party, which detests the existing laws and institutions and would willingly

substitute any other government. The Catholics sympathize with Rome, the Progressists with democracy, the Socialists with the revolution, the Poles and Particularists with the irrevocable past. The leader of the centre is Windthorst; of the Progressists, Virchow, besides Duncker and Schulze-Delitzsch. Among the Socialists are Hasenclever, who sits for Berlin, although he is a resident of Leipsic, where he publishes a socialist newspaper; Fritsche, a cigar-maker, sits also for Berlin; but their real leader, as far as they admit of leadership, is Ferdinand August Bebel. He was born at Cologne in 1840, is a turner by trade, resides at Leipsic, the principal seat of German socialism, and has been a member of every German parliament. He grows more radical as he grows older, a fact not common among German socialists, and was at one time quite intimate with Karl Marx, the president of the Internationalists. He has been frequently imprisoned, once on account of high treason, together with his friend Liebknecht; but he always gets reelected, this time by the capital of Saxony, although the popular party opposed him most bitterly. While the Catholics usually control Bavaria, the Socialists are particularly strong in the great cities, including Berlin, which thus far was considered the exclusive property of the Progressists. Out of one hundred votes cast in Dresden—

The Conservatives had	23
The Liberals,	24
The Progressists,	14
The Socialists,	39

Hamburg barely escaped electing any but Socialists. The latter, therefore, are in great glee, and their nearest friends and allies, the Progressists, are correspondingly depressed, as they have generally lost what the admirers of Lassalle have gained. There is now a movement on foot to consolidate the whole opposition, and the world may hear, before long, of a union between the Catholics and the Socialists. They have already voted together in two or three districts, and, should they form an alliance, the Particularists would at once join them, the Progressists could not stay away from them, and the rest of the anti-Bismarck men, as they call themselves sometimes, would



naturally gravitate into the great party. While this would be the greatest calamity to the Empire, it is reasonable to suppose, either that the union will not be formed, or that it will become a less revolutionary opposition, or that it will be crushed by a loyal majority. The latter can be expected with great confidence. The supporters of the Empire polled the following vote on the tenth of January last :—

The National Liberals,	1,742,501
The Imperialists,	375,523
The Conservatives,	<u>359,950</u>
The Government in full,	2,477,974

These figures seem to give a majority to the opposition; the majority of the members, however, is loyal in its support not only of the Empire, but also of the actual administration, the most important members of which, in this connection, are Prince Bismarck, Falk, and Count Eulenburg. It must be remembered also that nearly forty voters out of every hundred,—in all over three million and five hundred thousand,—have stayed away from the polls, and that most of these are liberals or conservatives, both of them supporting the government. Even in the great cities a change for the better may be expected, as soon as the voters will do their duty. In Berlin there voted only eighty thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine out of one hundred and fifty-three thousand three hundred and ninety-nine registered, or less than forty-seven per cent. Many members of the opposition will also be driven into more loyal affiliations, if the organization of the Empire or of German society should be endangered. The Emperor, therefore, used the following language in his address from the throne, when he opened the third parliament on February 22 :—

"You will agree with me in not sharing the apprehension that a revival of trade might be prevented by a lack of confidence in the future security of our lawful institutions. The organization of the Empire and the sound sense of the German people form a strong protection against the dangers that might issue from the attempts of anarchy against the security and systematic development of our lawful institutions."

V.

If the socialism of contemporary Germany may be defined theoretically as communism and solidarity in production, while all consumption is to take place mainly in families, and practically as an attempt to promote the good of the laboring classes at the expense of the *bourgeoisie* and at the risk of social and political organization as now existing, the Empire defines its own object as "the protection of the whole Empire, of all its domestic laws, and the promotion of civil welfare among the German people" (see the introduction of the German Constitution). Hence the central government differs from that of the United States by having all the power and sovereignty which is not specially given to the individual States or to the people at large; while in this country the people of the coördinate and semi-sovereign States are supposed to retain whatever they have not specially delegated and transferred to the federal authorities. Or, in other words, the organs of the political estate in this country are: first the people, secondly the national government and the coördinate States; while in Germany the imperial government is the principal seat of power, law, and order, and the people at large are of subordinate importance, in philosophic theory. The question—which theory be the better—of course admits of no solution. But it is very plain that in Germany the law and its administration is of vastly greater importance than in the United States, because vastly more is depending upon it and much more material included in its domain. In America, moreover, the lawmaker merely expresses the average sentiment of the people, while in Germany the whole organism of civil society is, more or less, the result and effect of statute law. Hence it is possible in America, though by no means probable, that socialism and communism will come to be a great power without coming to any conflict with the laws of the land; while in Germany there must be a struggle between the two as soon as socialism becomes enough of a reality to indicate that it has not been provided for by the legislature. Consequently the lawmakers can but choose one of two things: either to make *a priori* laws, and to compel the people into obedience until they turn rebellious and revolutionary; or to make *a posteriori* laws

that shall fit the people as they actually are. A very limited acquaintance with the acts of the German parliaments sufficiently shows that they have elected the latter method, and that they have been so successful as to make a revolution on the part of socialists a practical impossibility. In fact, after the victory of German laws over Roman impertinencies, a possible conflict between the German Empire and the followers of Lassalle would be absolutely ruinous to the latter. Whatever they need is usually given them before they ask for it, and the imaginary blows which they strike at the Empire usually turn out to be a strike in the air, misspent force, or a blow at themselves. Lassalle asked for universal suffrage; it was introduced a few years later, long before the great mass of laborers knew what it meant. He asked for free labor; labor was soon so free that almost all the small shops disappeared, because they could not compete with the larger ones. He demanded that the State should specially help the workingman; the State has provided for him so well that he has hardly any thing to do but to sell his labor as dearly as possible. The only thing left undone by the State, and yet demanded by Lassalle, is the supply of capital to the workingman; and that will have to be done by parliament, not, however, out of the coffers of government, for they are either empty or already engaged, but out of the pockets of the *bourgeois* into those of the laborer. The question, then, might ultimately become one of votes; and in that case a very slender acquaintance with the distribution of property in Germany will show that the greater part of the aggregate wealth in Germany is held, not by a minority, but by a majority of the voters under the present system of universal suffrage. Hence even a general revolution of the socialists would be disastrous to nobody but themselves, and nothing is really left them but to make the most of society as now constituted. It is not difficult to show this both from the laws and the tax-books of Germany.

It is a singular fact how generally the poor overrate the wealth of those whom they think rich, and how frequently this mistake is made by Germans particularly by German socialists. The largest tax-payer in Prussia is Krupp of Essen, and he paid last year only eighty-four thousand six hundred marks, or, roughly speaking, twenty thousand dollars; next to him comes a tax-

payer in the government of Oppeln with seventy thousand two hundred marks; the third lives in the government of Wiesbaden and pays sixty-eight thousand eight hundred marks. The greatest tax-payer in Berlin pays forty-five thousand marks. But all these, down to the men who pay a thousand per annum, are solitary and exceptional instances, while the real budget is made up of contributions less than a hundred dollars each, and 6,369,856 out of 24,832,784 persons paid nothing at all: 2,177,806 of these were unmarried people, while the others lived in families. Besides this, all branches of the government and administration are conducted with such rigorous economy, are so full of culture, talent, and honesty, as to preclude any competition between private business and public service; and for years to come the people at large will receive more than they give,—will be benefited by the government much more than they could benefit themselves, as Lassalle expresses it. Hence there is very much less difference between Bismarck, the statesman, Lassalle, the agitator, and Hegel, the thinker, than the partisan of any or all of them is ready to allow. It is interesting to notice this in those laws that are of special interest to the socialist.

The third article of the German Constitution defines and confers citizenship in so liberal a way as to make the same laws of America look rather ungenerous: every German citizen has in every German State the same privileges as a native, which is not equally true in the United States. The act of November 1, 1867, permits the people to live and settle anywhere within the boundaries of the Empire, to acquire and hold real property, and to engage in any trade whatever. It is well-known that in this country a man always loses certain political privileges for a time, if he merely moves from one ward of a city to another. The act of May 13, 1870, prevents double taxation by regulating the law of domicile in such a way as to domicile any servant of the State where he happens to reside officially, and people without a home at the place where they happen to be present. It is interesting to compare this with the frequent journeys of gentlemen officially in Washington, in cases of national elections. The act of June 1, 1870, compels every State to confer full citizenship, including the right of active and passive election, under conditions the most

liberal, and the same act makes State-citizenship identical with citizenship of the Empire. Hence the mechanics of Germany, and all other classes liable to move from one place to another, retain more political power than they do in the United States. The act of June 7, 1871, makes the owners of railways, factories, and mines responsible for a great many injuries to their employees and customers for which they are not responsible in the United States. The act of November 14, 1867, protects all mortgages to a liberal extent against foreclosure,—an act of incalculable benefit to the large class among the poor who wish to acquire real property. The act of June 21, 1869, protects all wages against attachment, unless actually earned and not called for at the regular day of payment. The act of May 4, 1868, permits any kind of marriage, except between very near relatives. The act of June 21, 1869, in fine, regulates all mechanical trades and professions, always with particular kindness to the poor, the ignorant, and the struggling. This important law, while under discussion, revealed in a striking manner the sentiments of the government, the liberal party, the progressists, and the socialists. The party of progress demanded absolute liberty after the heart of Adam Smith and Ricardo, but was easily shown that a policy of *laissez faire* would surrender all the weak to the pleasure of the strong, and therefore was incompatible with the policy of the Empire, which intended to help all classes alike. The socialists announced a formal war of labor against capital, but were promptly told that their distinction between labor and capital was simply ignorance and self-deception. They complained that modern machinery had enslaved the laborer, but were easily shown that machinery makes labor literally free by performing an enormous amount of work which previously had to be done by force of muscle. They wanted to have a normal working day, but were informed that day-labor had been supplanted by piece-labor, and that their request, consequently, was a return to the irrevocable past. One speaker explained to the socialists the legitimate consequences of their crude theories and the inevitable results of their practical demands. The accumulation of capital and rent was shown to be a moral act, and this moral agency was proved to underlie all trades as much as land is the basis

of farming. Hence war against either labor or capital is a war against moral civilization. Therefore, should a war come such as the socialists wish, the rich will become poor, if their enemies be victorious, and the poor will not become rich, if they are the victors themselves.

The narrow limits of the present article forbid a detailed account of the later acts. It will do itself justice, if it merely points out the various factors which combine, on one side, to make the socialism of Germany a hopeful and important enterprise, and, on the other side, to make its partisan movements all vain and futile.

C. W. ERNST.

## THEODORE PARKER AS RELIGIOUS REFORMER.

THE sun of Theodore Parker's life was his assured and triumphant belief in God. There is one light of the sun and another of the moon, and his was solar belief, no weak lunar ray. "What a happy man he must have been!" said lately a thoughtful woman, to whom one of his sermons upon his dearest theme had been read. Temperament had doubtless its part in the unconquerable cheerfulness of his belief; but, with all due allowance for its effect, just appreciation must still say that a faith in God more spontaneous, spacious, entire, and controlling than his, or healthier, manlier, freer from emotional flatulence or fatty bloat of pietism, has scarcely been seen in our century. And his, if any man's, was belief in the sense which implies, not intellectual opinion or assent only, but loyal devotedness, unconditioned duty, and that obedience whose joy and honor it is to obey.

Believing with his whole soul, he also believed entirely in a whole God. The countenance that seemed to shine down from heights above all height upon his heart was not divided,—a brightness to dazzle on the one side, and a blackness to appall on the other,—but was an entire and unblemished luminance of justice glorified in benignity. Kant and his own heart had taught him to derive the idea of God from the ethical consciousness in man, that is, from the human sense of righteousness; and, so deriving, we do not find the being of the deity first, and his moral perfection afterward, but it is the sense of a sovereign righteousness which implicates and evidences divine being. He did not follow Kant strictly, nor, though endowed with rare power to grasp and render generally apprehensible the chief ethical results of philosophy, was he a strict philosophical thinker



in the sense of the schools ; but he was so far a Kantian as with philosophic certitude to say : We are authorized and engaged by our own moral being to affirm a perfect moral government of the universe.

There he was immovable ; nothing could shake him. If tradition came with a black-spotted picture of the divine, and cried, "Bow down !" he answered, "I worship upward, not downward." If facts of our natural experience seemed scarce consonant with his belief, he admitted, though reluctantly and sparingly, the apparent discrepancy, but did so only to house himself more wholly in the high native faith of his spirit. The outward facts of life do not agree with the idea of a perfect God ? "Then," said the stout man, "I must go forth and do my part, by hard work in the world, to *make* them agree." And that, if not philosophy, was a mode of the want of it, of which, perhaps, more could be endured !

Believing in an All-powerful who is perfect justice, he held, with Plato and with Jesus, that only perfect goodness is perfect justice. He meant no flabby goody-goodness, but a sovereign rule that only and ever for benign ends orders disciplines and uses chastisements. Consistently with that faith, he could not think of God as an eternal destroyer. He was unable to conceive of the universe as divinely well and whole, and at the same time sick with an eternal running sore, to be eternally cauterized with fire, but run still. Wisely the world is so designed that moral evil is possible ; but the design, to be wise, must include the overcoming of it, and the evocation of moral power thereby. "I came," said one, "to seek and save that which is lost." In that utterance Parker heard a veritable voice from heaven. So, he said, the Eternal Providence seeks and saves ; and the universe has no pit so dark that its eye cannot see, or so deep that its care cannot reach, to the bottom.

If, now, with such a faith, he had thought that God works by supernatural irruption into his universe, he might have taken occasion to fold the hands in idle rest and wait, or to fold the hands and pray God to use diligence. Such was not his thought. He believed that the design of Heaven lies in the ethical spirit of man, thence working out to its realization. Hence the great plan of Divine Providence was to him, in the measure of

his powers, committed; and all his loyalty of religion, all his conscience of duty, all his heart's longing for a supremacy of righteousness and justice on earth, and all his deep, sacred love of his kind, joined in one, and moved him as one in his labor. By so much, therefore, as he was sure God intended the overcoming of evil, by so much he was bound in duty, and by religion inspired, to help God do it. Look at his faith from the supernaturalistic point of view, and you may imagine it a soft optimism, lulled in lazy security. Apprehend it in its proper interior connection, and you will see there, on the contrary, the plan of a righteous Providence, self-kindled to a flame of consecrate and achieving duty in a human soul.

This it was that drove him to and through his great work. The eloquent Monday lecturer<sup>1</sup> says he was a statue, partly of bronze and partly of clay: the enduring bronze his anti-slavery labor; the crumbling clay his religion. To me the matter presents itself in a different aspect. His religion bound him to wrestle down unrighteousness, instead of folding the hands in a prayer-meeting; his anti-slavery labor *was* the wrestling-down, religiously as heroically done. How clay should beget bronze I have yet to learn. It will not do; the man was of one piece, no patchwork. He did better than many others, because, with heart and will as well as intellect, he believed better. Just his religion it was that, like the engine of a steamship in a storm, drove him ploughing a way over or through the rage-crested waves of national iniquity.

Because himself so moved, he was led to estimate highly the power and worth of religious motive. By true religion, he meant living righteousness in man, that feels itself working under, and sustained by, the design of an Infinite Righteousness. Morals alone are the bird running upon its feet; ethical religion is the same bird soaring on the wing; religion without ethics is a paper kite. There is much kiting religion in the world, and it may fly high; but the string of self-interest binds it always to the earth, while the thing itself, be as solemn about it as men may, is but a toy. But by religion Parker meant rectitude winged with worship. And could this religion have its own free and

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<sup>1</sup> Rev. Joseph Cook.

glorious course, what might it, what must it, not do for the world! What horrors of war and foulnesses of peace would it not banish; to what heights of character and equities of action must it not lead the way!

But he looked around, and saw with pain that religion was, to a sad extent, a wasted power. Much of it there was, but what was it doing? Hercules clad in a gown and twirling a distaff! It would not even try to purge the foulness from politics, and to breathe a moral soul under the ribs of trade; but had retired to the meeting-house, there to "save souls." What it was doing to make the souls worth saving might be inquired. Or was it at all the human soul, the ethical spirit of man, which it would save? Was it not rather aiming to provide safety after death for resurrected bodies? At any rate, it was doing less than enough. With all its ostensible labor to soften hard hearts, there were in those days but too many tokens that hearts were becoming hard, and only heads getting softened! Let us not needlessly drag past shames to light; but this must be said: there was a time when "soul-saving" religion in America was expressly and conspicuously put to the test; and dull indeed were the ears that then heard no incontrovertible voice saying of it, "weighed in the balances and found wanting."

Why, Theodore Parker asked, is religion thus weakened or falsified in effect? He found two deep-lying causes. First, its living spirit was clogged with a dead body, a traditional *corpus*: or corpse of creed, of which one must say, as Martha at the grave, "By this time it stinketh." Secondly, it was put in theory upon a narrow and dubious basis of supernaturalism, becoming of necessity more dubious every day, rather than upon the universal spiritual basis proper to it. By effect of the former cause, it was morally deteriorated; by effect of the latter, was wasting its force in an unnatural war with human reason and knowledge, instead of adding all the strength of reason to its own, to employ both in fruitful labor.

Such was his diagnosis of the case. It required of him two chief labors, which he dutifully undertook; one of critical elimination and rejection, and the other of fresh construction. At these we will glance in due order.

A ship sails upon a long voyage, touching and taking in cargo at various ports. Midway in the voyage, and yet far from home, it is already overladen, and in danger to be swamped, while a stormy season is coming on. Meantime, the cargo, while comprising inestimable treasures, consists also, and in too considerable part, either of stuff that never was valuable,—oyster shells as well as pearls,—or of perishable stuff, worth something when taken in, but decayed, and become not only worthless, but pestilent. What should be done? Prudent counsel would say: Open the hatches without delay, and set the crew at work to separate the trash from the treasure, and get it safely overboard. Parker found himself upon such a ship, and the name of it was Christianity. A goodly ship, and freighted with treasure richer than gems and gold, but dangerously encumbered also, and at the opening of a stormy season for religion, with worthless weight. He perceived the situation; others did not. Discernment has its duties; he lifted up his voice and cried, "Lighten the ship! Save the precious treasure it bears, and make room for more, by casting away what is of no value!"

The title of his first notable sermon, "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity," indicates his spirit and aim in all his labor of criticism. He enlarged his purpose indeed, and sought to distinguish between transient and permanent in historical religion generally; but his object ever was to rescue the vital, immortal essence of religion from its imprisonment in defunct forms of thought, or its oppression by accidental accretions.

Was it not, now, antecedently probable that such a work would be required? For religion, like every vital and perennial principle in history, has always its immortal soul and its mortal body. The one is ever the same, but expands and ascends from lesser to greater, and from lower to higher historical expressions and embodiments; the other lives its day, then becomes a dead body, in which the spirit, though it cannot die, languishes imprisoned and oppressed. But the dogmatic body of Christian religion is already fifteen centuries old, and was shapen in a time which could give little promise of ability to think adequately for ours. Nor is the lapse of centuries

a sufficient measure of the mental distance. For a line has been crossed, another epoch in the history of the human mind has come; and with it, not only new knowledge, but other morals of mental action have arrived. The precept of the old epoch was, "Hear and believe;" the precept of the new is, "Look and learn." Before this eye that looks and learns, not only have the old heavens rolled themselves together as a scroll and disappeared, leaving to view the infinite spaces, sun-peopled, with their mystery only of open depth; not only has the flat patch of earth become a globe resting in everlasting motion and poised in pure law; and not only has the earth's surface, before unmeaning, become all one great letter-press, wherein its own ancient and wondrous history is told,—but in the sphere of human history discoveries have been made, of themselves sufficient to effect a mental revolution. The traditional outsides of history have been pierced, seen through, and found to be only outsides. At first it was with Voltairean mockery, as if tradition were no more than a hollow shell; but the sciolistic eye is soon replaced by a deeper insight: the shallow jest dies away, the grin disappears. For beneath the old outsides is found somewhat still older, and yet new as this day's morning; namely, the undying powers and principles of the human spirit, identical in endless change, and unfolding by processes that, while differing much with place, time, and temper of a people, have yet their order and law. And this fact is put now out of question: only vital, productive principles are immortal; their historical forms never. All grows old in history, except that which makes it. Symbol, ceremonial, institution, creed, are the shell which the human spirit builds, and from which it must soon or late migrate, to build anew. The ethical ideal that one age wholesomely worships becomes the idol that some other age, to worship wholesomely, must cast down. And, through all, principles are continuous, and the unity of history not broken.

It was, therefore, with the laws of history at his back, and wholly in the interest of religion itself, that Theodore Parker, following upon Channing and others, turned a clear, intrepid eye upon that body of religious belief which the tradition of centuries has brought to us. He saw there an ideal of the divine,

once the best that men could arrive at, now not best nor good, but still forced upon shrinking conscience by means of a book reputed infallible. This, once the temple of the religious spirit, has become the prison from which it must be delivered. And he addressed himself in brave earnest to that labor of liberation.

A Calvinistic mother had read of a morning to her little daughter that chapter of the New Testament, in which mention is made of a sin that shall never be forgiven. After the reading, the child sat silent a minute; then said, "Mamma, won't God forgive them ever, ever?" "No, my child." "But why not, mamma?" The embarrassed mother answered as best she could, that is, with the common-places about God's constraining justice. The little girl seemed to accept the explanation, and was again silent; but presently cried out, "Well, mamma, God isn't a Christian, then, is he?"

Theodore Parker was a childlike man, who said: The God the Father of the Christian trinity is any thing but a Christian. It was a human conception, religiously conceived, suited to the ages that begot it, and such as they, with many ages following, could look up to with reverence and adoration unfeigned; but to us it is as little a representation of perfect goodness or justice as the three-headed god of Hindoo sculpture is an Apollo. And because it no longer represents that which the human soul, with open eye and sincere vision, can recognize as goodness or justice, he could only see in the worship of it,—I hesitate to say it, for it is a sad thing, but the plain words must come,—he could only see a worship of unrighteousness. That it was such without intention and without consciousness of the fact, he more than willingly acknowledged; but such to him it was, even such,—among the saddest of all sights that this world of ours ever offers to the afflicted eye: religion beguiled, deluded, and worshipping downward!

But how is this possible, an unintended and unconscious worship of unrighteousness? The possibility is too easily explained. In a society of ministers in this State, one spoke thus: "The principal of our high school," said he, "who has lately lost a daughter, and is thinking seriously about religion, came to me the other day with this question: 'How can it be right for God, of free will, to create an immortal soul, knowing before-

hand that he will have to damn it in hell eternally?" Of course," continued the minister, "I maintained it was right, but really I do not see my way, and would like more light if you can give it me." There was a space of silence; then a brother took heart to say: "I wonder if God is obliged to do what seems right to us?" Other response there was none. Begin, now, imputing to God character that cannot seem just, and action that cannot seem right to us; then call it just and right because it has been so imputed,—and the way lies broad open for an unconscious worship of unrighteousness. Parker said that the worshippers of Moloch doubtless praised their god as just and good. Why not? They had but to say, "Moloch is not obliged to do what seems right to us," and room was made to any required extent for that spurious ascription.

With the traditional object of worship Parker did not deal by a process of ratiocination; his appeal was made to conscience chiefly. He stated the conception in plain, graphic terms; then said, "Look; look and see what it really is; look and say if honest conscience will suffer you to accept *that* as the portrait of Infinite Righteousness."

We will not only look at it, but also into it, if that be possible.

It is a curious question: Where did the God the Father of the Christian trinity come from? The intense contrast of the conception to the Father whom Jesus loved is obvious at a glance. I am apt to think that the conception arose by a composition between the Hebrew Jehovah and the Greek Fate. Fate—to attend to one only of its two chief characters—was the ideal of legal or penal justice, executing judgment by its ministers, the Erinnyes or Furies. In the first person of the trinity, legal justice was imagined as set on the throne of heaven, and there made one with the infinite holiness ascribed to Jehovah.

Legal justice cannot forgive. Moreover, it demands perfection, no less, within its province. Perfection: the citizen must keep the whole law, to the uttermost syllable and letter. It is true that legal justice, as known here on earth, does not require moral perfection; for it does not enter at all into the interior of life, but is limited to its extreme outside, and, as penal justice, prohibits and punishes those actions only which no man, however imperfect, need be guilty of, and which, if permitted,



would break the bones of civilization. But so far as this mode of justice goes, it necessarily demands a perfect obedience, a perfect conduct. Therefore it has but a limited application. Should it quit its proper outside place, and strike inward into the realm of spontaneous personal morals, where there is a finer law of obligation and a very different economy, it would become itself the transgressor. Hence the Latin adage, *Summum jus summa injuria*,—"the highest justice is the greatest wrong." The English, however, cannot have the precision of the original: for our word "justice" has a moral as well as a legal signification, while the Latin *jus*, like the German *Recht*, signified legal right only. The extreme or excess of this, its intrusion into the sphere of the finer equities, is the utmost injury and wrong.

Now, in the first person of the trinity legal justice was made infinite, and one and the same with infinite holiness. What law, now, has this justice to execute? Why, the law of absolute holiness, ideal perfection. Its code does not correspond to the imperfect moral ability of man, but to the infinite holiness of God. This standard it must apply to mortals; must find them criminals, felons, in so far as they do not perfectly obey it; and must assume the black cap to denounce sentence of infinite condemnation against all human beings accordingly.

For before such a justice, executing such a law, what flesh shall stand? Its code necessarily exceeds all measure of human possibility. So tried, we are felons, one and all, and can be no less. Best and worst are alike criminals, and under infinite condemnation. Vain is all human endeavor; vainly the good look up to the ideal of perfect right, and, not for reward, but as drawn in love to that high goal, seek it with step stoutly climbing; all in vain the noble do and dare, forgetting self: they are not perfect, and "he that offendeth in one point is guilty of all." Nor would any mere human virtue, though indeed perfect, at all suffice. Human righteousness is but "filthy rags." A transcendental holiness is required, far above all measure of mere human well-doing. The want of this is called "sin;" and accordingly one shall confess himself the "vilest of sinners," without intending at all to intimate that he is, in the human sense, a bad

man,—feeling, very likely, that he rather shows how good a man he is than confesses himself a bad one.<sup>1</sup>

If, now, there is to be any condescension to man's imperfection, any kindness toward it, the name of it must be mercy, not justice. But how is mercy to come in? Infinite legal justice excludes it. What a situation for the human race! Here it is, hemmed in, destruction impending over it, and no way, no power, to fly. "Escape!" it cries; but escape there is none. Mercy would come to it, but legal justice bars the way. But, in this desperate strait, suddenly a "door of escape" is opened. There is to be, there is, a strange thing, quite unknown to any human code; namely, an expiation by proxy: the infinite legal justice is compounded with in that else unheard-of way, and "mercy" may come in. Such was the ethical conception that for a series of centuries was to prevail in history. That it has had its function there is not to be doubted. For a time, for ages, it was a prodigious sharpener of hard consciences. But, if a dull axe be held upon the keen grindstone day out and day in, the steel will at length be quite cut away, and only the soft iron left. Have there been no indications among us of soft conscience, conscience that could well divide between Saturday and Sunday, but whose edge was quickly turned when applied to a hard material, as some great wrong, with which many pecuniary interests were bound up, and for which avarice pleaded? The grindstone has its use, but there is a limit to its uses.

And now let us look at an aspect of human life to which a very different mode of justice is suited. Here is an apprentice. He enters the workshop to learn a trade. Quite ignorant he enters; compared with a perfect workman, he might be called totally depraved. Of course, he will blunder and bungle. Charity itself could not make up a mouth to call him a good workman. Nevertheless, he may be a good apprentice; that is, a good sort of imperfect creature. And, if he is attentive, diligent, and docile, the master will say of him, "He is a good lad, he does well." And, in saying so, the master will be simply

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<sup>1</sup> I happened of late to hear this scrap of conversation in the cars. "His talk," says one, "was nothing but confession of sin; you would have thought him the worst man in the world." "Ah!" said the other admiringly, "he is a fine man, he is a *very* fine man."

just: the approval is not mercy, it is justice only. Here, then,—and let the fact be well noted,—is a sort of justice that not only can, but, to be indeed justice, must *approve and applaud imperfection*. And the opposite of this would, in that place, be not only injustice, but injustice of a cruel and brutal kind.

For example, suppose that master to set up a standard of workmanship taken from his own practiced skill, to apply that standard to the boy, and to undertake the execution of all its demands upon him in the spirit of strict legal justice. Now he will say to the poor lad: "The law of this shop is that every one is to be a perfect workman. You cannot at once be such, it is true; but that is the law, and justice constrains me to execute it upon you. If, therefore, you are a perfect mechanic, you will stand acquitted; if you are less, I shall see that you hate me, since you do not obey my law, and as my enemy, and the enemy of all good workmanship as well, I shall treat you." Beautiful justice were that!

Theodore Parker would say that men are God's apprentices. It is a moral apprenticeship, too; they are learning to will rightly no less than to do well what has been rightly willed. This figure indicates his thought, not perfectly, but sufficiently for the immediate purpose. Apprentices: does not the term signify the reality of human life in one great aspect of it? To this reality a mode of divine justice corresponds. The name of it is not mercy, but justice. And it is a sort of divine justice, which, to be just, not only acquits, but positively approves moral imperfection striving to do well.

Meantime, Parker did not, in Mr. Cook's phrase, "set the universe upon rockers;" he merely did not fix it upon a grindstone. Legal justice has its proper outside place in a divine system. It is executed in the outward order of the world by the natural law of consequence. For example, a drunkard has reformed, and is confirmed in sobriety. Every good man accepts him for what he actually is, a man of sober habits. That is forgiveness, to accept one for what he has really become. At the same time, humane justice demands it, and I trust that divine justice is not unequal to the act. But the man's former habits have injured his constitution, and the burden of that injury he

will have to bear while he lives. That is legal justice, executed in its proper outside and subordinate place.

That law, now, of moral consequence is one which Parker, so far from ignoring, affirmed rigorously. He held that this law will go with every man out of this world, and never leave him. It was not he who preached a means to set it aside in behalf of "the elect." It was not he who cried, "Come to Jesus, and have all your sins in a moment washed away." He would not push legal justice to inhuman extremes, and try to push the finer justice of Heaven out of the universe in doing so: but neither was he a party to any plan for buying it off.

The conception of an infinite legal justice, excluding, not only all divine charity, but all the finer fatherly equities of divine justice as well, until itself be compounded with by a supernatural expiation, is one which no patchwork mercies can amend. There is a radical and ineradicable vice in the conception itself. But when the infinite legal justice is represented as creating its own helpless victims; when, Adam and Eve having fallen, it chooses that they shall nevertheless be the progenitors of the whole human race, and that their posterity shall inherit from them a nature totally depraved, but be felons and under capital condemnation by so much as they are even morally imperfect; when the expiator, who is to come with "mercy" to some of these unhappy creatures, delays his coming four thousand years; when, meantime, the infinite legal justice selects for arbitrary favor a small people, of no singular merit, in a corner of western Asia, but leaves all the rest of mankind to roll down to death in the darkness; when, eighteen hundred years after the great event, the very name of the expiator is still unknown to two-thirds of the human race; when the evidence afforded to all subsequent ages that any such supernatural expiation has been accomplished, or was intended, is such that numbers of candid and pious scholars, with all most studious examination of it, can only find that it is not evidence; and when, beyond all, appears in lurid perspective the place where unnumbered myriads of souls, so created, and so entreated on earth, are kept alive for an eternity of torment,—then the question propounds itself, and presses to the lips: Is there a man on this planet who can honestly say that such a representation commends itself to his

natural sentiments of justice? Is there an orthodox Christian who would not reject it with horror, did he not feel compelled to believe that God has actually done so, and that therefore it must be right? I will not credit it of any human being.

Theodore Parker was not born to an inheritance of such belief, as was my lot. He had not wasted years and strength and health in desperately trying to reconcile his heart to it. But he looked at the representation, and with an eye, not merely with an eyeball. And, as he saw, he spoke. It is not God, he said, but a spectre of imagination; and the worship of it is a worship of unrighteousness, though not so intended. Hence, as a religious man, he had no choice but to raise his voice against it. "Infidel" he was called for doing so; infidel he would have been,—false, that is, to his sense of sacred obligation,—had he forborne. Faithless he was not the man to be: therefore, in the name of Divine Justice, by such a representation violently caricatured; in the name of the human soul, by it perverted and oppressed; in the name of whatever is sacred in earth or heaven,—he entered against it his religious protest. The solemn voice, with its Hebrew resonance, rang out, and the cry of a soul that could not be silent was in it, saying, "Thou shalt not think evil of the Highest."

"But it is the God of the Bible," men say. It is not the God of the Bible; but, in nooks and corners of that venerable collection, "texts" may be found to keep it in countenance; and, while the Bible is regarded as a dead level of supernatural communication, there is little hope of its final dismissal. Now, Parker knew that the doctrine of biblical infallibility is exploded; and orthodox scholars knew it with him. Six years before his South Boston sermon, the noble-minded, learned, and pious Dr. Arnold, from the bosom of the English Church, had, in a private letter, put the infallibility of the Bible,—not quite in direct terms, but by indubitable implication,—in the same category with that of the Pope.<sup>1</sup> Even John Calvin had the candor to confess that the divine authority of the book,—divine authority, a pretension one degree lower than that of infallible inspiration,—could not

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<sup>1</sup> Stanley's "Life of Arnold," p. 238.

be proved; and modern research has left the old dogma not a leg to stand, not a crutch to lean, upon.

Parker was not extreme in this matter. He loved the Bible, and his voice grew almost lyrical when he spoke its praise. But he would not that it should be made a "fetich." He was justly unwilling that men should set up an unfounded doctrine about the book, and then, having themselves falsified it, use it to their own soul's hurt. As it was a treasure of moral incitement and instruction, he deeply appreciated and earnestly commended it; only when it was to be converted into a handcuff for human conscience, he interposed and said, "No! your doctrine about the book, which would fit it for that use, is one of your own making, and is now fully known to be untrue." And he said it quite aloud.

It may be that, with much good, some harm was done. His act brought down the great vulgar upon intelligences unfitted to contend with such an antagonist, and for a time there was a severe reaction. He had no choice, however; ours is a democratic country, and our only appeal is to the people. And now the reaction is past, while the good effect remains. Some day orthodox divines will be thanking Theodore Parker for forcing them to cast off an encumbrance. Or they may adopt a less handsome course, choosing rather to accuse him of misunderstanding their position and attributing to them a doctrine which, having abandoned it, they would be considered as having never held. For, to that sly way of changing front, theologians and others do sometimes resort, I am sorry to say.

But Parker did not stick fast in a mere *not*. Our century, in wide contrast to the last, has arrived at an understanding of the spontaneous self-annunciation of spiritual principles in man, which makes bibles intelligible as products of natural spirituality. The doctrine which presents itself from this point of view, and which Parker shared with others of his contemporaries at home and abroad, has been put by Emerson into two lines,—

"Out of the heart of Nature rolled  
The burdens of the Bible old,"—

out of the heart of human nature, the ethical nature in man, in which the great Whole gives itself voice. Men wrote there

the faith and fear and aspiration, the compelling duty and devotion of their souls, building better than they knew. It is spiritual spontaneity before reflection, coming forth simply because it is there and must come. Books so written do not furnish us out with a baggage of infallibly correct notions, but they do vastly better; they attest that spontaneity of belief, and they reveal its interior identity in all times. We touch there the most ancient heart of the race, and it is the thrill of unity, not the shock of dissonance, that arises. And, as that ethical heart of humanity speaks to us, intelligible, from the cradle of the ages, and our own answers back, in other dialect, but the same mother tongue, there springs up from these consonances a voice to tell us of the spirit that once moved upon the face of the waters, and still moves in the soul of man.

Yonder, suppose, in the heavens is a cloud that the eye cannot penetrate; and, while the atmosphere continues in the same state, it will there remain. But now comes a warmer, drier air that drinks it up, holds it in transparent solution, and converts it into blue sky. In the last century the Bible was still a cloud, opaque, to human intelligence impenetrable. Some looked upon it, and said, "Miracle;" and some looked, and said, "Imposture." But other airs of thought have come to solve and render it transparent; and now, though no particle of its significance is lost, it is cloud no longer, but azure sky, through which the tempered sunlight streams. And in cordial, grateful recognition of its offices, as thus contained in the atmosphere of human intelligence, Parker rested. It had become such to him as freely to transmit heaven's light, and to cast no shadow upon his soul.

I now turn, but conscious that brevity is imperative, to his labor of construction. Three questions here present themselves.

What ground did he build upon?

Whence was the material drawn?

What edifice did he erect?

I. His ground was the three great facts of natural spirituality, normal inspiration, and the law of moral development in history.

1. Natural spirituality: man is, by his proper nature as Person, a spiritual being, and, as such, a fountain of religion and morals. Faiths and bibles, sanctities of duty and devotion, flow



naturally from his being. In the greater number the flow is mostly by way of response to the nobler hearts, and may be like the flow of brooks in midsummer drought, when the scanty waters creep, scarce visible, among grasses and rushes; or it may appear hardly otherwise than in the faith that sustains institutions and continues customs; while now and then in some rich soul the tide rises high, and flows as from fountains in heaven. But man is a born worshipper; and Parker regarded all religions, and Christianity with the rest, as issuing from springs of spirituality native to the being of humanity.

2. Therefore issuing from God; for, in these powers of man, he said, God is immanent, and in their proper outcome is expressed or revealed. That immanence of God is inspiration; and it is important to grasp the precise nature and purport of Parker's doctrine, chiefly on account of its intrinsic importance, but also on account of statements recently made. For the people of Boston have been told of late that he failed to distinguish between inspiration and several other things, real or imaginary, as dictation, illumination, supernatural revelation, etc. These statements, to proceed not only from an honest man, but from an honest *mind* as well, have caused me no little wonderment. For Parker said precisely what he meant by inspiration, and, if words can make any thing clear, it is so that he meant none of these things. "But the problem of inspiration," he says in his biographical sketch, "got sooner solved. I believed in the Immanence of God in man; . . . hence that all men are inspired in proportion to their actual powers and their normal use thereof; that Truth is the test of intellectual inspiration, Justice of moral, and so on." That is, God inspires man with intellectual, moral, and religious powers; with active reason, active conscience, the active principle of religion; and is in these powers and principles as the divine legitimation and authentication of their proper significance and lawful use. Hence divine reason is not one thing, and human reason another of a different sort; divine justice not a something different in kind from humane justice; the difference is of degree, not kind: there is but one reason, one right, homogeneous, or with itself consistent, in earth and heaven; and insomuch as any man is indeed a rational and moral being, he has the clew to it. And so what comes nor-

mally from the spiritual being of man, comes not from that alone, but the founts of eternity feed the stream. Such is the purport of Parker's doctrine.

3. The idea of history as a scene of moral as well as intellectual development was with Theodore Parker a fundamental one. Now I do not, for my own part, swear by Herbert Spencer; and think it possible that Mr. Parker held to the doctrine of progress in a somewhat stricter sense than I am able to do. For it is not my opinion,—and perhaps was not his,—that a later age is of necessity superior to an earlier one. The fresh bud or fragrant blossom is a wholesomer object than the rotten apple, though the latter represents a maturer stage; and there are nations, if not ages, that are rotten apples. It is true that in the decayed fruit the seeds may still be alive and healthy; and so in history, seeds of new growth may live long, even amid the wretchedest stagnancy of mind and rot of morals.

But we must confess it: the world moves, and gets on. If we read in the books of Kings in the Old Testament, and see there what Jewish life then was, it is impossible not to be sensible that our times, compared with those, show an immense advance, and in morals as in all else. And so, if we look into the Rig Veda, the Zendavesta, the Ramayana, the Iliad, it is again impossible not to see that, even in the ideal life there expressed or portrayed, the mental and moral states are comparatively inchoate and obscure: it is a morning twilight, inspiring in its way, with freshness of dews and roseate flushes of dawn, but twilight still. Athens is a star in history; but we could not endure the manners of Athens. Roman virtue was noble, but under favor of the past tense; set down here in New England, it would be uncouth. And so, call it development, growth, progress, what you will, a process of enlargement and improvement is the great fact of history. Therefore, if there be a divine idea or economy of history, that is it, or an essential part of it.

But progress implies imperfection, and is only possible to an imperfect creature. Thorwaldsen wept upon completing a statue in which he could discover no fault. Because he could find no degree of failure, he could have no hope of farther advance. Moral progress assumes the fact, and requires the sense, of moral imperfection. And so the divine idea of history is grounded on

imperfection; since only the imperfect is improvable. To say that is not to garnish wickedness. Parker had no purpose, as I have none, to pour water of Cologne upon putrescence, and then call it sweet-scented; or to make darlings of rattlesnakes by decking them with fine ribbons. It is as well to be sane. We do not now hang for petty larceny; it does not follow that the moral sense of the community is dulled, nor that those who procured this mitigation of punishment did it in favor of thievery.

But there is no room for dispute about the broad fact: there it is, before every man's eyes. Every thing best in life is connected with the fact of imperfection. It is in the mother's unmeasured love for the babe at her breast; in the father's care; in the mutual attraction of young man and maiden, and mutual service of husband and wife; in all pity, charity, and gratitude; in reverence and sacred awe; in aspiration that seeks an ideal excellence; in the want that hungers and thirsts after righteousness. That is the divine plan.

Moreover, this plan comprehends the uses of *failure*. They say that all production of higher forms of life upon this planet has been connected with changes in the planet itself. Higher terrestrial conditions arrived; the existing organisms were not adjusted to them,—failed to meet them; at the point of that failure, there was a sally of life,—a birth-throe,—out of which issued higher forms of animal being. I think there must be truth in this, for the like is to be observed in national and individual life. Out of a sense of failure, most bitter at the time, this Federal Union was born; and had not the sense of failure been so very bitter, nothing half so good had been reached. Now we are again feeling ourselves behindhand, and there is occasion to feel so; but the cause is, perhaps, not that the nation has really retrograded, but that the honest work formerly done has made conditions that call for higher degrees of political and social virtue. Even the abolition of slavery has brought fresh difficulty upon us. Because the nation has done well, it must do better. And I trust that its consciousness of imperfection, and consequent self-condemnation, has not come for the last time. That would augur ill for its future; for through that very consciousness it is that the divine plan is worked out; and the nations in which it does not arise are in a state of suspended

animation. And so in the individual life. He that has never said to himself, "You are not doing well enough," is scarcely doing well at all. "On steps of our dead selves," as Tennyson sings, we ascend.

Such, substantially, was Parker's theory of history and human life. Who will say that it was not, in the main, a true one? And who does not see how utterly and monstrously unsuited to such a system were that infinite legal justice, measuring all men by the standard of absolute moral perfection, and denouncing infinite woes against that want of it which is signified by the theological term "sin."

## II. Whence was Parker's material drawn?

The proper source, he said, of belief is the consciousness of humanity. Now, there are those who make merry over consciousness, considered as a source of belief. The vivacious Lewes, in his *Life of Goethe*, diverts himself with the fable of a German philosopher constructing a camel out of his interior consciousness. That consciousness is no authority upon camels is certain, and it may be that a philosophic camel would not be the best authority upon consciousness. But is the conscious soul conscious of nothing, or of the first personal pronoun only? Assume the Darwinian hypothesis, and see how that would look. In form after form of life, through myriads of millenniums, experience has been funded and made mental capital: already in the ant and the bee, with their marvellous instincts, already in the wild goose, steering north or south through the high air, with a mariner's compass in its narrow head, much has been laid up; but Nature, upon arriving at her highest terrestrial product, is all at once exhausted, and has only Locke's "piece of white paper" to put inside! That were strange, and to me is quite incredible.

Parker stated as matter of immediate consciousness these three: God, Absolute Right, Immortality. According to Kant, we know by direct moral consciousness only of Justice, or Right, as absolute law; and thence necessarily infer the other two. Parker really followed the same course. In his sermons, he reasoned to God and immortality substantially in the Kantian way. But his formula ran differently; for in him belief was so spontaneous, inevitable, rich, and overrunning, that, while

reasoning to its objects for others, he could scarcely feel that he did so for himself. Light takes time in passing through space, but we, with the sun overhead in the light-flooded noons of summer, cannot feel that it does so; and he, with the sun above his heart, could not feel that there was any interval of reasoning thought between it and his apprehension of it. Meantime, his source was not merely the consciousness of an isolated individual, but that of humanity, as expressed in bibles, worships, high philosophies, psalms, and epic singing, in all words and deeds and growths that attest the significant fulness of man's heart.

### III. What building did Parker erect?

His edifice comprises these three ideas; The Perfect God and divine universe; The equality of faculty to function and obligation in man; Absolute religion. For convenience's sake, I glance at these in the reverse order.

1. Absolute religion is but religion itself. There is religion, and also particular forms of it, as there is a human nature, with individual and national expressions of it. The apostle James undertook to say what pure religion is: Parker undertook the like, with a difference of expression. He did not try to put all historical religions in a pot, and stew out of them a broth, to be named absolute religion, but simply inquired what religion essentially is. I suppose it to be essentially something, and think the endeavor to distinguish its essence a very proper and even laudable one.

2. Faculty equals function and obligation. It cannot be the duty of a babe at the breast to hold a plow or navigate a ship. Obviously, it were injustice and outrage to punish or condemn one for not doing what he has not the natural power to do. But upon this matter it cannot be necessary here to spend another word; though, as against the traditional speculation of theology,—say that of Jonathan Edwards,—the doctrine has a significance very extensive indeed.

3. The perfect God and Divine Universe: ethical religion can affirm no less. God and his work are perfect; else—no God; for nothing imperfect can receive the name. But in a perfect universe there can be no eternal sore, with an eternal cautery of fire, that, nevertheless, does not cure. There can be

no "absolute evil," Parker said, no evil endlessly persisting, in a world conceived in a perfect thought, made by a perfect hand, and governed by a perfect Providence. Now, it is well known in this community that his doctrine to such effect has of late been challenged, on grounds of ethical science, by a critic of rare brilliancy and power. Parker mistook, it seems; the universe would not be perfect without an eternal hell, nor God without the everlasting woe of many among his creatures. The appeal to ethical science is one not to be refused; if, in that court, judgment has been given against Parker's doctrine, its defeat is indeed final. But has it in fact been overthrown there? The question is one which I propose neither to avoid, nor to answer with any mere shuffle.

Parker's critic, in a masterly piece of moral pathology, shows that when one has looked upon the law of right, and, with full purpose and full understanding of his act, said, "I will not obey it," he then begins to hate it; then to blind himself to it; and so, darkening the ethical eye ever more, and ever more hardening the neck in iniquity, he comes at length to that chronic persistence in evil ways, which is named depravity. Speaking now only for myself, I admit it. One does observe such a process, —a sad sight! Let all men learn from it to beware how, even in the name of God and religion, they tamper with the sacred sense of right and truth.

How far may that process go? The critic seeks to show that it may go to the length of utter moral blindness, utter extinction of goodness in the soul. Suppose that this is indeed the fact. Let it be admitted that one may quite lose his moral soul. For my own part, I do not profess to be *sure* that no one ever does so.

This admitted, what follows? The critic assumes that he who has lost his soul continues, nevertheless, to have a human soul, which will be kept alive to fructify eternally in depravity and devilishness, and to be rewarded with eternal pain.

There I must call a halt. There the doctrine passes into that which no analogy sustains, which is simply impossible, and which would make the universe not only undivine, but horrible, were it possible.

Depravity is corruption, corruption is death. "Dead in tres-

passes and sins" is dead. For what is the human soul? It is, primarily, that ethical being of man which, according to Kant, rises above the merely phenomenal world, and belongs to the sphere of real being. In that, if anywhere, are the springs of immortality, and, that extinct, the springs are dry. Or is it said that absolute depravity is not moral death, but only moral disorder? Is there, then, such a thing as immortal disorder? The conception is unnatural. Disorder is but a transient stage of indetermination between recovery and dissolution, and one way or the other must terminate. In short, the conception of a soul kept in death or deadly disorder alive for ever, that the stench of its foulness may ascend with the smoke of its torment, is one with which no terms can be made; it is simply inadmissible.

And Mr. Cook's chosen analogy serves but to prove it inadmissible. That gentleman opens his case with one of those speaking illustrations of which his mind is so affluent. You find, says he, a fossil hand, with the two first fingers closed upon the palm, and you know that had the third finger been extricated from the stone, it also would have been bent toward the palm. The way thus prepared, he proceeds to show—first in the inorganic, and then in the organic, realms of Nature—that there is a point beyond which the power of self-recovery does not continue. These are the two closed fingers; and thence he argues that, in the moral realm also, there is a point at which that power quite ceases.

So far I open no dispute with him for the present, but will simply pursue his own illustrations to their proper consequence. A ship, says the critic, careens too far and does not recover itself, but goes over. Yes; and that ship sails the seas no more: there's an end of it. A tree, he continues, is cut into beyond the heart, and does not build up the wound with fresh wood, but falls and perishes. True; and that tree is down, is dead, and there's an end of it. There are the two fingers closed in plain death. *If*, now, a soul is ever so self-hurt that it cannot recover, but goes down into sheer depravity, analogy says of it,—Mr. Cook's analogy says,—That soul is fallen, is dead, and *there's an end of it*. And I am confident that the whole world of Nature will yield no analogy to the contrary. So that those stone fingers, and with them the visible universe entire, are closed against



the monstrous imagination of an endless survival in moral death. But the tree is mortal at best, and, if the soul be designed for immortal life, there is an infinite difference between the two cases. Hence it were rash, were indeed somewhat youthful, to assume that all the limitations of the one are to be found in the other. A larger logic would say that, if for the mortal tree there is a measured *vis medicatrix*, or power of self-repair, there must for a spirit, in which are the seeds of immortality, be a similar power not thus limited, but having the scope of the destinies with which it is associated. The logic of Julius Müller may be formally perfect, only it is too small for the matter. One should not look to find the ocean swell in an ounce vial. To know at all the ways of Providence on the scale of immortality, reason should launch itself with generous courage, dare to lose sight of these mortal shores, and to sail by the unattainable stars. Induction in a closet, from observations made in a point of time, does not, perhaps, serve for the navigation of God in the spaces of eternity.

But the observation is itself uncertain. Who *knows* that the moral life can be quite extinguished? Who knows that any human being has sunk into a depravity helpless, hopeless, absolute? "Theodore Parker's guesses,"—here is a guess that is not Theodore Parker's! And which of those that venture it dares say to a fellow-creature, "Useless for you to try; bad you are, and bad you must be"? I am not so bold, and dare as little fling such words after men from this earth departed as dash them in the face of any here. And, to encourage hope, do we not see examples almost of moral resurrection? Does not the Orthodox church itself, at the death-bed of a wretch the most hardened, still say, "It is not too late"? And how small-minded, how *unbelieving*, at bottom, it is to assume that the mere physical fact, mere accident, it may be, of death, determines all for the moral life,—that scarlet fever, a mad dog, a runaway horse, a falling brick, or rusty nail may hedge up for ever the gracious providence of Heaven and fix a soul's fate for eternity! Such credulity is not spiritual faith, but the want of it. It indicates an eye to which providential purpose and law hinge upon small physical events,—the infinitely greater upon the infinitely less.

The Monday lecturer, if I understand him aright, assumes, and as the basis of his entire argument, that at the moment of death every man is irrevocably determined in character; either he has so chosen the right and good that, through day and darkness and all temptations and tests, his choice would still endure, or, with the determination of pure depravity, has said, "Evil, be thou my good!" But with what inattention to the facts is such a notion entertained! Here is a young man of twenty at work upon a high staging, in which is a defective board. He steps upon that board; it breaks; the poor fellow is precipitated to the earth and killed. What, now, of him? He was not bad, and was not a saint. Like thousands of others, he would probably have done well under good influences, and under evil ones might have been quite led astray. Is any man so absurd a pagan as to say that a weak piece of pine lumber was commissioned to determine his soul's destiny for ever? Or can paganism itself believe that God would take him, morally undetermined as he was, from the arms of death, thrust him down into nether places, and say, "You shall have no second opportunity; I will make an eternal sinner of you, whether you will or no; you *shall* be nothing else"? Horrible to think of! It is almost an offence against good taste so far to entertain the ghastly fancy as to give it words. These are imaginations which, could they become realities, would not only slay souls, but murder Divine Justice itself!

Theodore Parker looked at the facts broadly, and did not deceive himself. He saw—to distinguish roughly—three classes of character. The highest consists of men singularly noble and good; saints, like Channing; figures in which virtue becomes poetic and classic, like Emerson; men of heroic morals, like Sumner. Beneath these, and such as these, appears the great average of human quality, the respectable middle class in morals, comprising men in and out of the churches,—not bad and not heroically good, but good for ordinary occasions, and with better stuff in them, very likely, than they commonly put in use, or are themselves aware of. Lower than these, and quite at the bottom, are men who afflict the eye,—base, sordid, false, unclean, of whom the worst may fairly be called depraved. Concerning these last Parker might have doubted, had he, with "the greatest living theologian," depended upon observation alone; though he

was of a mind quite too healthy to doubt if they would not be preserved alive to rot and burn, and burn and rot, and make the universe foul for ever. But he could not know; for none can learn from observation only that such characters will cast their slough, and recover moral health. At the point, however, of that doubt he threw in his faith in God, and the scale was quickly turned. For here was a man with such a faith in God as should count for something in his thinking; faith in a just GOD, I say, and not merely in a cast-iron omnipotence of legalism. Therefore, where observation failed to give his soul assurance, and his great humane heart might otherwise have wavered in a sad uncertainty, he put to his eye the speculum of that faith, and with new optics saw a spiritual world where, as was said of old, there is more joy over one fallen man that amends than over ninety and nine upright ones that need no amendment; and saw an infinite Providence with an eternity before him, in which, now by kind severities of punitive discipline and now by influences as of the vernal sun that melts the frozen heart of winter and makes the brown sod green, to reprove, to correct, to subdue, to warm and inspire, and so to bring every wandered soul soon or late in consistency with its own freedom of election to the true light and right way. For he, Theodore Parker, believed in a Divine *can*, not a Divine *can't*, and in a Divine *will*, not a Divine *won't*; therefore in a God who both can and will keep the health of his universe, protecting his own laws in consistency with the ultimate good of his own creatures, and vindicating his own righteousness by making righteousness universal.

One may find himself not qualified for a faith so generous, and still be a sound man, dutifully doing the day's labor by the day's light. But the reader sees what success has attended upon the effort of a man uncommonly able to array ethical science against it. That any effort of another with like intent will prosper better I do not anticipate. And were that grand belief quite confuted, the ghastly alternative presented by Mr. Parker's critic would be no real one, but an imagination at war equally with the truth of Nature and the justice of Heaven.

Here are two pictures of the spiritual universe. In the one, the universe appears as divided into two contrasting halves, two continents or spheres,—an upper one bathed in everlasting light,

a nether one buried in eternal darkness, with some narrow neck or isthmus between them, and each comprising millions numberless of human souls. In the upper realm all the souls are pardoned criminals, but their guilt has been paid for by another; therefore they are regarded as innocent. And their hearts are turned the right way; they love goodness, and seek it with sincere desire: and so, in glory of divine light, in joy without shadow, in gratitude that has no measure, in sweet ease of everlasting leisure and rapture of heavenly thoughts, they praise the Lamb that has bought them with his blood, they praise the spirit that has sanctified them, they praise the infinite legal justice that for a consideration has pardoned them; and, singing praises, sing themselves into new depths and ecstasies of blessedness, and upward into new heights and intensities of perfect sanctity, and so on for ever more. Meantime, all this has in the nether half of this same universe its equal and horrible accompaniment. There like myriads of souls are criminals not pardoned, nor ever to be pardoned, nor ever permitted to amend. All that half of the universe is one immeasurable mass of reeking, festering rottenness, obscene, abominable, abhorrent, as no speech can adequately say or imagination conceive. There depravity rots downward for ever into horror beneath horror of foulness and loathsomeness; the evil man becomes an imp of darkness, the impish becomes devilish, the devil damned, fructified eternally in hatefulness of heart and hideousness of moral feature. That moiety of God's universe reverberates through eternity with one endless roar of curses and execrations, of oaths that surpass all measure of profanity, of blasphemies that blister where they fall, and scald the demon hearts that conceived them. And all in a ghastly darkness, made visible, rather than lit, by lurid flames that lick the ocean of eternal sin, and fill with foul smoke this half of a divine universe. And this half, like the other, is in God, an equal part of his manifested perfection. For in God all is contained, and in him eternal hell lives and moves and has its being, if eternal hell be.

Look at the other picture. Here is a universe with no rotten and eternally rotting nether half; it is healthy and whole, everlastingly well and sound in every part. An infinitely perfect Creator, Father, and Master has brought into being countless

numbers of intelligent and morally capable creatures ; not to triumph over them, whether as the unworthy recipients of his "grace" or as the worthy victims of his "justice," but to reproduce in them, through eternal ages, more and more of his own perfection. Of his household, and in his school, they are immortally to learn, and, learning, to make their own the wisdom of his thought, the justice of his ways, the beauty of his manifested being. His truth they learn and appropriate by thought and study, his righteousness by being themselves its subjects, the beauty of his perfect wholeness by harmonizing in themselves the various chords of a manifold being. From smallest beginnings they ascend, and in freedom rise ; there is imperfection of the learner, but none of the plan which comprehends and conducts all ; justice governs, but corrects without destroying, and subdues to transform surrender itself into moral victory. A perfect moral government and a perfect providence make common cause, and are one and the same. And so in light the whole intelligent and moral creation still ascends toward the light : all that is gross in imperfection disappears ; all that is noble in purpose, great in design, or glorious in achievement accumulates with perpetual increase, and shines with brighter ray ; while highest and lowest alike look up to that all-transcending ideal, whose reality God himself is, to see there the infinite "parent of good, almighty," and to feel themselves his begotten. Here Heaven's justice triumphs, not over, but in and with its subjects ; here the work itself of God is that praise of his perfection which infinite perfection can never need or seek ; here all may well learn that it is more blessed to give than to receive, for it is the All-Blessed himself, that, in his own person and providence, gives the lesson. A universe with no black spot ; immortality that is everywhere blessing, and not curse ; freedom that, without fail, glorifies the wisdom that begot it ; the good for ever arriving at the better, and for ever to arrive ; justice vindicating itself by creating its law, to be a living spring in every soul ; an eternity that is all health, and a whole creation that in eternity blossoms in the beauty of a divine ideal, and ripens in the reality of a divine consummation,—such is the representation.

From whom the former picture, so highly captivating, proceeds it is needless to say : the latter is Theodore Parker's. Which

of the two is that of a perfect universe, or in the better degree reflects the image of a perfect God, it is for the reader to determine.

A word only upon his labor of practical reform, and I shall have done. That labor was the offspring and exemplification of his religion. The tree bore the fruit, and the fruit shows the quality of the tree. He believed in a Divine Righteousness that, from within men's hearts, and by the work of their hands, would make righteousness on earth; and his religion enlisted him to be its soldier. He believed that God intends the overcoming of evil; and he religiously made that intention his own. He believed that the providential design lies for us, first of all, in human conscience; and his religion engaged him to do heroically the work of conscience. The great battle had come. Heaven called him; he left all, and marched; and few can know how much he left to do his duty. Into the imminent deadly breach, foremost among the foremost, he threw himself, and his clarion voice rang out above the din, till at last he fell stricken, and was borne forth from the smoke to die. And I, above his grave, deem it not too bold to say: Brave soldier of God! if thine were not true religion, then it is from religion itself, and not from thy brow, that a laurel falls.

D. A. WASSON.

## THE DISCOVERER.

I HAVE a little kinsman  
Whose earthly summers are but three,  
And yet a voyager is he  
Greater than Drake or Frobisher,  
Than all their peers together!  
He is a brave discoverer,  
And, far beyond the tether  
Of them who seek the frozen Pole,  
Has sailed where the noiseless surges roll.  
Ay, he has traveled whither  
A winged pilot steered his bark  
Through the portals of the dark,  
Past hoary Mimir's well and tree,  
Across the unknown sea.

Suddenly, in his fair young hour,  
Came one who bore a flower  
And laid it in his dimpled hand  
With this command:  
"Henceforth thou art a rover!  
Thou must make a voyage far,  
Sail beneath the evening star,  
And a wondrous land discover."  
—With his sweet smile innocent  
Our little kinsman went.

Since that time no word  
From the absent has been heard.  
Who can tell  
How he fares, or answer well  
What the little one has found



Since he left us, outward-bound?  
Would that he might return!  
Then should we learn  
From the pricking of his chart  
How the skyey roadways part.  
Hush! does not the baby this way bring,  
To lay beside this severed curl,  
Some starry offering  
Of chrysolite or pearl?

Ah, no! not so!  
We may follow on his track,  
But he comes not back.  
And yet I dare aver  
He is a brave discoverer  
Of climes his elders do not know.  
He has more learning than appears  
On the scroll of twice three thousand years,  
More than in the groves is taught  
Or from furthest Indies brought;  
He knows, perchance, how spirits fare,—  
What shapes the angels wear,  
What is their guise and speech  
In those lands beyond our reach,—  
And his eyes behold  
Things that shall never, never be to mortal hearers told.

EDMUND C. STEDMAN.

# SYSTEM OF ECONOMICAL CONTRADICTIONS:

OR,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MISERY.

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 BY P. J. PROUDHON.

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 TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY THE EDITOR.
 

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## INTRODUCTION.

**B**EFORE entering upon the subject-matter of these new memoirs, I must explain an hypothesis which will undoubtedly seem strange, but in the absence of which it is impossible for me to proceed intelligibly: I mean the hypothesis of a God.

To suppose God, it will be said, is to deny him. Why do you not affirm him?

Is it my fault if belief in Divinity has become a suspected opinion; if the bare suspicion of a Supreme Being is already noted as evidence of a weak mind; and if, of all philosophical Utopias, this is the only one which the world no longer tolerates? Is it my fault if hypocrisy and imbecility everywhere hide behind this holy formula?

Let a public teacher suppose the existence, in the universe, of an unknown force governing suns and atoms, and keeping the whole machine in motion. With him this supposition, wholly gratuitous, is perfectly natural; it is received, encouraged: witness attraction—an hypothesis which will never be verified, and which, nevertheless, is the glory of its originator. But when, to explain the course of human events, I suppose, with all imaginable caution, the intervention of a God, I am sure to shock scien-

tific gravity and offend critical ears : to so wonderful an extent has our piety discredited Providence, so many tricks have been played by means of this dogma or fiction by charlatans of every stamp ! I have seen the theists of my time, and blasphemy has played over my lips ; I have studied the belief of the people,—this people that Brydaine called the best friend of God,—and have shuddered at the negation which was about to escape me. Tormented by conflicting feelings, I appealed to reason ; and it is reason which, amid so many dogmatic contradictions, now forces the hypothesis upon me. *A priori* dogmatism, applying itself to God, has proved fruitless : who knows whither the hypothesis, in its turn, will lead us ?

I will explain therefore how, studying in the silence of my heart, and far from every human consideration, the mystery of social revolutions, God, the great unknown, has become for me an hypothesis,—I mean a necessary dialectical tool.

## I.

If I follow the God-idea through its successive transformations, I find that this idea is preëminently social : I mean by this that it is much more a collective act of faith than an individual conception. Now, how and under what circumstances is this act of faith produced ? This point it is important to determine.

From the moral and intellectual point of view, society, or the collective man, is especially distinguished from the individual by spontaneity of action,—in other words, instinct. While the individual obeys, or imagines he obeys, only those motives of which he is fully conscious, and upon which he can at will decline or consent to act ; while, in a word, he thinks himself free, and all the freer when he knows that he is possessed of keener reasoning faculties and larger information,—society is governed by impulses which, at first blush, exhibit no deliberation and design, but which gradually seem to be directed by a superior power, existing outside of society, and pushing it with irresistible might toward an unknown goal. The establishment of monarchies and republics, caste-distinctions, judicial institutions, etc., are so many manifestations of this social spontaneity, to note the effects of which is much easier than to point out its principle

and show its cause. The whole effort, even of those who, following Bossuet, Vico, Herder, Hegel, have applied themselves to the philosophy of history, has been hitherto to establish the presence of a providential destiny presiding over all the movements of man. And I observe, in this connection, that society never fails to evoke its genius previous to action: as if it wished the powers above to ordain what its own spontaneity has already resolved on. Lots, oracles, sacrifices, popular acclamation, public prayers, are the commonest forms of these tardy deliberations of society.

This mysterious faculty, wholly intuitive, and, so to speak, super-social, scarcely or not at all perceptible in persons, but which hovers over humanity like an inspiring genius, is the primordial fact of all psychology.

Now, unlike other species of animals, which, like him, are governed at the same time by individual desires and collective impulses, man has the privilege of perceiving and designating to his own mind the instinct or *fatum* which leads him; we shall see later that he has also the power of foreseeing and even influencing its decrees. And the first act of man, filled and carried away with enthusiasm (of the divine breath), is to adore the invisible Providence on which he feels that he depends, and which he calls God,—that is, Life, Being, Spirit, or, simpler still, Me; for all these words, in the ancient tongues, are synonyms and homophones.

"I am *Me*," God said to Abraham, "and I covenant with *Thee*." . . . And to Moses: "I am the Being. Thou shalt say unto the children of Israel, 'The Being hath sent me unto you.'" These two words, the Being and Me, have in the original language—the most religious that men have ever spoken—the same characteristic.<sup>1</sup> Elsewhere, when Ie-hovah, acting as law-giver through the instrumentality of Moses, attests his eternity and swears by his own essence, he uses, as a form of oath, *I*; or

<sup>1</sup> *Ie-hovah*, and in composition *Iah*, the being; *Iao*, *iou*, *piter*, same meaning; *ha-iah*, Heb., he was; *ei*, Gr., he is, *ei-nai*, to be; *an-i*, Heb., and in conjugation *th-i*, me; *e-go*, *io*, *ich*, *i*, *m-i*, *m-e*, *t-ibi*, *t-e*, and all the personal pronouns in which the vowels *i*, *e*, *ei*, *oi*, denote personality in general, and the consonants *m* or *n*, *s* or *t*, serve to indicate the number of the person. For the rest, let who will dispute over these analogies; I have no objections: at this depth, the science of the philologist is but cloud and mystery. The important point to which I wish to call attention is that the phonetic relation of names seems to correspond to the metaphysical relation of ideas.

else, with redoubled force, *I, the Being*. Thus the God of the Hebrews is the most personal and wilful of all the gods, and none express better than he the intuition of humanity.

God appeared to man, then, as a me, as a pure and permanent essence, placing himself before him as a monarch before his servant, and expressing himself now through the mouth of poets, legislators, and soothsayers, *musa, nomos, numen*; now through the popular voice, *vox populi vox Dei*. This may serve, among other things, to explain the existence of true and false oracles; why individuals secluded from birth do not attain of themselves to the idea of God, while they eagerly grasp it as soon as it is presented to them by the collective mind; why, finally, stationary races, like the Chinese, end by losing it.<sup>1</sup> In the first place, as to oracles, it is clear that all their accuracy depends upon the universal conscience which inspires them; and, as to the idea of God, it is easily seen why isolation and *statu quo* are alike fatal to it. On the one hand, absence of communication keeps the mind absorbed in animal self-contemplation; on the other, absence of motion, gradually changing social life into mechanical routine, finally eliminates the idea of will and providence. Strange fact! religion, which perishes through progress, perishes also through quiescence.

Notice further that, in attributing to the vague and (so to speak) objectified consciousness of a universal reason the first revelation of Divinity, we assume absolutely nothing concerning

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<sup>1</sup>The Chinese have preserved in their traditions the remembrance of a religion which had ceased to exist among them five or six centuries before our era. (See Pauthier, "China," Paris, Didot.) More surprising still is it that this singular people, in losing its primitive faith, seems to have understood that divinity is simply the collective *me* of humanity: so that, more than two thousand years ago, China had reached, in its commonly-accepted belief, the latest results of the philosophy of the Occident. "What Heaven sees and understands," it is written in the *Shu-king*, "is only that which the people see and understand. What the people deem worthy of reward and punishment is that which Heaven wishes to punish and reward. There is an intimate communication between Heaven and the people: let those who govern the people, therefore, be watchful and cautious." Confucius expressed the same idea in another manner: "Gain the affection of the people, and you gain empire. Lose the affection of the people, and you lose empire." There, then, general reason was regarded as queen of the world, a distinction which elsewhere has been bestowed upon revelations. The *Tao-te-king* is still more explicit. In this work, which is but an outline criticism of pure reason, the philosopher Lao-tsé continually identifies, under the name of *Tao*, universal reason and the infinite being; and all the obscurity of the book of Lao-tsé consists, in my opinion, of this constant identification of principles which our religious and metaphysical habits have so widely separated.

even the reality or non-reality of God. In fact, admitting that God is nothing more than collective instinct or universal reason, we have still to learn what this universal reason is in itself. For, as we shall show directly, universal reason is not given in individual reason; in other words, the knowledge of social laws, or the theory of collective ideas, though deduced from the fundamental concepts of pure reason, is nevertheless wholly empirical, and never would have been discovered *à priori* by means of deduction, induction, or synthesis. Whence it follows that universal reason, which we regard as the origin of these laws; universal reason, which exists, reasons, labors, in a separate sphere and as a reality distinct from pure reason, just as the planetary system, though created according to the laws of mathematics, is a reality distinct from mathematics, whose existence could not have been deduced from mathematics alone: it follows, I say, that universal reason is, in modern languages, exactly what the ancients called God. The name is changed: what do we know of the thing?

Let us now trace the evolution of the Divine idea.

The Supreme Being once posited by a primary mystical judgment, man immediately generalizes the subject by another mysticism,—analogy. God, so to speak, is as yet but a point: directly he shall fill the world.

As, in sensing his social me, man saluted his *Author*, so, in finding evidence of design and intention in animals, plants, springs, meteors, and the whole universe, he attributes to each special object, and then to the whole, a soul, spirit, or genius presiding over it; pursuing this inductive process of apotheosis from the highest summit of Nature, which is society, down to the humblest forms of life, to inanimate and inorganic matter. From his collective me, taken as the superior pole of creation, to the last atom of matter, man *extends*, then, the idea of God,—that is, the idea of personality and intelligence,—just as God himself *extended heaven*, as the book of Genesis tells us; that is, created space and time, the conditions of all things.

Thus, without a God or master-builder, the universe and man would not exist: such is the social profession of faith. But also without man God would not be thought, or—to clear the interval—God would be nothing. If humanity needs an author, God

and the gods equally need a revealer; theogony, the history of heaven, hell, and their inhabitants,—those dreams of the human mind,—is the counterpart of the universe, which certain philosophers have called in return the dream of God. And how magnificent this theological creation, the work of society! The creation of the *démiourgos* was obliterated; what we call the Omnipotent was conquered; and for centuries the enchanted imagination of mortals was turned away from the spectacle of Nature by the contemplation of Olympian marvels.

Let us descend from this fanciful region: pitiless reason knocks at the door; her terrible questions demand a reply.

"What is God?" she asks; "where is he? what is his extent? what are his wishes? what his powers? what his promises?"—and here, in the light of analysis, all the divinities of heaven, earth, and hell are reduced to an incorporeal, insensible, immovable, incomprehensible, undefinable I-know-not-what; in short, to a negation of all the attributes of existence. In fact, whether man attributes to each object a special spirit or genius, or conceives the universe as governed by a single power, he in either case but SUPPOSES an unconditioned, that is, an impossible, entity, that he may deduce therefrom an explanation of such phenomena as he deems inconceivable on any other hypothesis. The mystery of God and reason! In order to render the object of his idolatry more and more *rational*, the believer despoils him successively of all the qualities which would make him *real*; and, after marvellous displays of logic and genius, the attributes of the Being *par excellence* are found to be the same as those of nihility. This evolution is inevitable and fatal: atheism is at the bottom of all theodicy.

Let us try to understand this progress.

God, creator of all things, is himself no sooner created by the conscience,—in other words, no sooner have we lifted God from the idea of the social me to the idea of the cosmic me,—than immediately our reflection begins to demolish him under the pretext of perfecting him. To perfect the idea of God, to purify the theological dogma, was the second hallucination of the human race.

The spirit of analysis, that untiring Satan who continually questions and denies, must sooner or later look for proof of



religious dogmas. Now, whether the philosopher determine the idea of God, or declare it indeterminable; whether he approach it with his reason, or retreat from it,—I say that this idea receives a blow; and, as it is impossible for speculation to halt, the idea of God must at last disappear. Then the atheistic movement is the second act of the theologic drama; and this second act follows from the first, as effect from cause. "The heavens declare the glory of God," says the Psalmist. Let us add, And their testimony dethrones him.

Indeed, in proportion as man observes phenomena, he thinks that he perceives, between Nature and God, intermediaries; such as relations of number, form, and succession; organic laws, evolutions, analogies,—forming an unmistakable series of manifestations which invariably produce or give rise to each other. He even observes that, in the development of this society of which he is a part, private wills and associative deliberations have some influence; and he says to himself that the Great Spirit does not act upon the world directly and by himself, or arbitrarily and at the dictation of a capricious will, but mediately, by perceptible means or organs, and by virtue of laws. And, retracing in his mind the chain of effects and causes, he places clear at the extremity, as a balance, God.

A poet has said,—

*Par delà tous les cieux, le Dieu des cieux réside.*

Thus, at the first step in the theory, the Supreme Being is reduced to the function of a motive power, a mainspring, a cornerstone, or, if a still more trivial comparison may be allowed me, a constitutional sovereign, reigning but not governing, swearing to obey the law and appointing ministers to execute it. But, under the influence of the mirage which fascinates him, the theist sees, in this ridiculous system, only a new proof of the sublimity of his idol; who, in his opinion, uses his creatures as instruments of his power, and causes the wisdom of human beings to redound to his glory.

Soon, not content with limiting the power of the Eternal, man, increasingly deicidal in his tendencies, insists on sharing it.

If I am a spirit, a sentient me giving voice to ideas, continues the theist, I consequently am a part of absolute existence; I am

free, creative, immortal, equal with God. *Cogito, ergo sum*,—I think, therefore I am immortal: that is the corollary, the translation of *Ego sum qui sum*: philosophy is in accord with the Bible. The existence of God and the immortality of the soul are posited by the conscience in the same judgment: there, man speaks in the name of the universe, to whose bosom he transports his me; here, he speaks in his own name, without perceiving that, in this going and coming, he only repeats himself.

The immortality of the soul, a true division of divinity, which, at the time of its first promulgation, arriving after a long interval, seemed a heresy to those faithful to the old dogma, has been none the less considered the complement of divine majesty, necessarily postulated by eternal goodness and justice. Unless the soul is immortal, God is incomprehensible, say the theists; resembling in this the political theorists who regard sovereign representation and perpetual tenure of office as essential conditions of monarchy. But the inconsistency of the ideas is as glaring as the parity of the doctrines is exact: consequently the dogma of immortality soon became the stumbling-block of philosophical theologians, who, ever since the days of Pythagoras and Orpheus, have been making futile attempts to harmonize divine attributes with human liberty, and reason with faith. A subject of triumph for the impious! . . . But the illusion could not yield so soon: the dogma of immortality, for the very reason that it was a limitation of the uncreated Being, was a step in advance. Now, though the human mind deceives itself by a partial acquisition of the truth, it never retreats, and this perseverance in progress is proof of its infallibility. Of this we shall soon see fresh evidence.

In making himself like God, man made God like himself: this correlation, which for many centuries had been execrated, was the secret spring which determined the new myth. In the days of the patriarchs God made an alliance with man; now, to strengthen the compact, God is to become a man. He will take on our flesh, our form, our passions, our joys, and our sorrows; will be born of woman, and die as we do. Then, after this humiliation of the infinite, man will still pretend that he has elevated the ideal of his God in making, by a logical conversion, him whom he had always called creator, a saviour, a redeemer.

Humanity does not yet say, I am God: such a usurpation would shock its piety; it says, God is in me, IMMANUEL, *nobiscum Deus*. And, at the moment when philosophy with pride, and universal conscience with fright, shouted with unanimous voice, The gods are departing! *excedere deos!* a period of eighteen centuries of fervent adoration and superhuman faith was inaugurated.

But the fatal end approaches. The royalty which suffers itself to be limited will end by the rule of demagogues; the divinity which is defined dissolves in a pandemonium. Christolatry is the last term of this long evolution of human thought. The angels, saints, and virgins reign in heaven with God, says the catechism; and demons and reprobates live in the hells of eternal punishment. Ultramundane society has its left and its right: it is time for the equation to be completed; for this mystical hierarchy to descend upon earth and appear in its real character.

When Milton represents the first woman admiring herself in a fountain, and lovingly extending her arms toward her own image as if to embrace it, he paints, feature for feature, the human race.—This God whom you worship, O man! this God whom you have made good, just, omnipotent, omniscient, immortal, and holy, is yourself: this ideal of perfection is your image, purified in the shining mirror of your conscience. Gôd, Nature, and man are three aspects of one and the same being; man is God himself arriving at self-consciousness through a thousand evolutions. In Jesus Christ man recognized himself as God; and Christianity is in reality the religion of God-man. There is no other God than he who in the beginning said, ME; there is no other God than THEE.

Such are the last conclusions of philosophy, which dies in unveiling religion's mystery and its own.

## II.

It seems, then, that all is ended; it seems that, with the cessation of the worship and mystification of humanity by itself, the theological problem is for ever put aside. The gods have gone: there is nothing left for man but to grow weary and die

in his egoism. What frightful solitude extends around me, and forces its way to the bottom of my soul! My exaltation resembles annihilation; and, since I made myself a God, I seem but a shadow. It is possible that I am still a *me*, but it is very difficult to regard myself as the absolute; and, if I am not the absolute, I am only half of an idea.

Some ironical thinker, I know not who, has said: "A little philosophy leads away from religion, and much philosophy leads back to it." This proposition is humiliatingly true.

Every science develops in three successive periods, which may be called—comparing them with the grand periods of civilization—the religious period, the sophistical period, the scientific period.<sup>1</sup> Thus, alchemy represents the religious period of the science afterwards called chemistry, whose definitive plan is not yet discovered; likewise astrology was the religious period of another science, since established,—astronomy.

Now, after being laughed at for sixty years about the philosopher's stone, chemists, governed by experience, no longer dare to deny the transmutability of bodies; while astronomers are led by the structure of the world to suspect also an organism of the world; that is, something precisely like astrology. Are we not justified in saying, in imitation of the philosopher just quoted, that, if a little chemistry leads away from the philosopher's stone, much chemistry leads back to it; and similarly, that, if a little astronomy makes us laugh at astrologers, much astronomy will make us believe in them?<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, among others, Auguste Comte, "Course of Positive Philosophy," and P. J. Proudhon, "Creation of Order in Humanity."

<sup>2</sup> I do not mean to affirm here in a positive manner the transmutability of bodies, or to point it out as a subject for investigation; still less do I pretend to say what ought to be the opinion of *savants* upon this point. I wish only to call attention to the species of scepticism generated in every uninformed mind by the most general conclusions of chemical philosophy, or, better, by the irreconcilable hypotheses which serve as the basis of its theories. Chemistry is truly the despair of reason: on all sides it mingles with the fanciful; and the more knowledge of it we gain by experience, the more it envelops itself in impenetrable mysteries. This thought was recently suggested to me by reading M. Liebig's "Letters on Chemistry" (Paris, Masgana, 1845, translation of Bertet-Dupiney and Dubreuil-Héliou).

Thus M. Liebig, after having banished from science hypothetical causes and all the entities admitted by the ancients,—such as the creative power of matter, the horror of a vacuum, the *esprit recteur*, etc. (p. 22),—admits immediately, as necessary to the comprehension of chemical phenomena, a series of entities no less obscure,—vital force, chemical force, electric force, the force of attraction, etc. (pp. 146, 149). One might call it a realization of the properties of bodies, in imitation of the psychologists' re-

I certainly have less inclination to the marvellous than many atheists, but I cannot help thinking that the stories of miracles,

alization of the faculties of the soul under the names liberty, imagination, memory, etc. Why not keep to the elements? Why, if the atoms have weight of their own, as M. Liebig appears to believe, may they not also have electricity and life of their own? Curious thing! the phenomena of matter, like those of mind, become intelligible only by supposing them to be produced by unintelligible forces and governed by contradictory laws: such is the inference to be drawn from every page of M. Liebig's book.

Matter, according to M. Liebig, is essentially inert and entirely destitute of spontaneous activity (p. 148): why, then, do the atoms have weight? Is not the weight inherent in atoms the real, eternal, and spontaneous motion of matter? And that which we chance to regard as rest,—may it not be equilibrium rather? Why, then, suppose now an inertia which definitions contradict, now an external potentiality which nothing proves?

Atoms having *weight*, M. Liebig infers that they are *indivisible* (p. 58). What logic! Weight is only force, that is, a thing hidden from the senses, whose phenomena alone are perceptible,—a thing, consequently, to which the idea of division and indivision is inapplicable; and from the presence of this force, from the hypothesis of an indeterminate and immaterial entity, is inferred an indivisible material existence!

For the rest, M. Liebig confesses that it is *impossible for the mind* to conceive of particles absolutely indivisible; he recognizes, further, that the *fact* of this indivisibility is not proved; but he adds that science cannot dispense with this hypothesis: so that, by the confession of its teachers, chemistry has for its point of departure a fiction as repugnant to the mind as it is foreign to experience. What irony!

Atoms are unequal in weight, says M. Liebig, because unequal in volume: nevertheless, it is impossible to demonstrate that chemical equivalents express the relative weight of atoms, or, in other words, that what the calculation of atomic equivalents leads us to regard as an atom is not composed of several atoms. This is tantamount to saying that *more matter* weighs more than *less matter*; and, since weight is the essence of materiality, we may logically conclude that, weight being universally identical with itself, there is also an identity in matter; that the differences of simple bodies are due solely, either to different methods of atomic association, or to different degrees of molecular condensation, and that, in reality, atoms are transmutable: which M. Liebig does not admit.

"We have," he says, "no reason for believing that one element is convertible into another element" (p. 135). What do you know about it? The reasons for believing in such a conversion can very well exist and at the same time escape your attention; and it is not certain that your intelligence in this respect has risen to the level of your experience. But, admitting the negative argument of M. Liebig, what follows? That, with about fifty-six exceptions, irreducible as yet, all matter is in a condition of perpetual metamorphosis. Now, it is a law of our reason to suppose in Nature unity of substance as well as unity of force and system; moreover, the series of chemical compounds and simple substances themselves leads us irresistibly to this conclusion. Why, then, refuse to follow to the end the road opened by science, and to admit an hypothesis which is the inevitable result of experience itself?

M. Liebig not only denies the transmutability of elements, but rejects the spontaneous formation of germs. Now, if we reject the spontaneous formation of germs, we are forced to admit their eternity; and as, on the other hand, geology proves that the globe has not been inhabited always, we must admit also that, at a given moment, the eternal germs of animals and plants were born, without father or mother, over the whole face of the earth. Thus, the denial of spontaneous generation leads back to the hypothesis of spontaneity: what is there in much-derided metaphysics more contradictory?

Let it not be thought, however, that I deny the value and certainty of chemical theories, or that the atomic theory seems to me absurd, or that I share the Epicurean opinion as to spontaneous generation. Once more, all that I wish to point out is that, from the point of view of principles, chemistry needs to exercise extreme tolerance, since its own existence depends on a certain number of fictions, contrary to reason and experience, and destructive of each other.

prophecies, charms, etc., are but distorted accounts of the extraordinary effects produced by certain latent forces, or, as was formerly said, by occult powers. Our science is still so brutal and unfair; our professors exhibit so much impertinence with so little knowledge; they deny so impudently facts which embarrass them, in order to protect the opinions which they champion,—that I distrust strong minds equally with superstitious ones. Yes, I am convinced of it; our gross rationalism is the inauguration of a period which, thanks to science, will become truly *prodigious*; the universe, to my eyes, is only a laboratory of magic, from which any thing may be expected. . . . This said, I return to my subject.

They would be deceived, then, who should imagine, after my rapid survey of religious progress, that metaphysics has uttered its last word upon the double enigma expressed in these four words,—the existence of God, the immortality of the soul. Here, as elsewhere, the most advanced and best established conclusions, those which seem to have settled for ever the theological question, lead us back to primeval mysticism, and involve the new data of an inevitable philosophy. The criticism of religious opinions makes us smile to-day both at ourselves and at religions; and yet the *résumé* of this criticism is but a reproduction of the problem. The human race, at the present moment, is on the eve of recognizing and affirming something equivalent to the old notion of Divinity; and this, not by a spontaneous movement as before, but through reflection and by means of irresistible logic. I will try, in a few words, to make myself understood.

If there is a point on which philosophers, in spite of themselves, have finally succeeded in agreeing, it is without doubt the distinction between intelligence and necessity, the subject of thought and its object, the me and the not-me; in ordinary terms, spirit and matter. I know well that all these terms express nothing that is real and true; that each of them designates only a section of the absolute, which alone is true and real; and that, taken separately, they involve, all alike, a contradiction. But it is no less certain also that the absolute is completely inaccessible to us; that we know it only by its opposite extremes, which alone fall within the limits of our experience; and that, if unity only can win our faith, duality is the first condition of science.

Thus, who thinks, and what is thought? What is a soul? what is a body? I defy any one to escape this dualism. It is with essences as with ideas: the former are seen separated in Nature, as the latter in the understanding; and just as the ideas of God and immortality, in spite of their identity, are posited successively and contradictorily in philosophy, so, in spite of their fusion in the absolute, the me and the not-me posit themselves separately and contradictorily in Nature, and we have beings who think, at the same time with others which do not think.

Now, whoever has taken pains to reflect knows to-day that such a distinction, wholly realized though it be, is the most unintelligible, most contradictory, most absurd thing which reason can possibly meet. Being is no more conceivable without the properties of spirit than without the properties of matter: so that if you deny spirit, because, included in none of the categories of time, space, motion, solidity, etc., it seems deprived of all the attributes which constitute reality, I in my turn will deny matter, which, presenting nothing appreciable but its inertia, nothing intelligible but its forms, manifests itself nowhere as cause (voluntary and free), and disappears from view entirely as substance; and we arrive at pure idealism, that is, nihility. But nihility is inconsistent with the existence of living, reasoning—I know not what to call them—uniting in themselves, in a state of commenced synthesis or imminent dissolution, all the antagonistic attributes of being. We are compelled, then, to end in a dualism whose terms we know perfectly well to be false, but which, being for us the condition of the truth, forces itself irresistibly upon us; we are compelled, in short, to commence, like Descartes and the human race, with the me; that is, with spirit.

But, since religions and philosophies, dissolved by analysis, have disappeared in the theory of the absolute, we know no better than before what spirit is, and in this differ from the ancients only in the wealth of language with which we adorn the darkness that envelops us. With this exception, however; that while, to the ancients, order revealed intelligence *outside* of the world, to the people of to-day it seems to reveal it rather *within* the world. Now, whether we place it within or without, from the moment we affirm it on the ground of order, we must admit



it wherever order is manifested, or deny it altogether. There is no more reason for attributing intelligence to the head which produced the "Iliad" than to a mass of matter which crystallizes in octahedrons; and, reciprocally, it is as absurd to refer the system of the world to physical laws, leaving out an ordaining ME, as to attribute the victory of Marengo to strategic combinations, leaving out the first consul. The only distinction that can be made is that, in the latter case, the thinking ME is located in the brain of a Bonaparte, while, in the case of the universe, the ME has no special location, but extends everywhere.

The materialists think that they have easily disposed of their opponents by saying that man, having likened the universe to his body, finishes the comparison by presuming the existence in the universe of a soul similar to that which he supposes to be the principle of his own life and thought; that thus all the arguments in support of the existence of God are reducible to an analogy all the more false because the term of comparison is itself hypothetical.

It is certainly not my intention to defend the old syllogism: Every arrangement implies an ordaining intelligence; there is wonderful order in the world; then the world is the work of an intelligence. This syllogism, discussed so widely since the days of Job and Moses, very far from being a solution, is but the statement of the problem which it assumes to solve. We know perfectly well what order is, but we are absolutely ignorant of the meaning of the words Soul, Spirit, Intelligence: how, then, can we logically reason from the presence of the one to the existence of the other? I reject, then, even when advanced by the most thoroughly informed, the pretended proof of the existence of God drawn from the presence of order in the world; I see in it at most only an equation offered to philosophy. Between the conception of order and the affirmation of spirit there is a deep gulf of metaphysics to be filled up; I am unwilling, I repeat, to take the problem for the demonstration.

But this is not the point which we are now considering. I have tried to show that the human mind was inevitably and irresistibly led to the distinction of being into me and not-me, spirit and matter, soul and body. Now, who does not see that the objection of the materialists proves the very thing it is

intended to deny? Man distinguishing within himself a spiritual principle and a material principle,—what is this but Nature herself, proclaiming by turns her double essence, and bearing testimony to her own laws? And notice the inconsistency of materialism: it denies, and has to deny, that man is free; now, the less liberty man has, the more weight is to be attached to his words, and the greater their claim to be regarded as the expression of truth. When I hear this machine say to me, "I am soul and I am body," though such a revelation astonishes and confounds me, it is invested in my eyes with an authority incomparably greater than that of the materialist who, correcting conscience and Nature, undertakes to make them say, "I am matter and only matter, and intelligence is but the material faculty of knowing."

What would become of this assertion, if, assuming in my turn the offensive, I should demonstrate that belief in the existence of bodies, or, in other words, in the reality of a purely corporeal nature, is untenable? Matter, they say, is impenetrable.—Impenetrable by what? I ask. Itself, undoubtedly; for they would not dare to say spirit, since they would therein admit what they wish to set aside. Whereupon I raise this double question: What do you know about it, and what does it signify?

I. Impenetrability, which is pretended to be the definition of matter, is only an hypothesis of careless naturalists, a gross conclusion deduced from a superficial judgment. Experience shows that matter possesses infinite divisibility, infinite expansibility, porosity without assignable limits, and permeability by heat, electricity, and magnetism, together with a power of retaining them indefinitely; affinities, reciprocal influences, and transformations without number: qualities, all of them, hardly compatible with the assumption of an impenetrable *aliquid*. Elasticity, which, better than any other property of matter, could lead, through the idea of spring or resistance, to that of impenetrability, is subject to the control of a thousand circumstances, and depends entirely on molecular attraction: now, what is more irreconcilable with impenetrability than this attraction? Finally, there is a science which might be defined with exactness as the *science of the penetrability of matter*: I mean chemistry. In fact, how does what is called chemical composition differ from

penetration?<sup>1</sup> . . . In short, we know matter only through its forms; of its substance we know nothing. How, then, is it possible to affirm the reality of an invisible, impalpable, incoercible being, ever changing, ever vanishing, impenetrable to thought alone, to which it exhibits only its disguises? Materialist! I permit you to testify to the reality of your sensations; as to what occasions them, all that you can say involves this reciprocity: something (which you call matter) is the occasion of sensations which are felt by another something (which I call spirit).

2. But what, then, is the source of this supposition that matter is impenetrable, which external observation does not justify and which is not true; and what is its meaning?

Here appears the triumph of dualism. Matter is pronounced impenetrable, not, as the materialists and the vulgar fancy, by the testimony of the senses, but by the conscience. The *me*, an incomprehensible nature, feeling itself free, distinct, and permanent, and meeting outside of itself another nature equally incomprehensible, but also distinct and permanent in spite of its metamorphoses, declares, on the strength of the sensations and ideas which this essence suggests to it, that the *not-me* is extended and impenetrable. Impenetrability is a figurative term, an image by which thought, a division of the absolute, pictures to itself material reality, another division of the absolute; but this impenetrability, without which matter disappears, is, in the

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<sup>1</sup> Chemists distinguish between *mixture* and *composition*, just as logicians distinguish between the association of ideas and their synthesis. It is true, nevertheless, that, according to the chemists, composition may be after all but a mixture, or rather an aggregation of atoms, no longer fortuitous, but systematic, the atoms forming different compounds by varying their arrangement. But still this is only an hypothesis, wholly gratuitous; an hypothesis which explains nothing, and has not even the merit of being logical. Why does a purely *numerical* or *geometrical* difference in the composition and form of atoms give rise to *physiological* properties so different? If atoms are indivisible and impenetrable, why does not their association, confined to mechanical effects, leave them unchanged in essence? Where is the relation between the cause supposed and the effect obtained?

We must distrust our intellectual vision: it is with chemical theories as with psychological systems. The mind, in order to account for phenomena, works with atoms, which it does not and can never see, as with the *me*, which it does not perceive: it applies its categories to every thing; that is, it distinguishes, individualizes, concretes, numbers, compares, things which, material or immaterial, are thoroughly identical and indistinguishable. Matter, as well as spirit, plays, as we view it, all sorts of parts; and, as there is nothing arbitrary in its metamorphoses, we build upon them these psychologic and atomic theories, true in so far as they faithfully represent, in terms agreed upon, the series of phenomena, but radically false as soon as they pretend to realize their abstractions and are accepted literally.

last analysis, only a spontaneous judgment of inward sensation, a metaphysical *à priori*, an unverified hypothesis of spirit.

Thus, whether philosophy, after having overthrown theological dogmatism, spiritualizes matter or materializes thought, idealizes being or realizes ideas; or whether, identifying *substance* and *cause*, it everywhere substitutes FORCE, phrases, all, which explain and signify nothing,—it always leads us back to this everlasting dualism, and, in summoning us to believe in ourselves, compels us to believe in God, if not in spirits. It is true that, making spirit a part of Nature, in distinction from the ancients, who separated it, philosophy has been led to this famous conclusion, which sums up nearly all the fruit of its researches: In man spirit *knows itself*, while everywhere else it seems *not to know itself*.—"That which is awake in man, which dreams in the animal, and sleeps in the stone," said a philosopher.

Philosophy, then, in its last hour, knows no more than at its birth: as if it had appeared in the world only to verify the words of Socrates, it says to us, wrapping itself solemnly around with its funeral pall, "I know only that I know nothing." What do I say? Philosophy knows to-day that all its judgments rest on two equally false, equally impossible, and yet equally necessary and inevitable hypotheses,—matter and spirit. So that, while in former times religious intolerance and philosophic disputes, spreading darkness everywhere, excused doubt and tempted to libidinous indifference, the triumph of negation on all points no longer permits even this doubt; thought, freed from every barrier, but conquered by its own successes, is forced to affirm what seems to it clearly contradictory and absurd. The savages say that the world is a great fetich watched over by a great manitou. For thirty centuries the poets, legislators, and sages of civilization, handing down from age to age the philosophic lamp, have written nothing more sublime than this profession of faith. And here, at the end of this long conspiracy against God, which has called itself philosophy, emancipated reason concludes with savage reason, The universe is a *not-me*, objectified by a *me*.

Humanity, then, inevitably supposes the existence of God: and if, during the long period which closes with our time, it has believed in the reality of its hypothesis; if it has worshipped the inconceivable object; if, after being apprehended in this act

of faith, it persists knowingly, but no longer voluntarily, in this opinion of a sovereign being which it knows to be only a personification of its own thought; if it is on the point of again beginning its magic invocations,—we must believe that so astonishing an hallucination conceals some mystery, which deserves to be fathomed.

I say hallucination and mystery, but without intending to deny thereby the superhuman content of the God-idea, and without admitting the necessity of a new symbolism,—I mean a new religion. For if it is indisputable that humanity, in affirming God,—or all that is included in the word *me* or *spirit*,—only affirms itself, it is equally undeniable that it affirms itself as something other than its own conception of itself, as all mythologies and theologies show. And since, moreover, this affirmation is incontestable, it depends, without doubt, upon hidden relations, which ought, if possible, to be determined scientifically.

In other words, atheism, sometimes called humanism, true in its critical and negative features, would be, if it stopped at man in his natural condition, if it discarded as an erroneous judgment this first affirmation of humanity, that it is the daughter, emanation, image, reflection, or voice of God,—humanism, I say, if it thus denied its past, would be but one contradiction more. We are forced, then, to undertake the criticism of humanism; that is, to ascertain whether humanity, considered as a whole and throughout all its periods of development, satisfies the Divine idea, after eliminating from the latter the exaggerated and fanciful attributes of God; whether it satisfies the perfection of being; whether it satisfies itself. We are forced, in short, to inquire whether humanity *tends toward* God, according to the ancient dogma, or is itself *becoming* God, as modern philosophers claim. Perhaps we shall find in the end that the two systems, despite their seeming opposition, are both true and essentially identical: in that case, the infallibility of human reason, in its collective manifestations as well as its studied speculations, would be decisively confirmed.—In a word, until we have verified to man the hypothesis of God, there is nothing definitive in the atheistic negation.

It is, then, a scientific, that is, an empirical demonstration of the idea of God, that we need: now, such a demonstration has

never been attempted. Theology dogmatizing on the authority of its myths, philosophy speculating by the aid of categories, God has existed as a *transcendental* conception, incognizable by the reason, and the hypothesis always subsists.

It subsists, I say, this hypothesis, more tenacious, more pitiless than ever. We have reached one of those prophetic epochs when society, scornful of the past and doubtful of the future, now distractedly clings to the present, leaving a few solitary thinkers to establish the new faith; now cries to God from the depths of its enjoyments and asks for a sign of salvation, or seeks in the spectacle of its revolutions, as in the entrails of a victim, the secret of its destiny.

Why need I insist further? The hypothesis of God is allowable, for it forces itself upon every man in spite of himself: no one, then, can take exception to it. He who believes can do no less than grant me the supposition that God exists; he who denies is forced to grant it to me also, since he entertained it before me, every negation implying a previous affirmation; as for him who is in doubt, he needs but to reflect a moment to understand that his doubt necessarily supposes an unknown something, which, sooner or later, he will call God.

But if I possess, through the fact of my thought, the right to *suppose* God, I must abandon the right to *affirm* him. In other words, if my hypothesis is irresistible, that, for the present, is all that I can pretend. For to affirm is to determine; now every determination, to be true, must be reached empirically. In fact, whoever says determination, says relation, conditionality, experience. Since, then, the determination of the idea of God must result from an empirical demonstration, we must abstain from every thing which, in the search for this great unknown, not being established by experience, goes beyond the hypothesis, under penalty of relapsing into the contradictions of theology, and consequently arousing anew atheistic dissent.

### III.

It remains for me to tell why, in a work on political economy, I have felt it necessary to start with the fundamental hypothesis of all philosophy.

And first, I need the hypothesis of God to establish the authority of social science.—When the astronomer, to explain the system of the world, judging solely from appearance, supposes, with the vulgar, the sky arched, the earth flat, the sun much like a football, describing a curve in the air from east to west, he supposes the infallibility of the senses, reserving the right to rectify subsequently, after further observation, the data with which he is obliged to start. Astronomic philosophy, in fact, could not admit *à priori* that the senses deceive us, and that we do not see what we do see: admitting such a principle, what would become of the certainty of astronomy? But the evidence of the senses being able, in certain cases, to rectify and complete itself, the authority of the senses remains unshaken, and astronomy is possible.

So social philosophy does not admit *à priori* that humanity can err or be deceived in its actions: if it should, what would become of the authority of the human race, that is, the authority of reason, synonymous at bottom with the sovereignty of the people? But it thinks that human judgments, always true at the time they are pronounced, can successively complete and throw light on each other, in proportion to the acquisition of ideas, in such a way as to maintain continual harmony between universal reason and individual speculation, and indefinitely extend the sphere of certainty: which is always an affirmation of the authority of human judgments.

Now, the first judgment of the reason, the preamble of every political constitution seeking a sanction and a principle, is necessarily this: *There is a God*; which means that society is governed with design, premeditation, intelligence. This judgment, which excludes chance, is, then, the foundation of the possibility of a social science; and every historical and positive study of social facts, undertaken with a view to amelioration and progress, must suppose, with the people, the existence of God, reserving the right to account for this judgment at a later period.

Thus the history of society is to us but a long determination of the idea of God, a progressive revelation of the destiny of man. And while ancient wisdom made all depend on the arbitrary and fanciful notion of Divinity, oppressing reason and conscience, and arresting progress through fear of an invisible master, the



new philosophy, reversing the method, trampling on the authority of God as well as that of man, and accepting no other yoke than that of fact and evidence, makes all converge toward the theological hypothesis, as toward the last of its problems.

Humanitarian atheism is, therefore, the last step in the moral and intellectual enfranchisement of man, consequently the last phase of philosophy, serving as a pathway to the scientific reconstruction and verification of all the demolished dogmas.

I need the hypothesis of God, not only, as I have just said, to give a meaning to history, but also to legitimate the reforms to be effected, in the name of science, in the State.

Whether we consider Divinity as outside of society, whose movements it governs from on high (a wholly gratuitous and probably illusory opinion); or whether we deem it immanent in society and identical with that impersonal and unconscious reason which, acting instinctively, makes civilization advance (although impersonality and ignorance of self are contrary to the idea of intelligence); or whether, finally, all that is accomplished in society results from the relation of its elements (a system whose whole merit consists in changing an active into a passive, in making intelligence necessity, or, which amounts to the same thing, in taking law for cause),—it always follows that the manifestations of social activity, necessarily appearing to us either as indications of the will of the Supreme Being, or as a sort of language typical of general and impersonal reason, or, finally, as landmarks of necessity, are absolute authority for us. Being connected in time as well as in spirit, the facts accomplished determine and legitimate the facts to be accomplished; science and destiny are in accord; every thing which happens resulting from reason, and, reciprocally, reason judging only from experience of that which happens, science has a right to participate in government, and that which establishes its competency as a counsellor justifies its intervention as a sovereign.

Science, expressed, recognized, and accepted by the voice of all as divine, is queen of the world. Thus, thanks to the hypothesis of God, all conservative or retrogressive opposition, every dilatory plea offered by theology, tradition, or selfishness, finds itself peremptorily and irrevocably set aside.

I need the hypothesis of God to show the tie which unites civilization with Nature.

In fact, this astonishing hypothesis, by which man is assimilated to the absolute, implying identity of the laws of Nature and the laws of reason, enables us to see in human industry the complement of creative action, unites man with the globe which he inhabits, and, in the cultivation of the domain in which Providence has placed us, which thus becomes in part our work, gives us a conception of the principle and end of all things. If, then, humanity is not God, it is a continuation of God; or, if a different phraseology be preferred, that which humanity does to-day by design is the same thing that it began by instinct, and which Nature seems to accomplish by necessity. In all these cases, and whichever opinion we may choose, one thing remains certain: the unity of action and law. Intelligent beings, actors in an intelligently-devised fable, we may fearlessly reason from ourselves to the universe and the eternal; and, when we shall have completed the organization of labor, may say with pride, The creation is explained.

Thus philosophy's field of exploration is fixed; tradition is the starting-point of all speculation as to the future; utopia is for ever exploded; the study of the *me*, transferred from the individual conscience to the manifestations of the social will, acquires the character of objectivity of which it has been hitherto deprived; and, history becoming psychology, theology anthropology, the natural sciences metaphysics, the theory of the reason is deduced no longer from the vacuum of the intellect, but from the innumerable forms of a Nature abundantly and directly observable.

I need the hypothesis of God to prove my good-will towards a multitude of sects, whose opinions I do not share, but whose malice I fear:—theists; I know one who, in the cause of God, would be ready to draw sword, and, like Robespierre, use the guillotine until the last atheist should be destroyed, not dreaming that that atheist would be himself;—mystics, whose party, largely made up of students and women marching under the banner of MM. Lamennais, Quinet, Leroux, and others, has taken for a motto, "Like master, like man;" like God, like people; and, to regulate the wages of the workingman, begins

by restoring religion ;—spiritualists, who, should I overlook the rights of spirit, would accuse me of establishing the worship of matter, against which I protest with all the strength of my soul ;—sensualists and materialists, to whom the divine dogma is the symbol of constraint and the principle of enslavement of the passions, outside of which, they say, there is for man neither pleasure, nor virtue, nor genius ;—eclectics and sceptics, sellers and publishers of all the old philosophies, but not philosophers themselves, united in one vast brotherhood, with approbation and privilege, against whoever thinks, believes, or affirms without their permission ;—conservatives finally, retrogressives, egotists, and hypocrites, preaching the love of God by hatred of their neighbor, attributing to liberty the world's misfortunes since the deluge, and scandalizing reason by their foolishness.

Is it possible, however, that they will attack an hypothesis which, far from blaspheming the revered phantoms of faith, aspires only to exhibit them in broad daylight ; which, instead of rejecting traditional dogmas and the prejudices of conscience, asks only to verify them ; which, while defending itself against exclusive opinions, takes for an axiom the infallibility of reason, and, thanks to this fruitful principle, will doubtless never decide against any of the antagonistic sects ? Is it possible that the religious and political conservatives will charge me with disturbing the order of society, when I start with the hypothesis of a sovereign intelligence, the source of every thought of order ; that the semi-Christian democrats will curse me as an enemy of God, and consequently a traitor to the republic, when I am seeking for the meaning and content of the idea of God ; and that the tradesmen of the university will impute to me the impiety of demonstrating the non-value of their philosophical products, when I am especially maintaining that philosophy should be studied in its object,—that is, in the manifestations of society and Nature ? . . . .

I need the hypothesis of God to justify my style.

In my ignorance of every thing regarding God, the world, the soul, and destiny ; forced to proceed like the materialist,—that is, by observation and experience,—and to conclude in the language of the believer, because there is no other ; not knowing whether my formulas, theological in spite of me, would be taken literally

or figuratively; in this perpetual contemplation of God, man, and things, obliged to submit to the synonymy of all the terms included in the three categories of thought, speech, and action, but wishing to affirm nothing on either one side or the other,—rigorous logic demanded that I should suppose, no more, no less, this unknown that is called God. We are full of Divinity, *Fovis omnia plena*; our monuments, our traditions, our laws, our ideas, our languages, and our sciences, all are infected by this indelible superstition outside of which we can neither speak nor act, and without which we do not even think.

Finally, I need the hypothesis of God to explain the publication of these new memoirs.

Our society feels itself big with events, and is anxious about the future: how account for these vague presentiments by the sole aid of a universal reason, immanent if you will, and permanent, but impersonal, and therefore dumb, or by the idea of necessity, if it implies that necessity is self-conscious, and consequently has presentiments? There remains then, once more, an agent or nightmare which weighs upon society, and gives it visions.

Now, when society prophesies, it puts questions in the mouths of some, and answers in the mouths of others. And wise, then, he who can listen and understand; for God himself has spoken, *quia locutus est Deus*.

The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences has proposed the following question:—

“To determine the general facts which govern the relations of profits to wages, and to explain their respective oscillations.”

A few years ago the same Academy asked, “What are the causes of misery?” The nineteenth century has, in fact, but one idea,—equality and reform. But the wind bloweth where it listeth: many began to reflect upon the question, no one answered it. The college of aruspices has, therefore, renewed its question, but in more significant terms. It wishes to know whether order prevails in the workshop; whether wages are equitable; whether liberty and privilege compensate each other justly; whether the idea of value, which controls all the facts of exchange, is, in the forms in which the economists have represented it, sufficiently exact; whether credit protects labor;

whether circulation is regular ; whether the burdens of society weigh equally on all, etc.

And, indeed, insufficiency of income being the immediate cause of misery, it is fitting that we should know why, misfortune and malevolence aside, the workingman's income is insufficient. It is still the same question of inequality of fortunes, which has made such a stir for a century past, and which, by a strange fatality, continually reappears in academic programmes, as if there lay the real difficulty of modern times.

Equality, then,—its principle, its means, its obstacles, its theory, the motives of its postponement, the cause of social and providential iniquities,—these the world has got to learn, in spite of the sneers of incredulity.

I know well that the views of the Academy are not thus profound, and that it equals a council of the Church in its horror of novelties ; but the more it turns towards the past, the more it reflects the future, and the more, consequently, must we believe in its inspiration : for the true prophets are those who do not understand their utterances. Listen further.

"What," the Academy has asked, "are the most useful applications of the principle of voluntary and private association that we can make for the alleviation of misery?"

And again :—

"To expound the theory and principles of the contract of insurance, to give its history, and to deduce from its rationale and the facts the developments of which this contract is capable, and the various useful applications possible in the present state of commercial and industrial progress."

Publicists admit that insurance, a rudimentary form of commercial solidarity, is an association in things, *societas in re* ; that is, a society whose conditions, founded on purely economical relations, escape man's arbitrary dictation. So that a philosophy of insurance or mutual guarantee of security, which shall be deduced from the general theory of real (*in re*) societies, will contain the formula of universal association, in which no member of the Academy believes. And when, uniting subject and object in the same point of view, the Academy demands, by the side of a theory of association of interests, a theory of voluntary association, it reveals to us the most perfect form of society, and

thereby affirms all that is most at variance with its convictions. Liberty, equality, solidarity, association! By what inconceivable blunder has so eminently conservative a body offered to the citizens this new programme of the rights of man? It was in this way that Caiaphas prophesied redemption by disowning Jesus Christ.

Upon the first of these questions, forty-five memoirs were addressed to the Academy within two years,—a proof that the subject was marvellously well suited to the state of the public mind. But among so many competitors no one having been deemed worthy of the prize, the Academy has withdrawn the question; alleging as a reason the incapacity of the competitors, but in reality because, the failure of the contest being the sole object that the Academy had in view, it behooved it to declare, without further delay, that the hopes of the friends of association were groundless.

Thus, then, the gentlemen of the Academy disavow, in their session-chamber, their announcements from the tripod! There is nothing in such a contradiction astonishing to me; and may God preserve me from calling it a crime! The ancients believed that revolutions announced their advent by dreadful signs, and that among other prodigies animals spoke. This was a figure, descriptive of those unexpected ideas and strange words which circulate suddenly among the masses at critical moments, and which seem to be entirely without human antecedent, so far removed are they from the sphere of ordinary judgment. At the time in which we live, such a thing could not fail to occur. After having, by a prophetic instinct and a mechanical spontaneity, *pecudesque locutæ*, proclaimed association, the gentlemen of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences have returned to their ordinary prudence; and with them custom has conquered inspiration. Let us learn, then, how to distinguish heavenly counsel from the interested judgments of men, and hold it for certain that, in the discourse of sages, that is the most trustworthy to which they have given the least reflection.

Nevertheless the Academy, in breaking so rudely with its intuitions, seems to have felt some remorse. In place of a theory of association in which, after reflection, it no longer believes, it asks for a "Critical examination of Pestalozzi's system of

instruction and education, considered mainly in its relation to the well-being and morality of the poor classes." Who knows? perchance the relation between profits and wages, association, the organization of labor indeed, are to be found at the bottom of a system of instruction. Is not man's life a perpetual apprenticeship? Are not philosophy and religion humanity's education? To organize instruction, then, would be to organize industry and fix the theory of society: the Academy, in its lucid moments, always returns to that.

"What influence," the Academy again asks, "do progress and a desire for material comfort have upon a nation's morality?"

Taken in its most obvious sense, this new question of the Academy is commonplace, and fit at best to exercise a rhetorician's skill. But the Academy, which must continue till the end in its ignorance of the revolutionary significance of its oracles, has drawn aside the curtain in its commentary. What, then, so profound has it discovered in this Epicurean thesis?

"The desire for luxury and its enjoyments," it tells us; "the singular love of it felt by the majority; the tendency of hearts and minds to occupy themselves with it exclusively; the agreement of individuals AND THE STATE in making it the motive and the end of all their projects, all their efforts, and all their sacrifices,—engender general or individual feelings which, beneficent or injurious, become principles of action more potent, perhaps, than any which have heretofore governed men."

Never had moralists a more favorable opportunity to assail the sensualism of the century, the venality of consciences, and the corruption instituted by the government: instead of that, what does the Academy of Moral Sciences do? With the most automatic calmness, it establishes a series in which luxury, so long proscribed by the stoics and ascetics,—those masters of holiness,—must appear in its turn as a principle of conduct as legitimate, as pure, and as grand as all those formerly invoked by religion and philosophy. Determine, it tells us, the motives of action (undoubtedly now old and worn-out) of which LUXURY is historically the providential successor, and, from the results of the former, calculate the effects of the latter. Prove, in short, that Aristippus was only in advance of his century, and that his



system of morality must have its day, as well as that of Zeno and A Kempis.

We are dealing, then, with a society which no longer wishes to be poor; which mocks at every thing that was once dear and sacred to it,—liberty, religion, and glory,—so long as it has not wealth; which, to obtain it, submits to all outrages, and becomes an accomplice in all sorts of cowardly actions: and this burning thirst for pleasure, this irresistible desire to arrive at luxury,—a symptom of a new period in civilization,—is the supreme commandment by virtue of which we are to labor for the abolition of poverty: thus saith the Academy. What becomes, then, of the doctrine of expiation and abstinence, the morality of sacrifice, resignation, and happy moderation? What distrust of the compensation promised in the other life, and what a contradiction of the Gospel! But, above all, what a justification of a government which has adopted as its system the golden key! Why have religious men, Christians, Senecas, given utterance in concert to so many immoral maxims?

The Academy, completing its thought, will reply to us:—

“Show how the progress of criminal justice, in the prosecution and punishment of attacks upon persons and property, follows and marks the ages of civilization from the savage condition up to that of the best-governed nations.”

Is it possible that the criminal lawyers in the Academy of Moral Sciences foresaw the conclusion of their premises? The fact whose history is now to be studied, and which the Academy describes by the words “progress of criminal justice,” is simply the gradual mitigation which manifests itself, both in the forms of criminal examinations and in the penalties inflicted, in proportion as civilization increases in liberty, light, and wealth. So that, the principle of repressive institutions being the direct opposite of all those on which the welfare of society depends, there is a constant elimination of all parts of the penal system as well as all judicial paraphernalia, and the final inference from this movement is that the guarantee of order lies neither in fear nor punishment; consequently, neither in hell nor religion.

What a subversion of received ideas! What a denial of all that it is the business of the Academy of Moral Sciences to defend! But, if the guarantee of order no longer lies in the fear

of a punishment to be suffered, either in this life or in another, where then are to be found the guarantees protective of persons and property? Or rather, without repressive institutions, what becomes of property? And without property, what becomes of the family?

The Academy, which knows nothing of all these things, replies without agitation:—

“Review the various phases of the organization of the family upon the soil of France from ancient times down to our day.”

Which means: Determine, by the previous progress of family organization, the conditions of the existence of the family in a state of equality of fortunes, voluntary and free association, universal solidarity, material comfort and luxury, and public order without prisons, courts, police, or hangmen.

There will be astonishment, perhaps, at finding that the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, after having, like the boldest innovators, called in question all the principles of social order,—religion, family, property, justice,—has not also proposed this problem: *What is the best form of government?* In fact, government is for society the source of all initiative, every guarantee, every reform. It would be, then, interesting to know whether the government, as constituted by the Charter, is adequate to the practical solution of the Academy's questions.

But it would be a misconception of the oracles to imagine that they proceed by induction and analysis; and precisely because the political problem was a condition or corollary of the demonstrations asked for, the Academy could not offer it for competition. Such a conclusion would have opened its eyes, and, without waiting for the memoirs of the competitors, it would have hastened to suppress its entire programme. The Academy has approached the question from above. It has said:—

The works of God are beautiful in their own essence, *justificata in semet ipsa*; they are true, in a word, because they are his. The thoughts of man resemble dense vapors pierced by long and narrow flashes. *What, then, is the truth in relation to us, and what is the character of certainty?*

As if the Academy had said to us: You shall verify the hypothesis of your existence, the hypothesis of the Academy which interrogates you, the hypotheses of time, space, motion, thought,

and the laws of thought. Then you may verify the hypothesis of pauperism, the hypothesis of inequality of conditions, the hypothesis of universal association, the hypothesis of happiness, the hypotheses of monarchy and republicanism, the hypothesis of Providence! . . . .

A complete criticism of God and humanity.

I point to the programme of the honorable society: it is not I who have fixed the conditions of my task, it is the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. Now, how can I satisfy these conditions, if I am not myself endowed with infallibility; in a word, if I am not God or divine? The Academy admits, then, that divinity and humanity are identical, or at least correlative; but the question now is in what consists this correlation: such is the meaning of the problem of certainty, such is the object of social philosophy.

Thus, then, in the name of the society that God inspires, an Academy questions.

In the name of the same society, I am one of the prophets who attempt to answer. The task is an immense one, and I do not promise to accomplish it: I will go as far as God shall give me strength. But, whatever I may say, it does not come from me: the thought which inspires my pen is not personal, and nothing that I write can be attributed to me. I shall give the facts as I have seen them; I shall judge them by what I shall have said; I shall call every thing by its strongest name, and no one will take offence. I shall inquire freely, and by the rules of divination which I have learned, into the meaning of the divine purpose which is now expressing itself through the eloquent lips of sages and the inarticulate wailings of the people: and, though I should deny all the prerogatives guaranteed by our Constitution, I shall not be factious. I shall point my finger whither an invisible influence is pushing us; and neither my action nor my words shall be irritating. I shall stir up the cloud, and, though I should cause it to launch the thunderbolt, I should be innocent. In this solemn investigation to which the Academy invites me, I have more than the right to tell the truth,—I have the right to say what I think: may my thought, my words, and the truth be but one and the same thing!

And you, reader,—for without a reader there is no writer,—

you are half of my work. Without you, I am only sounding brass ; with the aid of your attention, I will speak marvels. Do you see this passing whirlwind called SOCIETY, from which burst forth, with startling brilliancy, lightnings, thunders, and voices ? I wish to cause you to place your finger on the hidden springs which move it ; but to that end you must reduce yourself at my command to a state of pure intelligence. The eyes of love and pleasure are powerless to recognize beauty in a skeleton, harmony in naked viscera, life in dark and coagulated blood : consequently the secrets of the social organism are a sealed letter to the man whose brain is beclouded by passion and prejudice. Such sublimities are unattainable except by cold and silent contemplation. Suffer me, then, before revealing to your eyes the leaves of the book of life, to prepare your soul by this sceptical purification which the great teachers of the people,—Socrates, Jesus Christ, St. Paul, St. Rémi, Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Kant, etc.,—have always claimed of their disciples.

Whoever you may be, clad in the rags of misery or decked in the sumptuous vestments of luxury, I restore you to that state of luminous nudity which neither the fumes of wealth nor the poisons of envious poverty dim. How persuade the rich that the difference of conditions arises from an error in the accounts ; and how can the poor, in their beggary, conceive that the proprietor possesses in good faith ? To investigate the sufferings of the laborer is to the idler the most intolerable of amusements ; just as to do justice to the fortunate is to the miserable the bitterest of draughts.

You occupy a high position : I strip you of it ; there you are, free. There is too much optimism beneath this official costume, too much subordination, too much idleness. Science demands an insurrection of thought : now, the thought of an official is his salary.

Your mistress, beautiful, passionate, artistic, is, I like to believe, possessed only by you. That is, your soul, your spirit, your conscience, have passed into the most charming object of luxury that nature and art have produced for the eternal torment of fascinated mortals. I separate you from this divine half of yourself : at the present day it is too much to wish for justice and at the same time to love a woman. To think with

grandeur and clearness, man must remove the lining of his nature and hold to his masculine hypostasis. Besides, in the state in which I have put you, your lover would no longer know you: remember the wife of Job.

What is your religion? . . . Forget your faith, and, through wisdom, become an atheist.—What! you say; an atheist in spite of our hypothesis!—No, but because of our hypothesis. One's thought must have been raised above divine things for a long time to be entitled to suppose a personality beyond man, a life beyond this life. For the rest, have no fears for your salvation. God is not angry with those who are led by reason to deny him, any more than he is anxious for those who are led by faith to worship him; and, in the state of your conscience, the surest course for you is to think nothing about him. Do you not see that it is with religion as with governments, the most perfect of which would be the denial of all? Then let no political or religious fancy hold your soul captive; in this way only can you now keep from being either a dupe or a renegade. Ah! said I in the days of my enthusiastic youth, shall I not hear the tolling for the second vespers of the republic, and our priests, dressed in white tunics, singing after the Doric fashion the returning hymn: *Change, ô Dieu, notre servitude, comme le vent du désert en un souffle rafraîchissant!* . . . But I have despaired of republicans, and no longer know either religion or priests.

I should like also, in order to thoroughly secure your judgment, dear reader, to render your soul insensible to pity, superior to virtue, indifferent to happiness. But that would be too much to expect of a neophyte. Remember only, and never forget, that pity, happiness, and virtue, like country, religion, and love, are masks. . . .

## THE INFLUENCE OF PHYSICAL CONDITIONS IN THE GENESIS OF SPECIES.

AMONG biologists who accept the modern theory of evolution as the only reasonable hypothesis available for the explanation of the diversity of structure among organized beings, there is a wide difference of opinion as to what are the leading causes of differentiation. The doctrine of natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, has recently been brought prominently forward as the key to this complex problem, and is upheld by a large class of enthusiastic adherents, who accept it as the full solution of the whole question. By others the conditions of environment are believed to be far more influential in effecting a certain class of modifications, at least, than the necessarily precarious influence of natural selection, which must take its origin in isolated instances of variation in favorable directions, and depend for its continuance upon these fortuitous advantages being inherited by the descendants of the favored individuals in which they originate. The modifying influence of conditions resulting from geographic or climatic causes, was long since noticed, and for nearly a century has been considered by many writers as explanatory of much of the diversity existing not only in the human race, but among animals. It has, however, remained, until recently, vaguely grounded, being based more in conjecture than on observed facts. Scarcely, indeed, have two decades passed since the real nature and extent of geographical variation among animals, and even as yet among only a few species, began to receive careful attention, while only within the last fifteen years has any attempt been made to correlate the observed differences with the climatic or geographical conditions of habitat. Only within recent years have the differences in

general size, and in the relative size of different parts, been ascertained by careful measurement, and the differences in the character of the tegumentary covering (as the pelage in mammals) and in color, in individuals of the same species inhabiting distant portions of a common habitat, been duly recorded. In the work of registering these instructive data, it has fallen to Americans to take a leading part; large credit in the matter being due not only to the activity of our professional biologists, but to the liberality of the general Government in attaching competent natural-history observers and collectors to the numerous surveying parties it has sent out during the last twenty years to explore the, till then, practically unknown geography and productions of our Western Territories. The combined fruits of their labors, together with those of the agents and correspondents of the Smithsonian Institution, have resulted in the accumulation of an amount of material far exceeding that elsewhere accessible to single investigators; representing, as it does, at least two of the vertebrate classes of animals from the whole North American continent so fully, that generalizations may be made from their study which could not otherwise have been reached for many years, and for which no similar facilities for any other equal area as yet exist. The recent investigations of American mammalogists and ornithologists have been, in consequence, largely directed to the subject of geographical variation; and their publications teem with tabulated measurements and records of variations in form and color that accompany differences in the climatic or geographical conditions of habitat. Among the results that have followed are the discovery of numerous interesting geographical varieties or sub-species, and the demonstration of the complete intergradation of many forms, often quite widely diverse in color, size, and proportion of parts, formerly regarded (and properly so as then known) as unquestionably distinct species; which discoveries have of course necessitated a large reduction in the number of recognized "specific" or non-intergrading forms. But most important of all has been the correlation of local variations with the conditions of environment, and the deduction therefrom of certain laws of geographical variation. Upon these have been based hypotheses that go far toward explaining many of the phenomena of intergradation



and differentiation observed among existing animals. In the present paper will be given not only a summary of the results thus far attained, but enough of the details of the subject to show the nature of the evidence on which rest the conclusions already reached. These results, it is claimed, show that other influences than natural selection operate powerfully in the differentiation of specific forms, and that geographical causes share more largely in the work than naturalists have heretofore been prepared to admit,—at least to consider as proven.

As is well known, animals vary greatly in respect to the extent of the areas they inhabit. While a few species are nearly or quite cosmopolitan, many others are restricted to single small islands, or to limited portions of a continent. Not a few range over the greater part of whole hemispheres, while by far the larger number are confined within comparatively narrow limits. Of the numerous species of mammals and birds inhabiting North America, none are equally common throughout the whole extent of the continent. The habitats of a few only extend from the Barren Grounds of the Arctic regions to Mexico, and from the Atlantic coast westward to the Pacific; one or two only among the mammals range over the whole continent from Alaska to Central America, while some occupy merely the extreme boreal parts of the continent. The latter, in many cases, range also over the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions of the Old World. Others extend from Arctic America southward to the United States. Still others occupy only the middle or more temperate latitudes, being unrepresented in the extreme north or the extreme south. Others, again, first appear in the middle or more southerly parts, and range thence southward far into the tropics. A large number are restricted to the region east of the Rocky Mountains; others are confined to a narrow belt along the Pacific coast; and others still to limited areas of the great Rocky Mountain Plateau. In general, their distribution accords with climatal regions or zones, their respective ranges being limited in part by latitude and in part by geographical barriers, as treeless, arid plains or high mountain ranges. The northern and southern boundaries of the habitat of a species are found to agree, not generally with the arbitrary parallels of the geographer, but with isothermal lines, these being more or less

different for each species. The geographical distribution of a species is thus mainly determined by climatic or other physical causes, though in part, doubtless, by its organic constitution. In most cases, species that are wide-ranging are the most variable, as would naturally follow from their being subjected, in the different portions of their habitats, to widely different environing circumstances. Hence such species are often found to run into numerous local races, some of them greatly differing from others, but still inseparably connected by individuals inhabiting the intervening regions. Over districts slightly diversified, even if of large extent, species generally preserve comparative constancy of character, while, conversely, local races are of frequent occurrence in regions of alternating valleys, mountain ranges, and table lands; and more especially is this true if the highly diversified region be situated in the warmer latitudes. Small islands, remotely situated from other lands, have usually many species peculiar to themselves, their differentiation being proportionate to the geologic antiquity of the islands and their remoteness from larger land areas. In islands of recent origin, and not widely separated from continental lands, the ancestral stock of the species is still often clearly apparent, the forms thus differentiated through insular influences not having passed beyond the varietal stage; in other cases they are specifically different from their nearest continental allies, or may even have advanced far toward generic distinctness, while their origin may still remain tolerably apparent.

Plasticity, or susceptibility to the influences of physical surroundings, often differs even among quite closely allied species, as those of the same family or even genus; and different species are evidently affected differently by the same circumstances. Variability in color may, or may not, accompany variability in size, or in the character of particular organs. Generally, however, a species which varies greatly in one feature, varies to a similar degree in many others. Species having a wide geographical range not only commonly run into a greater or less number of local races, but they generally present more than the average amount of strictly individual variation, as though species ranging widely in space were originally more plastic than those having more circumscribed habitats, and were thus able more easily to

adapt themselves to their surroundings ; they are also more persistent, their fossil remains being far more frequently met with in the quaternary deposits than are those of the more local and generally more specialized forms.

Geographical variation, as exhibited by the mammals and birds of North America, may be summarized under the following heads: namely, (1) variation in general size, (2) in the size of peripheral parts, and (3) in color ; the latter being subdivisible into (*a*) variation in color with latitude, and (*b*) with longitude. As a rule, the mammals and birds of North America increase in size from the south northward. This is true not only of the individual representatives of each species, but generally the largest species of each genus and family are northern. There are, however, some strongly marked exceptions, in which the increase in size is in the opposite direction, or southward. There is for this an obvious explanation, as will be presently shown ; the increase being found to be almost invariably toward the region where the type or group to which the species belongs receives its greatest numerical development, and where the species attain the largest size, and are also most specialized. Hence the representatives of a given species increase in size toward its hypothetical centre of distribution, which is in most cases doubtless also its original centre of dispersal. Consequently there is frequently a double decadence in size within specific groups, and both in size and numerically in the case of species, when the centre of development of the group to which they belong is in the warm-temperate or tropical regions. This may be illustrated by reference to the distribution of the higher classes of vertebrates in North America. Among the species occurring north of Mexico, there are very few that may not be supposed to have had a northern origin ; and the fact that some are circumpolar in their distribution, while most of the others (especially among the mammals) have congeneric Old World allies, further strengthens the theory of their northern origin. Not only do individuals of the same species increase in size toward the north, but the same is true of the species of the different genera. Again, in the exceptional cases of increase in size southward, the species belong to southern types, or, more correctly, to types having their centre of development within or near the intertropical regions, where occur

not only the greatest number of the specific representatives of the type, but also the largest.

For more detailed illustration we may take three families of the North American Carnivora; namely, the Canidæ (wolves and foxes), the Felidæ (lynxes and wild cats), and the Procyonidæ (raccoons). The first two are to some extent cosmopolitan, while the third is strictly American. The Canidæ have their largest specific representatives, the world over, in the temperate or colder latitudes. In North America the family is represented by six species,<sup>1</sup> the smallest of which (speaking generally) are southern, and the largest northern. Four of them are among the most widely-distributed of North American mammals, two (the gray wolf and the common fox) being circumpolar species; another (the arctic fox) is also circumpolar, but is confined to high latitudes. The three widest-ranging species (the gray wolf, the common fox, and the gray fox) are those which present the most marked variation in size. Taking the skull as the basis of comparison, it is found that the common wolf is fully one-fifth larger in the northern parts of British America and Alaska than it is in Northern Mexico, where it finds the southern limit of its habitat. Between the largest northern skull and the largest southern skull there is a difference of *about thirty-five per cent. of the mean size!* Specimens from the intermediate region show a gradual intergradation between these extremes, although many of the examples from the upper Missouri country are nearly as large as those from the extreme north.

The common fox, though occurring as far north as the wolf, is much more restricted in its southward range, especially along the Atlantic coast, and presents a correspondingly smaller amount of variation in size. The Alaskan animal, however, averages about one-tenth larger than the average size of specimens from New England. In the gray fox, whose habitat extends from Pennsylvania southward to Yucatan, the average length of the skull decreases from about five inches in Pennsylvania to considerably less than four in Central America,—a difference equal to about thirty per cent. of the mean size for the species.

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<sup>1</sup>The gray wolf (*Canis lupus*), the prairie wolf (*C. latrans*), the Arctic fox (*Vulpes lagopus*), the common fox (*V. alopes*), the kit fox (*V. velox*), and the gray fox (*Urocyon virginianus*).

The Felidæ, unlike the Canidæ, reach their greatest development, as respects both the number and the size of the species, in the intertropical regions. This family has but a single typical representative—the panther (*Felis concolor*)—north of Mexico, and this ranges only to about the northern boundary of the United States. The other North American representatives of the family are the lynxes, which, in some of their varieties, range from Alaska to Mexico. They form, however, the most northern, as well as the most specialized or “aberrant” type of the family. While they vary greatly in color, as well as in the length and texture of the pelage, at different localities, they afford a most remarkable exception to all laws of variation in size with locality; for a large series of skulls, representing localities as widely separated as Louisiana, Northern Mexico, and California on the one hand, and Alaska and the Mackenzie River District on the other, as well as various intermediate localities, reveals no appreciable difference in size throughout this wide area. The true cats, however, as the panther and the ocelots, are found to greatly increase in size southward, or toward the metropolis of the family. The panther ranges from the Northern States southward over most of South America. Skulls from the Adirondack region of New York have an average length of about seven and a half inches, the length increasing to eight and three-quarters in Louisiana and Texas, from beyond which points there is lack of data. The ocelot (*Felis pardalis*) finds its northern limit near the Rio Grande of Texas, and ranges thence southward far into South America. The average size of Costa Rican examples is about one-fifth greater than that of specimens from the Rio Grande.

The Procyonidæ are chiefly represented in tropical America, a single species—the common raccoon (*Procyon lotor*)—being found in the United States, and thence northward to Alaska. Here again the increase in size is southward, or toward the metropolis of the family,—Pennsylvania specimens averaging about one-tenth smaller than Costa Rican examples.

The common otter (*Lutra canadensis*) affords another example of increase in size southward among our Carnivora, although belonging to a family essentially northern in its distribution. The otters, however, form a distinct sub-family, which attains its

greatest number of species in the warmer regions of the earth ; and hence offers, not an exception to, but a confirmation of, the law of increase toward the centre of distribution of the group to which it belongs.

Instances of increase in size northward among the Carnivora of North America are so generally the rule that further space need not be taken in recounting examples in detail. It may suffice to state that the badger (*Taxidea americana*), the marten (*Mustela americana*), the fisher (*M. pennanti*), the wolverine (*Gulo luscus*), and the ermine (*Putorius ermineus*),—all northern types,—afford examples of variation in size strictly parallel with that already noticed as occurring in the foxes and wolves.

To refer briefly to other groups, it may be stated that the Cervidæ (deer family) are mainly rather northern in their distribution ; that the largest species occur in the colder zones, and that individuals of the same species increase rapidly in size toward the north. Some of the species, in fact, afford some of the most striking instances of northward increase in size ; among which are the common Virginia deer and its several representatives in the interior of the continent and on the Pacific slope. It is also noteworthy that the most obviously distinctive characteristic of the group—the large, annually deciduous antlers—reaches its greatest development at the northward. Thus all the northern species, as the moose, the elk, and the caribou, have branching antlers of immense size, while the antlers are relatively much smaller in the species inhabiting the middle region of the continent, and are reduced to a rudimentary condition—a simple slender sharp spike, or a small and singly forked one—in the tropical species ; the antlers declining in size much more rapidly than the general size of the animal. This is true in individuals of the same species as well as of the species collectively.

The Rodentia (the squirrels, marmots, spermophiles, mice, and their affines) offer the same illustrations in respect to the law of increase in size as the species already mentioned, the size sometimes increasing to the southward, but more generally to the northward, since the greater number of the species belong decidedly to northern types. There is no more striking instance known among mammals of variation in size with locality than that afforded by the flying squirrels, in which the northern race

is more than one-half larger than the southern; yet the two extremes are found to pass so gradually the one into the other, that it is hardly possible to define even a southern and a northern geographical race except on the almost wholly arbitrary ground of difference in size. The species, moreover, is one of the most widely distributed, ranging from the Arctic regions (the northern limit of forests) to Central America.

Among birds the local differences in size are almost as strongly marked as among mammals, and, in the main, follow the same general law. A decided increase in size southward, however, or toward the warmer latitudes, occurs more rarely than in mammals, although several well-marked instances are known. The increase is generally northward, and is often very strongly marked. The greatest difference between northern and southern races occurs, as in mammals, in the species whose breeding stations embrace a wide range of latitude. In species which breed from northern New England to Florida, the southern forms are not only smaller, but are also quite different in color and in other features. This is eminently the case in the common quail (*Ortyx virginianus*), the meadow lark (*Sturnella magna*), the purple grackle (*Quiscalus purpureus*), the red-winged blackbird (*Agelaius phoeniceus*), the golden-winged woodpecker (*Colaptes auratus*), the towhee (*Pipilo erythrophthalmus*), the Carolina dove (*Zenaidura carolinensis*), and in numerous other species; and is quite appreciable in the blue jay (*Cyanurus cristatus*), the crow (*Corvus americanus*), in most of the woodpeckers, in the titmice, numerous sparrows, and several thrushes and warblers, the variation often amounting to from ten to fifteen per cent. of the average size of the species.

As a general rule, certain parts of the organism vary more than does general size, there being a marked tendency to enlargement of peripheral parts under high temperature, or toward the tropics,—hence southward in North America. This is more readily seen in birds than in mammals, in consequence, mainly, of their peculiar type of structure. In mammals it is manifested occasionally in the size of the ears and feet, and in the horns of bovines, but especially and more generally in the pelage. At the northward, in individuals of the same species, the hairs are longer and softer, the under fur more abundant, and the ears



and the soles of the feet better clothed. This is not only true of individuals of the same species, but of northern species collectively as compared with their nearest southern allies. Southern individuals retain permanently, in many cases, the sparsely clothed ears and the naked soles that characterize northern individuals only in summer, as is notably the case among the different squirrels and spermophiles.

In mammals which have the external ear largely developed,—as the wolves, foxes, some of the deer, and especially the hares,—the larger size of this organ in southern as compared with northern individuals of the same species is often strikingly apparent. It is more especially marked, however, in species inhabiting extensive open plains and semi-desert regions. The little wood hare, or gray "rabbit" (*Lepus sylvaticus*), affords a case in point. This species is represented, in some of its varieties, across the whole breadth of the continent, and from the northern border of the United States southward to Central America,\*but in different regions by different geographical races or sub-species. In addition to certain differences of color and general size, the ears vary still more strongly. In the form inhabiting the Great Plains, commonly known as the little sagebrush hare (*L. sylvaticus, nuttalli*), the ears are considerably longer than in the eastern variety, and increase in size from the north southward, reaching their greatest development in Western Arizona and the desert region further westward and southward, where the variety of the plains proper passes into still another variety characterized mainly by the large size of its ears, which are in this race nearly twice the size they attain in the eastern variety. In the large long-eared "jackass" hares of the Plains, the ear likewise increases in size to the southward. In *Lepus callotis*, for example, which ranges from Wyoming southward far into Mexico, the ear is about one-fourth to one-third larger in the southern examples than in the northern. The little brown hare of the Pacific coast (*L. trowbridgei*) presents a similar increase in the size of the ear southward, as does, to a less extent, the prairie hare (*L. campestris*). Not only are all of the long-eared species of American hares confined to the open plains of the arid interior of the continent, but over this same region is the tendency to an enlargement of the ear southward stronger

than elsewhere. It is also of interest in this connection that the largest-eared hares of the Old World occur over similar open, half-desert regions, as do also the largest-eared foxes. On our western plains, the deer are represented by a large-eared species. Among the domestic races of cattle, those of the warm temperate and intertropical regions have much larger and longer horns than those of northern countries; as is shown by a comparison of the Texan, Mexican, and South American breeds, with the northern stock, or those of the south of Europe with the more northern races. In the wild species of the Old World, the southern or sub-tropical are remarkable for the large size of their horns. The horns of the American pronghorn (*Antilocapra americana*) are also much larger at southern than at northern localities.<sup>1</sup> Naturalists have also recorded the existence of larger feet in many of the smaller North American mammalia at the southward than at the northward, among individuals of the same species, especially among the wild mice, in some of the squirrels, the opossum and raccoon, as well as in other species.

In birds, the enlargement of peripheral parts, especially of the bill, claws, and tail, is far more obvious and more general than in mammals. The bill is particularly susceptible to variation in this regard,—in many instances being very much larger, among individuals of unquestionably the same species, at the southward than at the northward. This accords with the general fact that all the ornithic types in which the bill is remarkably enlarged occur in the intertropical regions. The southward enlargement of the bill within specific groups may be illustrated by reference to almost any group of North American birds, or to those of any portion of the continent. As in other features of geographical variation, the greatest differences in the size of the bill are met with among species having the widest distribution in latitude. Among the species inhabiting eastern North America we find several striking examples of this enlargement among the sparrows, black-birds, thrushes, crows, wrens, and warblers; in the quail, the meadow lark, the golden-winged woodpecker, etc. Generally the bill, in the slender-billed forms, becomes longer,

<sup>1</sup> The deer tribe, in which the antlers increase in size toward the north, offer an apparent exception to the rule of increase in size of peripheral parts toward the tropics. The antlers of the deer, however, are merely seasonal appendages, being annually cast and renewed, and are thus entirely different physiologically from the horns of bovines, which retain a high degree of vitality throughout the life of the animal.

more attenuated, and more decurved (in individuals specifically the same) in passing from the New England States southward to Florida, while in those which have a short, thick, conical bill there is a general increase in its size so that the southern representatives of a species, as a rule, have thicker and longer bills than their northern relatives, though the birds themselves are smaller. There is thus not only generally a relative, but often an absolute, increase in the size of the bill in the southern races. The species of the Pacific coast and of the interior afford similar illustrations, in some cases more marked even than in any of the eastern species. More rarely, but still quite frequently, is there a similar increase in the size of the feet and claws.

The tail, also, affords an equally striking example of the enlargement of peripheral parts southward. Referring again to the birds of the Atlantic coast, many of the above-named species have the tail absolutely longer at southern localities than at northern, and quite often relatively longer. Thus while the general size decreases, the length of the tail is wholly maintained, or decreases less than the general size; but, in some cases, while the general size is one tenth or more smaller at the south, the tail is ten to fifteen per cent. longer than in the larger northern birds. Some western species are even more remarkable in this respect; and in consequence mainly of this fact the southern types have been varietally separated from the shorter-tailed northern forms of the same species.

Variations in color with locality are still more obvious, particularly among birds, in which the colors are more positive, the contrasts of tint greater, and the markings consequently better defined than is usually the case in mammals. The soft, finely-divided covering of the latter is poorly fitted for the display of the delicate pencilings and the lustrous, prismatic hues that so often characterize birds. Mammals, however, present many striking instances of geographical variation in color.

As already stated, geographical variation in color may be conveniently considered under two heads. While the variation with latitude consists mainly in a nearly uniform increase in one direction, the variation observed in passing from the Atlantic coast westward is more complex. In either case, however,

the variation results primarily from nearly the same causes, which are obviously climatic, and depend mainly upon the relative humidity, or the hygrometric conditions of the different climatal areas of the continent. In respect to the first, or latitudinal variation, the tendency is always toward an increase in intensity of coloration southward. Not only do the primary colors become deepened in this direction, but dusky and blackish tints become stronger or more intense, iridescent hues become more lustrous, and dark markings, as spots and streaks or transverse bars, acquire greater area. Conversely, white or light markings become more restricted. In passing westward a general and gradual blanching of the colors is met with on leaving the wooded regions east of the Mississippi, the loss of color increasing with the increasing aridity of the climate and the absence of forests, the greatest pallor occurring over the almost rainless and semi-desert regions of the Great Basin and Colorado Desert. On the Pacific slope, north of California, the color again increases, with a tendency to heavy, sombre tints over the rainy, heavily-wooded region of the north-west coast.

Geographical variation in color among mammals, for reasons already stated, is generally, but not always, manifested merely through the varying intensity or depth of the tints. It is, however, often strongly marked. The common chickaree, or red squirrel (*Sciurus hudsonius*), for example, which ranges from high northern latitudes southward over the northern portion of the United States, shows an increase in the color over the middle of the dorsal surface from pale yellowish or fulvous to rufous. The fox squirrel of the Mississippi Valley (*Sciurus niger, ludovicianus*), which ranges from Dakota southward to the Gulf of Mexico, has the lower parts, at the northward, very pale yellowish-white, which tint gradually increases in intensity southward, till in Louisiana it becomes deep reddish-orange, the dorsal surface also becoming at the same time somewhat darker. Excepting the fox squirrels, and a Pacific coast variety of the chickaree, all the squirrels living north of Mexico have the lower parts white, while those inhabiting tropical America have the lower parts fulvous, deep golden, orange, or even dark brownish-red; specimens with the belly white being exceptional, though occasionally occurring in several of the species.

Mammals tend strongly to run into melanitic phases, which are especially developed at particular localities or over limited regions, but whether or not the result of geographical influences is not clearly evident. The whitening of the pelage in winter at the north in a considerable number of species of mammals, and in one genus of birds, and not elsewhere, is, on the contrary, a strictly geographical phenomenon, but seems to be the result of other than the ordinary causes of geographical variation in color. Its occurrence in some species, and its absence in others closely allied to them, is a fact not readily explained. It shows, however, how differently different animals are effected by the same influences. The change to a white winter livery is more complete in the higher latitudes, where the whiteness pervades the pelage to a greater depth, and continues for a longer period, the change being only partial in the southern representatives of species that exhibit this seasonal change of color.

In respect to southward increase in color among birds, a few examples only, out of the many almost equally striking, can be here given. These will be chosen from widely different groups, and will represent localities remotely separated, as well as very diverse styles of coloration. In comparing, for instance, New England examples of the common quail with others from southern Florida, the colors are found to be so much stronger and darker in the southern birds as to give the appearance of their being entirely distinct species; particularly when the smaller size and larger bills of the southern race are also considered. While in the northern birds the color of the dorsal surface is gray and rufous, slightly varied with black, the gray is wholly wanting in the southern type, the rufous is much stronger, and the black markings are very much broader. The lower surface is varied by transverse bars of black and white, but while in the northern birds the white bars are twice, or more than twice, the width of the black ones, in the southern birds they are often of equal width; or the black bars may be the broader, with much more black bordering the white throat-patch, giving, on the whole, a very much darker aspect to this region of the body. Yet, when a series is brought together from many intermediate localities, there is found to be a complete intergradation between the most extreme phases. In the common towhee the style of coloration

is entirely different from that seen in the quail, the colors being chiefly massed in large areas, with white markings on the wings, and large white spots at the ends of the outer tail-feathers. In this species, southern specimens differ from northern ones in the black of the upper parts and the chestnut of the sides being more intense, while the white markings on the wings and tail are greatly reduced in area. In the northern bird four of the outer pairs of tail-feathers have a large white spot near the end, while in the southern form only three pairs are thus marked.

In the purple grackle the plumage (in the males) is everywhere black, with, at the north, greenish or bronzy reflections; in the southern or Floridan form the black is more intense, and the reflections are steel-blue and purple, with iridescent bars across the middle and lower parts of the back. In the northern form the female is dull brownish-black, with little or no iridescence, while in the southern form the female is nearly as lustrous as the northern male. The two types differ so widely, not only in color, but, as previously noticed, in size and in the form of the bill, that, without the connecting specimens from intermediate localities, no ornithologist would hesitate to regard them as entirely distinct species; and they were, indeed, at one time so regarded. The red-winged black-bird has, excepting its red wing-patches, also a lustrous black plumage throughout, and presents a similar range of variation in general color with the preceding; while the red of the wing-patch becomes much darker at the southward, and its creamy-white border seen in the northern form changes to yellowish-orange in the southern.

The common blue jay, and the long-crested jays of the Rocky Mountain region, may be cited as illustrations of southward increase in brilliancy or intensity of coloring where the prevailing tint is blue; the green Mexican and Rio Grande jays of a passage from yellowish-green tints into bright yellow; the yellow-throated warblers (genus *Geothlypis*), several of the fly-catchers (genera *Myiarchus* and *Tyrannus*), and the meadow lark, as examples of increase in the area and intensity of yellow; several of the woodpeckers (genera *Centurus* and *Sphyrapicus*), the cardinal finches (genus *Cardinalis*), and some of the tanagers (genus *Pyrrhuloxia*), of a similar increase of red; the goldfinches (genus *Chrysomitris*), and most of the species above-named, of

increase in extent and purity of black areas. The Rocky Mountain jays have, at the northward, a large portion of the plumage rather dark ashen, which further southward becomes bluish ash, and still further south culminates, in the Central American States, in blue. In the genus *Geothlypis*, the Maryland yellowthroat (*G. triches*), which ranges over the whole United States, and thence far southward, has at the northward the abdomen whitish; more to the southward, yellowish; and, in the West Indies, Mexico, and northern South America, runs into races in which the abdomen is bright yellow. At the same time the black markings about the head increase in extent and purity, and the general size becomes larger, the group having its metropolis in the tropical regions. In consequence of these variations in color and size, this species at the southward becomes differentiated into several more or less well-marked sub-species (formally accorded full specific rank), which are connected by an unbroken series of intergradations.

In the great-crested flycatcher (*Myiarchus crinitus*) of the United States, the yellow of the abdominal region is much the stronger in the southern birds: while the same is true of several of the western species of the same genus, which at the southward also pass into several recognizable sub-species.

The western goldfinch (*Chrysomitris psaltria*) affords a well-known instance of increase of black. This species is found in the western half of North America from about the parallel of 40° southward to Ecuador. The northern form has the black of the upper parts mainly restricted to the head, wing, and tail, the rest of the dorsal surface being olive-green. In northern Mexico the back begins to be more or less clouded with black, which tint increases in extent in Central America till it wholly replaces the olive-green, while in northern South America it becomes more intense and lustrous. In northern specimens the tail is marked with white spots, which either decrease greatly in size, or become wholly obsolete, in the southern races. The extremes, as may well be imagined, are widely diverse in their coloration, and, though formally regarded as entirely distinct species, have been found so thoroughly to intergrade that it is impossible to draw any lines of separation between the several races. Lawrence's flycatcher (*Myiarchus lawrencei*) affords also a striking example



of southward increase in the area and intensity of black. At the northward this species has a grayish-black crown, which gradually passes southward into a form with the crown wholly deep black. With the increase southward of the area and intensity of black markings, there is also in this, as in other species, a general increase in the intensity or depth of the other accompanying tints.

The red-bellied, or Carolina woodpecker (*Centurus carolinus*), a common bird of the United States, shows a strong increase of red on the head and lower surface of the body at the southward, in which this tint is not only much brighter, but also much more extended in the south-Florida birds than in those from the Northern States. At the same time it presents, in common with other species of the same family, a marked southward decrease in the size of the white transverse bars and spots of the dorsal plumage.

In the southern portion of the Mississippi Valley, the variation is in a tropical direction, and is merely due to the more northward extension there of tropical influences. In passing to the Plains and the Great Basin west of the Rocky Mountains, however, an entirely different phase of color variation is met with. Here, as a general rule, there is a loss of color, this region being characterized by the presence of subdued or faded tints in the representatives of species having a nearly continental range. The transition, however, is as gradual as is that of the climatic conditions, the paleness beginning near the eastern border of the great plains, and, increasing westward, reaching its extreme phase in the arid wastes of the almost wholly rainless districts of the far south-west,—South Nevada, Arizona, and the contiguous region westward and southward. In respect to this part of the subject, it is hardly necessary to say more than that the representatives of continental species found here are uniformly much paler than those inhabiting the adjoining regions; that in many cases the paler forms were originally described as distinct species, and are commonly recognized as varietally distinct, though found to inseparably intergrade with the neighboring darker forms. In addition to the general paleness, there is often an increase in the areas of white, and in some cases an accession of new ones.

The wooded, mountainous districts embraced in this region also give rise to peculiar local phases of color variation, to give a detailed account of which would too greatly extend the present paper. The tendency is mainly toward the development of more or less well-marked rufous or fulvous phases of coloration, with sometimes an accession of red, while not a few species have more than the usual amount of black. A most striking instance of increase of red at western localities is seen in the yellow-bellied woodpecker (*Sphyrapicus varius*), which, in some of its forms, ranges in the breeding season over the more northern and elevated wooded portions of the continent. In its eastern form the male has merely the chin, throat, and crown red, while in the female the red is restricted to the crown. In rare instances there is a trace also of a narrow red nuchal band. In the Rocky Mountain form, however, there is always a red nuchal band, the red on the throat is more extended in the male, and a small area of red appears also on the throat of the female. In the form met with in the Cascade Range the red begins to spread over contiguous portions of the plumage, while in the form occurring along the Pacific coast the red overspreads the whole head, neck, and breast, through which, however, the markings of the eastern birds can generally be readily traced. Here we have, at one end of the series, the red confined to a few distinct patches about the head, while at the other it extends over the whole anterior half of the body. Yet the intergradation between the two has been so fully traced that these diverse forms are now held, by competent authorities, as merely local races of a single species!

Another case of the increase of red over the same region is afforded by the golden-winged and red-shafted woodpeckers (genus *Colaptes*), in which yellow in the eastern form is replaced by red in the other; in the middle region of the continent the species being largely represented by individuals in which are variously combined the special characteristics of the two forms. In the present case the black cheek-patch of the eastern form is replaced by a red one in the western. Traces of the characteristics of the western type occasionally appear in the most eastern representatives of the eastern type, and, conversely, features of the eastern bird appear in the most western representatives of

the western, showing at least their close affinity and probable community of origin.

The Pacific coast region from California northward is characterized by a great accession of color, all the continental species being here represented by forms much darker even than on the Atlantic coast. Here the coloration is duller than at the southward, though perhaps equally strong, the general tendency being to fuscous or dusky tints. We consequently find among the mammals and birds of the United States three strongly marked phases of color-differentiation among representatives of the same species, characterizing the three most strongly marked climatal regions,—a bright, strongly-colored form east of the Great Plains, a pallid form over the dry central region, and a deeply-colored fuscous form over the rainy, heavily-wooded region of the north-west coast. Examples of this differentiation are afforded by apparently all the species whose habitats extend entirely across the continent, the several local forms being in some species only more strongly marked than in others. Among mammals illustrations are afforded by different species of squirrels, hares, mice, lynxes, deer, etc. ; and among birds by six or eight species of sparrows, a number of woodpeckers, several flycatchers, thrushes, and warblers, the meadow lark, various hawks, owls, etc. Generally these several geographical forms were originally described as distinct species, and many of them are still thought worthy of recognition by varietal names. As intermediate links began to be discovered, they were at first looked upon as the result of hybridity between the supposed distinct species whose characters they respectively combined; but eventually such links were found to be too frequent, and too general over the areas where the habitats of the several forms come together, to render such a supposition longer tenable, it finally appearing evident that they were only the connecting forms between merely local races or incipient species.

The local races of any given region, as compared collectively with those of contiguous regions, and the manner of their mutual intergradation, point plainly to some general or widely acting cause of differentiation. This is indicated by the constancy of the results, so many species, belonging to numerous and widely distinct groups, being similarly affected. Will the

fortuitous, spontaneous results of natural selection yield a satisfactory explanation of these phenomena, or must we seek some more uniform and definitely acting cause? To briefly summarize the results above detailed, we have a somewhat uniform increase of size in some given direction affecting many species simultaneously and similarly over the same areas. We have a frequent enlargement of peripheral parts, affecting not a few but many species, and all in a similar manner, though in varying degrees. We have a very general increase in the depth or intensity of colors southward, a general loss of color in approaching the central, arid portions of the continent, and again an excessive increment of color under still different climatic conditions and over a different area. We find the increase of size among the individuals of any given species to be quite uniformly in the direction of the centre of distribution of the group to which the species belongs, this being especially well-marked in mammals. We find the increase in the size of peripheral parts,—as the external ear and the length of the pelage in mammals, and the size of the bill and length of the tail in birds,—to be in the direction of the regions where these parts meet respectively their greatest development,—the increase in color (especially among birds) toward the region where are developed the richest and most lustrous tints, the loss of color in the direction of the region where the greatest general pallor prevails. We find again that the enlargement of peripheral parts correlates with increase of temperature; the southward increase of color with an increase of atmospheric humidity and temperature, and consequently with the protective influences of luxuriant arboreal vegetation and clouds; and, conversely, the loss of color accompanying excessive aridity, a scanty vegetation, and an almost cloudless sky,—the conditions, in short, of all others the most powerfully effective in the blanching of color; and again the sombre, dusky tints of the north-west coast accompanying the most humid conditions of climate and the conditions generally most favorable for the protection or preservation of color. Are these merely accidental coincidences, or are they the evident results of cause and effect? Because the white winter livery of some of the northern species is more protective against cold than darker tints would be, or aids in concealing them in some cases (as in the hares and ptarmigans) from

their enemies, or in other cases (as in the ermines and the Arctic fox) tends to aid them in stealing unperceived upon their prey, are they to be regarded as unquestionably the beneficial results of the working of natural selection? Because the dull gray tints of species inhabiting the semi-desert regions of the interior harmonize well with the general gray aspect of their surroundings, is this concordance the result again of the operation of the law of natural selection, the less favorably colored having been weeded out in the struggle for existence? Are the heavy, dull colors of the humid region of the north-west the result, again, of the necessary influence of natural selection in perpetuating only the individuals whose colors best accord with their sombre conditions of environment? Has the same action brought about the bright, rich coloration of birds, insects, and other animals under the warm humid conditions of the hotter parts of the earth, preserving the ratio of brilliancy of coloration with that of the conditions that everywhere most favor such differentiation? Finally, is the exact correlation of the changes in coloration with the gradual change of climatic conditions in passing from one geographical region to another the result in like manner of the long-continued weeding out of the less-favored? Or are these modifications severally due to the *direct* action of the conditions of environment?

In answering these questions it may be well to glance first at the nature of the theoretical origin of differentiation through the influence of natural selection as expounded by the leading advocates of the theory. As is well known, all the individuals of a species found at the same locality (differences resulting from sex and age aside) are not all cast in the same mould, but differ constantly, the average range of purely individual variation in general size and in the size of different parts ranging (in birds and mammals) from eight to fifteen or twenty per cent. of the average size for the species, with a corresponding amount of variation in color. These variations are found to tend in every conceivable direction, and it of course follows that some of them must be in directions exceptionally favorable to the species. The theory of modification by the action of natural selection only supposes that the stronger or otherwise more favored individuals transmit their favorable qualities to their offspring,

and that the latter, in consequence of their inherited advantages, multiply more rapidly than their less favored relatives ; that these favorable deviations from the parental stock become in subsequent generations more pronounced, and that the original form is eventually overpowered and supplanted by its modified descendants. From the same original stock may be conceived to arise, even simultaneously, other forms diverging in different, though still favorable, directions, these in turn giving rise to several lines of descent, occupying perhaps different portions of the habitat of the original species, where they also multiply and become dominant, and eventually pass on from the stage of incipient species to more or less widely differentiated types. These premises being admitted,—and they are certainly within the bounds of reasonable conception,—only the element of time, apparently, is requisite for the development of an endless variety of unstable forms, constantly increasing in number and following divergent lines of development, and thus capable, apparently, of giving rise to all the diversity of organisms at present peopling the earth.

But there are many adverse circumstances with which the favored forms have in the outset to contend, and to which, in the majority of instances, they must succumb. These are, first, the minuteness of the first favorable divergence, the isolation of the individuals in which it appears, and consequently the impossibility of such individuals pairing with others similarly favored, and the consequent tendency of the offspring to possess the favorable characters in a less rather than in a greater degree than the parent, and to be absorbed into the original stock. Secondly, in case the incipient advantages are perpetuated, as it is necessary to suppose, the new offshoot must originate from a single point, and spread thence gradually to contiguous regions as its representatives slowly multiply.

But it is supposed, again, that new forms are not always thus gradually evolved from minute beginnings, but sometimes—perhaps not unfrequently—arise by a *saltus* ; that individuals may be born widely different from their parents, differing so widely and persistently as not to be so readily absorbed by the parental stock. In proof of this, instances are cited of new species apparently appearing suddenly, and of varieties thus originating under artificial conditions resulting from domestication.

Granting that new forms may thus arise, although as yet few facts have been adduced in its support, they are necessarily at first local, and in no way accord with the observed geographical differences that characterize particular regions, and which affect similarly many species belonging to widely different groups.

The direct influence of climatic or geographical conditions upon animals is, in the main, ignored by the leading exponents of the doctrine of natural selection. To quote Mr. Darwin's own words on this point:—

"The action of climate seems at first sight to be quite independent of the struggle for existence; but, in so far as climate chiefly acts in reducing food, it brings on the most severe struggle between the individuals, whether of the same or of distinct species, which subsist on the same kind of food. Even when climate, for instance extreme cold, acts directly, it will be the least vigorous, or those which have got the least food through the advancing winter, which will suffer most. When we travel from south to north, or from a damp region to a dry, we invariably see some species gradually getting rarer and rarer, and finally disappearing; and the change of climate being conspicuous, we are tempted to attribute the whole effect to its direct action. But this is a false view: we forget that each species, even where it most abounds, is constantly suffering enormous destruction at some period of its life from enemies, or from competitors for the same place and food; and, if these enemies or competitors be in the least degree favored by any slight change of climate, they will increase in numbers, and, as each area is already fully stocked with inhabitants, the other species will decrease. When we travel southward and see a species decreasing in numbers, we may feel sure that the cause lies quite as much in other species being favored, as in this one being hurt. So it is when we travel northward, but in a somewhat lesser degree, for the number of species of all kinds, and therefore of competitors, decreases northwards; hence, in going northward, or in ascending a mountain, we far oftener meet with stunted forms, due to the *directly* injurious action of climate, than we do in proceeding southward or in descending a mountain. When we reach the Arctic regions, or snow-capped summits, or absolute deserts, the struggle for life is almost exclusively with the elements. That climate acts in main part indirectly by favoring other species, we may clearly see in the prodigious number of plants in our gardens which can perfectly well endure our climate, but which never become naturalized, for they cannot compete with our native plants, nor resist destruction by our native animals."<sup>1</sup>

While there is perhaps little reason to question the general correctness of the above-quoted generalizations, they have little bearing upon the question of the modification of species by the direct action of climatic conditions, but relate mainly to such unfavorable climatic influences as tend toward the extinction of species, or to the circumscription of their ranges. Indeed, the

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<sup>1</sup> "Origin of Species," 5th ed., pp. 80, 81.



phenomena of variation detailed in the foregoing pages were almost wholly unknown at the time the earlier editions of the "Origin of Species" were published, and have hardly as yet become the common property of naturalists. Gradual decrease in size southward in hundreds of species inhabiting the same continent, or a gradual increase or decrease in color in given directions on a similarly grand scale, are facts but recently made known, and have not as yet been very fully discussed by evolutionists of the purely Darwinian school. Mr. Darwin, indeed, in referring to the "effects of changed conditions" upon animals, alludes to facts of a similar character,—as the alleged brighter colors of European shells near their southern limit of distribution and when living in shallow water, and the more sombre tints of birds that live on islands or near the coast under overcast skies, as compared with those of the same species living more in the interior, etc.; but is in doubt as to how much should be attributed, even in such cases, "to the accumulative action of natural selection, and how much to the definite action of the conditions of life." "Thus," he says, "it is well known to furriers that animals of the same species have thicker and better fur the farther north they live; but who can tell how much of this difference may be due to the warmest-clad individuals having been favored and preserved during many generations, and how much to the action of the severe climate? for it would appear that climate has some direct action on the hair of our domestic quadrupeds." <sup>1</sup> Since, however, it happens that some species do not vary at all, although living under the most opposite climates, he is thereby inclined "not to lay much weight on the direct and definite action of the conditions of life," though he fully admits "that strong arguments of a general nature may be advanced on the other side." "In one sense," he adds, "the conditions of life may be said, not only to cause variability, but likewise to include natural selection; for the conditions determine whether this or that variety shall survive." <sup>2</sup> But he says again: "I believe that natural selection generally acts slowly in effecting changes, *at long intervals of time, and only on a few of the inhabitants of the same region.*" In a latter work, however, he

<sup>1</sup> "Origin of Species," pp. 166, 167.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 168.

refers to the variation in color with locality seen in many species of birds in the United States, and says explicitly, in reference to northern and southern localities, "this seems to be the direct result of the difference in temperature, light, etc., between the two regions."<sup>1</sup>

There is, however, a vast amount of unquestionable proof of the direct and constant action of climate and other conditions of life upon animals, and that such geographical variations as the thicker and softer fur of mammals inhabiting cold regions, smaller size and brighter colors at the southward, etc., etc., do not require the action of natural selection, in its strict and proper sense, for their explanation. It is well known, for instance, that a flock of fine-wooled sheep, when taken to a hot climate, rapidly acquire a coarser and coarser fleece, till, in a few generations, it nearly loses its character of proper wool, and becomes simply hair; that the change affects simultaneously the whole flock, and is not brought about by one or two individuals acquiring a coarser fleece and through their descendants modifying the character of the herd. Furthermore, in the case of sheep, it is well known that certain countries are very favorable to the production of a fine fleece, and that fine-wooled breeds, even by man's aid, cannot be perpetuated in other regions. Again, it is a fact of common observation that in birds and mammals colors become more or less faded toward the moulting season simply by the direct action of the elements,—the tints of the fresh and the long-worn plumage or pelage being more or less strikingly different in the same individuals,—and that this contrast at different seasons is more marked in arid than in moist regions, through the greater bleaching effect of a dry heated atmosphere and the more intense dazzling sunlight of regions that are not only cloudless, but lack the protection afforded by abundant vegetation.

While so much is claimed by the writer as due to the direct action of climatic causes, it is admitted also that habits and food, and other conditions of life than those resulting from climate, have a marked effect in determining modifications of form and color among animals. A scarcity of a favorite kind of food

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<sup>1</sup> "The Descent of Man," 2d ed., p. 225.

will undoubtedly force species to subsist upon the next best that offers, which may be so different as to modify certain characters and fit the species to live upon the less desired food. A change of food may lead to modification of dentition, the muscles of mastication, and the organs of digestion, and, correlatively, of other organs or parts of the body; the modification, however, arising simultaneously among all the descendants of the individuals thus driven to a change of diet, instead of appearing first in a single individual and becoming perpetuated in its descendants alone. Entomologists have found that, among insects of the same species, the forced or voluntary use of different food-plants gives rise to modifications of color and structure, and hence result in what have been termed phytophagic varieties or sub-species, and that man can also effect such changes at will by simply changing the food of the species. Again, the geological character of a country is well known to have a marked effect upon the size and color of animals inhabiting it, as is strikingly illustrated among molluscos animals, whose abundance, and even presence, is largely dependent upon the constituents of the soil. Over regions of the United States, for example, where the underlying rock is non-calcareous, the species are both few in number and sparsely represented, while in other regions, where limestone abounds, but which are in other respects essentially the same, the species are far more numerous and far more abundantly represented. In respect to the fresh-water mussels, those of the same species from different streams are easily distinguishable by differences in the thickness of the shell, in color, shape, and ornamentation, so that the character of the shells themselves affords a clew to the locality of their origin. At some localities the species tend to become tuberculous or spinous, this being particularly the case toward the southward; at other localities they acquire a very much thickened shell, or different colors, the same characteristics appearing simultaneously in quite diverse species, and thus becoming distinctive of particular localities. In regard to mammals, measurements of large series of the skulls of minks, martens, squirrels, and other native species, show that the representatives of these species living in northern New England and north-eastern New York are smaller than the representatives of the same species occurring in the limestone districts of

Pennsylvania and the States more to the westward, and the same is true of the different kinds of domestic cattle. This is in opposition to the law of decrease in size southward that elsewhere and generally characterizes these same species, and seems obviously related to the geological character of the country at these localities; small size, in opposition to a general law, occurring over northern non-calcareous districts, and larger size more to the southward where the underlying rock is limestone. In this case the difference obviously results from the direct action of the conditions of habitat upon every individual rather than from "slowly effected changes" originating in "only a few of the inhabitants" of these respective districts.

Use and disuse of organs, through changes of habit resulting from changed conditions of environment, must result in some modification of the organ involved. As an example may doubtless be cited the passerine birds of some of the smaller, remotely-situated islands, as the Guadelupe and Galapagos groups, where recent investigations have shown that most of the species differ similarly in several features from their nearest allies of the mainland, and of which they are unquestionably insular forms. These differences consist in the greater size of the bill, shorter wings, longer tails, and darker colors. The sedentary life necessitated by the confined habitats of species thus situated would naturally act more or less strongly on the organs of flight, and a reduction in the size of the wing would follow;—not necessarily through the round-about process of natural selection, through the modification originally of a single individual, but by the direct action on all the individuals alike of the changed conditions of life.

It is doubtless unnecessary to further multiply examples of the modification of animals by the direct action of the conditions of life. The subject is one that can be but imperfectly treated at best in a short paper like the present. The illustrations have here been drawn from a limited geographical field, and mainly from among the two higher classes of vertebrates. There are, however, abundant indications that other fields and other classes would yield results equally confirmatory of the direct action of physical conditions in the evolution of specific forms among animals and plants. Changes in environing conditions

will, however, go but a short way toward explaining the origin of the great diversity of structure among existing organisms; the character of the food, habit, or the increased use or the disuse of particular organs, may explain many of the modifications, leaving a large share of the work to as yet unknown causes. Natural selection, as sometimes defined, is made to cover all causes of differentiation, it being stated by Mr. Darwin himself that, if organic beings undergo modification through changes in their conditions of life, "uniformity of character can be given to their modified offspring solely by natural selection preserving similar favorable variations." In its strict sense, variation by natural selection results only through favorable differences appearing at first in single isolated individuals, which transmit these favorable qualities to their offspring, in virtue of which they multiply till they outnumber, crowd out, and finally destroy the less favored form from which they originated.

It is hardly conceivable, for example, how the peculiar structure seen in the woodpecker, the kingfisher, the swift, the heron, or the duck, or the peculiar dentition and correlated characters of the rodents, the ruminants, or the shrews and moles, as compared with the Carnivora, can have been initiated by the direct action of climatic conditions, however much other conditions of environment may have favored the development of these diverse types.

Having thus far mainly detailed merely facts and coincidences relating to the subject of variation with locality, it may be well in conclusion to consider more fully some of the possible or probable causes of purely geographical variation. In regard to geographical variation in color, it seems evident that high temperature, conjoined with moisture, favors increase of color and especially the acquisition of lustrous tints, while moisture alone favors simply increase in depth or the production of dull, heavy, and especially fuscous phases of coloration; on the other hand, that aridity and exposure favor the loss of color. The latter is due apparently no less to the influence of a dry and often intensely heated atmosphere than to the direct action of light intensified by the reflection of the sun's rays from almost verdureless sands. That the latter conditions act powerfully in blanching color there is most abundant proof. Hence we have

the necessary correlation of increase of bright rich tints of coloration with the increase of atmospheric humidity. In respect to the enlargement of peripheral parts at the southward, it is obvious that a high temperature favors the more rapid circulation of the blood in these parts, while, as is well known, a low temperature produces the opposite effect, and necessarily retards their development.

With the decrease in size among birds, there has been observed a decrease of vivacity and deterioration of song, which may reasonably be attributed to the enervating influence of a high temperature. Since the northern types of animals reach their highest physical development toward the northward, it seems fair to suppose that decrease in size southward may be directly due to the enfeebling influences of increase of temperature, since certainly it cannot be attributed, in the majority of cases at least, to greater scarcity of food, for, in many instances, just the reverse obtains. This supposition is in accordance with the known effects of similar climatic conditions upon the northern races of man, which reach their greatest vigor and highest intellectual status under temperate conditions of climate, and deteriorate, both physically and mentally, on removing to intertropical regions. Again, the mammals and birds of the United States reach their maximum size within the United States under the stimulating climate of the region drained by the Upper Mississippi and Upper Missouri Rivers, being, as a rule, larger here than in corresponding latitudes more to the eastward. The decrease in size toward both the northern and southern borders of the habitat of a given species or genus, of which there are many marked instances, further shows that size varies with the varying conditions of habitat, and reaches the maximum only where the conditions are most favorable to the life of the species.

Much has been written respecting the influence of climate on man, and many speculations have been indulged in in relation to the part the conditions of life have taken in bringing about the diversity at present existing among the different races. A striking parallelism is often observable between the leading features of geographical variation among animals and the physical differences that obtain among nations or races of men inhabiting

the same areas and subjected to the same influences. While civilized man is, in a measure, less the subject of such influences than the lower animals, he is not wholly above them. Certain regions more favor both physical and intellectual development than others; and these prove to be, as would be expected, the milder temperate portions of the globe, where the struggle for a mere vegetative existence is reduced to a minimum.

The influence of different climatic conditions upon members of the same nationality find exemplification in different parts of our own country, and are so obvious as to be the subject of frequent observation and comment. The same original stock is found to gradually develop certain peculiar physical and mental characteristics when placed under diverse conditions of climate, certain localities more favoring intellectual growth and activity than others; just as certain regions are characterized by the frequent occurrence of particular diseases, which in other regions are exceptional. While humidity and a high temperature, when combined, are found to be enervating and deteriorating, a clear dry atmosphere favors vigor of both mind and body. But the subject of the influence of climatic conditions upon man is too vast to be entered upon in detail in the present connection. The study of man from a geographical standpoint, or with special reference to conditions of environment, offers a most important and fruitful field of research, which, it is to be hoped, will soon receive a more careful attention than has as yet been given it.

In conclusion, a few words seem called for concerning the question, What is a species? as well as in respect to the bearing of the general facts above detailed upon the evolution of specific forms.

As is well known, the belief that species were distinct and immutable creations was long the prevailing one among naturalists. Yet the question of what constitutes a species is one about which endless discussions have arisen, and one respecting which the most discordant opinions have been held by naturalists equally eminent in their respective fields of research. The amount and kind of difference necessary to characterize a species has been variously defined; forms that some have considered as specific others have regarded as merely varieties, and the reverse. In



certain groups of organisms intermediate forms have been constantly met with, constituting steps of easy intergradation between quite diverse types. Such forms have been, and still are, held by some writers as varieties of a single species, and by others as constituting a group (genus or sub-genus) of distinct, but nearly related, species. Through the frequent discovery of such intergradations, however, the instability of so-called "species" has been made manifest, and the contrary doctrine of the stability or fixity of species refuted. Indeed, naturalists now generally agree that the terms variety, species, genus, sub-genus, family, sub-family, super-family, and the like, are but conventional and more or less arbitrary designations for different degrees of differentiation,—convenient formulæ for the expression of general facts in biology. Not a few high authorities even maintain that the differences which characterize these several groups are of the same nature, differing only in degree, in opposition to others who hold that they are based on different categories of structure, or on differences of *kind* rather than of degree. The falsity of the latter view is shown more and more clearly with the increase of our knowledge of the structure and affinities of animals.

While formerly species were considered as necessarily characterized either by differences of a particular kind, or by a certain amount of difference, the present tendency is to regard neither as a sufficient criterion, the test of specific diversity being merely absence of intergradation,—in other words, breaks in the continuity of closely allied beings. Local races, or geographical forms, are thrown together under one specific designation whenever they are found to intergrade, however diverse may be their extreme phases of differentiation. The term species is now made to cover groups which were, not many years since, frequently regarded as sub-genera, or even genera,—the forms then supposed, in numberless instances, to be "good species" now ranking merely as sub-species. The reduction in the number of species has necessarily entailed a considerable reduction in the number of currently accepted genera, which in turn are limited by hiati rather than by any given amount or particular kind of difference. It was formerly urged against the theory of evolution

that its advocates could point to no instance of the gradual change of one species into another, and that, until this was done, the theory was untenable. Among the species of North American vertebrates recognized as valid ten years ago, hundreds of instances can now be cited of thoroughly proven intergradation; forms then regarded as unquestionable species being found to be but connected phases of one and the same specific type, which assumes, at remote localities, under the evident action of climatic agencies, phases widely diverse, which gradually merge the one into the other through the individuals inhabiting the intervening districts. So long as species are based on the absence of intergradation,—and biologists have found no other satisfactory criterion for their limitation,—there can of course be no passage of one species into another. Let, however, some of the connecting links become extinct, and these now intergrading forms would be resolved into distinct species. In this way insular and other local forms are passing beyond the so-called varietal stage, and species are similarly tending to generic distinctness. That varieties may and do arise by the action of climatic influences, and pass on to become species, and that species become, in like manner, differentiated into genera, is abundantly indicated by the facts of geographical distribution and the obvious relation of local forms to the conditions of environment. The present more or less unstable condition of the circumstances surrounding organic beings, together with the known mutations of climate our planet has undergone in past geological ages, points clearly to the agency of physical conditions as one of the chief factors in the evolution of new forms of life. So long as the environing conditions remain stable, just so long will permanency of character be maintained; but let changes occur, however gradual or minute, and differentiation begins. If too sudden or too great, extinction of many forms must result, giving rise to breaks in the chain of genetically connected organisms. In the deep abysses of the sea, where the temperature is low and stable, where the conditions of life must have remained almost unvaried since the early geological periods, the same low organisms still exist that were the prevailing forms of life when life first dawned upon the earth. The recent explorations of the depths of the sea have

gone far to prove that stability of organic forms is in direct ratio to the stability of the conditions of existence, while the facts of geographical distribution show that change of structure and diversity of life are directly related to the physical conditions of habitat.

JOEL A. ALLEN.

## OUR FINANCIERS: THEIR IGNORANCE, USURPATIONS, AND FRAUDS.

### I.

THE great battle in Ohio for more money,—by which is here meant the political canvass for the year 1875,—in which the whole country participated, is still worthy of notice, not only because there is doubtless a widespread determination to fight it over again, but also because it affords a ludicrous, but much needed, illustration, as well as an irrefutable proof, of the prevailing ignorance on the subject of money.

That that violent, but ridiculous, contest may serve as a caution to the people against being drawn into the same, or any similar one, in future, is one purpose of this article. Its other purposes are to expose the usurpations and frauds by which the people are deprived of money, and to vindicate, as far as its limits will permit, the right of the people, by the use of their own property and credit, to supply themselves with such money as they can, and as much of it as they please, free of all dictation or interference from the government.

The question at issue in Ohio, in 1875, was the 3.65 interconvertible bond scheme; a scheme, of the practical operation of which the writers and speakers, on neither side, seemed to have the least real knowledge whatever. It would have had neither the good effects which its friends expected, nor the bad effects which its enemies predicted. That is to say, it would neither have provided "a currency equal to the wants of trade," as claimed by its friends, nor would it have flooded the country with a depreciated currency, as predicted by its opposers. As a system for furnishing a *permanent* currency, either good or bad, it would have fallen utterly dead. Worse than that, instead of furnishing a permanent currency in place of that we now have,

it would have deprived us of the one we now have, without furnishing any substitute at all.

That such would have been its effect is evident from these considerations, namely :—

It is a settled principle that a paper currency depends, for its true and natural market value, wholly upon the redemption that is provided for it. It has, and it can have, no more true or natural market value than the property with which it is to be redeemed. A paper currency, therefore, that has no other redemption than that of being convertible into interest-bearing bonds, can be worth no more in the market than are the bonds themselves, and, consequently, no more than it is worth *for conversion into the bonds*. And it is worth nothing for conversion into bonds, unless there are some one or more persons who wish thus to convert it. In other words, it is this demand for the *bonds, as investments*, that alone gives the *currency* any value in the market. A convertible note of this kind, therefore, circulates as money only because some one or more persons want it for conversion. *And it circulates only until it falls into the hands of such a person*. When it falls into his hands, he converts it, *and thus takes it out of circulation*.

The destiny, therefore, of all such convertible paper, *that is in circulation as money, is finally to be converted into bonds, and thus taken out of circulation*. And there is then an end of it, so far as its being currency is concerned.

We saw the operation of this principle so long as the greenbacks were convertible into bonds. The conversion went on so rapidly that we should soon have had no greenbacks at all in circulation, had not the conversion of them into bonds been stopped by law. And our greenbacks now remain in circulation only because they are *not* convertible into bonds.

For the reasons now given, if our whole national debt were to-day in circulation as currency, *having no other redemption than that of being convertible into 3.65 bonds*, it would be worth for circulation no more than it would be worth for such conversion; and, as a natural consequence, it would rapidly, though not instantly, be converted, *and thus taken out of circulation; and we should then have entirely lost it as a currency*. And, as the scheme

proposes to prohibit all other currency, we should then be left with no currency at all.

The 3.65 bond scheme, therefore, instead of being a scheme for providing the country with a currency, is perfectly suicidal, so far as furnishing a currency is concerned. It is simply a scheme for providing a paper currency for circulation *by withdrawing all such currency from circulation!* It is absurdity run mad.

## II.

But the advocates of the scheme will say that it provides that these bonds *may* be reconverted into currency. Yes, it does indeed provide that they *may*, but not that they *must*, be thus reconverted. *And it offers no inducements whatever for such reversion*; because, if reconverted, the currency will then be worth no more in the market than the bonds are worth as investments; since all that will give the currency any value at all in the market will then, as before, be the simple fact that it (the currency) is convertible back into the same bonds from which it has just been reconverted!

The bonds are to be holden by men who preferred the bonds to the currency, *when both had the same value in the market*. And now the scheme contemplates that the country will go without any currency at all, until these same bondholders shall change their minds, and prefer the currency to the bonds, *when both have still the same value in the market!* Who can tell when the bondholders will do that? The bonds are their estates, their investments, on which they rely for their daily bread. They are the estates which they have preferred to all others, as a means of living. To presume that they will reconvert them into currency, is just as absurd as it would be to presume that a man who has just bought a farm, and relies upon it for his living, will sell it for money that will enable him to do nothing else so good for himself as to buy back the same farm that he parts with.

## III.

But General Butler, who, I believe, claims to have been the author of this scheme, says that, "*in case of a scarcity of money,*"

"a demand for money by a high rate of interest will call forth these bonds."<sup>1</sup>

He means by this that, in times of "scarcity of money," "a high rate of interest"—that is, a higher rate than the bonds themselves bear—will induce a holder of these bonds to convert them into legal tender notes, *in order to lend them!*

This is certainly furnishing "more money" with a vengeance. The real value of the notes corresponds precisely to the value of a 3.65 interest-bearing bond, and General Butler would allow the people to have no money at all, except in some rare emergency, when the "scarcity" is so great as to induce them to give a higher rate of interest than the money is really worth,—enough higher to induce the bondholder to surrender his investments, and become a money lender instead.

This is equivalent to saying that nobody shall be permitted to borrow money, except in those emergencies when he will submit to be fleeced for the sake of getting it!

And to make it impossible for any body to borrow money, except at this extortionate rate, he would "*prohibit by the severest penalties every other person, corporation, or institution from issuing any thing that might appear in the semblance of money!*"

And this proposition comes from a man who proposes to furnish the people with "more money," and thus save them from the extortions of the present money dealers!

However such an extortion might occasionally relieve an individual, who was so sorely pressed as to consent to be fleeced, it would do nothing towards supplying the people at large with money; because the money thus issued to an individual would not continue in circulation, unless it should constantly pass from hand to hand *at a price beyond its true value*; that is, at a price beyond its value for conversion. The result would be that the people could have no money at all, except upon the condition of their constantly giving more for the money than it was worth!

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<sup>1</sup> See his speech in New York, October 14, 1875, reported in the New York "Daily Graphic" of October 15.



## IV.

Another device of General Butler, by which he appears to think he could keep at least some of the currency in circulation, is this: He would make it "*the legal tender of the United States for all debts due to or by the government or individuals.*"

But this would add nothing at all to its real value; and it would have no appreciable, or certainly no important, effect in preventing the conversion of the currency into bonds; or, what is the same thing, in preventing a withdrawal of the currency from circulation; for the currency would still have no more real or true value for circulation than it would for conversion.

General Butler's plan, therefore, amounts practically to this: He would allow the people no money at all, except on rare occasions, when, as he thinks, the "scarcity" would be so severe as to induce them to pay an extortionate price for it!

But, under such a system, there would really be no such thing as a *rare and occasional* "scarcity;" *there would be nothing but constant, perpetual, and utter destitution.* At least such would be the case, so soon as all the notes should have been converted into bonds.

The idea of allowing the people no money at all, except occasionally in times of "scarcity," corresponds to one that should forbid the people to have any food at all, except occasionally in times of famine. Under such a system, it is plain there would never be a rare or occasional famine; but there would be, instead of it, a constant and perpetual one. So, under Butler's scheme, there would never be any rare or occasional "scarcity of money;" but there would be a constant and perpetual destitution of it.

Yet he calls it a scheme for providing the people with more money! In reality, it is merely a scheme for depriving them of money altogether.

## V.

Such being the real character of this 3.65 scheme, we are enabled to see the true character of the late battle in Ohio for and against it. And it is important to consider that, although the

battle was nominally fought in Ohio, the whole country took part in it. The whole country took part in it, because it was considered that the result in Ohio would very likely decide the result in the whole country.

Thus we had the ludicrous and humiliating spectacle of forty millions of people fighting a fierce and bitter contest for and against a scheme, *of the real nature of which neither party knew any thing!* One party thought it was a scheme for furnishing the money really needed for industry and trade. The other party thought it was a scheme for overwhelming the country with a depreciated currency. In reality, it was a scheme to deprive the country of money altogether!

If any body had any thing to *fear* from this system, it was the very party that advocated it; for they wanted *more* money and not less. And if any body had any thing to *hope* from the system, it was the party that opposed it; for they wanted *less* money and not more.

Here, then, were two opposing armies, each fighting with all fury against itself, under the belief that it was fighting its antagonist!

## VI.

The question now arises: If all the statesmen (so-called), all the financiers and bankers, all the editors, all the violent writers and speakers, who took part in this contest, know no more about finance than to take such parts as they did *either for or against* this ridiculous and absurd scheme, how much do they know about the system which the industry and prosperity of the country really require?

And if we shall conclude that they do not know any thing, perhaps we may conclude that they should not quite so arrogantly assume to dictate to us what, or how much, money we shall, or shall not, have; nor, consequently, to decide (as it is their purpose to do) what, or how much, money all other property shall be sold for.

Perhaps we may even conclude that men who have demonstrated their ignorance beyond all cavil or controversy, as they have, and who, by their ignorance, or something worse, have brought upon forty millions of people such ruin and misery as

they have, ought to be exceedingly modest for the rest of their lives, especially on the subject of money.

Perhaps we may conclude that to paralyze the industry of the country for four, five, or six years together, at a loss of three, four, or five thousand millions of dollars per annum,—say, twenty thousand millions in all,—under pretence that it is necessary in order to raise, by five, ten, or fifteen per cent., the market value of eight hundred millions,—that is, to raise their value, say, one hundred millions in all,—perhaps, I say, we may conclude that to thus impoverish a people to the extent of twenty thousand millions, under pretence of saving or giving to somebody one hundred millions, is neither good financiering, good morals, nor good government; and that it indicates that there is something a great deal worse than sheer ignorance at work in the plans of the government.

Perhaps we may conclude that a dollar, in order to be a standard of value, must have something like a fixed value itself, *which it will maintain against all competition*; that, if it has any thing like such a fixed value, then ten, a hundred, a thousand, or a million of dollars must necessarily have ten, a hundred, a thousand, or a million times more value than one dollar has; and to say that, by the prohibition of all other money, one dollar can be made to have as much “purchasing power” as ten, a hundred, a thousand, or a million dollars, is only to say that, by the prohibition of all other money, the holder of the one dollar will be enabled to extort, in exchange for it, ten, a hundred, a thousand, or a million times more of other men’s property than the money is worth.

Perhaps we may conclude that the holders of the present stock of money, whose cardinal financial principle is that, by the prohibition of all other money, any small amount becomes invested with a “purchasing power” indefinitely greater than its true and natural market value, and who openly avow that that is their reason for insisting that all money shall be suppressed, except that small amount which they themselves hold, thereby virtually proclaim their purpose to be to so use their money as to extort, in exchange for it, an indefinite amount more of other men’s property than the money is worth. And perhaps we may conclude that a government which, on this

ground, as avowed by its most conspicuous members and partisans, maintains a hard monopoly of money, thereby virtually acknowledges itself to be a mere instrument in the hands of these extortioners, for accomplishing the purposes they have in view.

Perhaps we may conclude that it is indispensable to all honest and equitable traffic that the money that is paid for any other property should have the same amount of true and natural market value as the property that is given in exchange for it; and that the moment this principle is acknowledged, all justification for the interference of the government ceases; since it is the sole right of the parties to contracts to decide for themselves, in each case, what money, and what amount of money, is, and is not, a *bona fide* equivalent for the property that is to be given in exchange for it.

Perhaps, also, we may conclude that the notes of private persons or private companies, who have property with which to pay their notes, and who can be sued and compelled to pay them, with interest and costs from the time of demand, are quite as likely to give us a specie-paying currency, and are quite as deserving of the name of "honest money," as are the notes of a government that has no property to pay with; that cannot be sued or compelled to pay; and that has no intention of paying, unless, or until, it can do so without relaxing the monopoly it is determined to maintain.

Perhaps we may conclude that a government, which, for ten years together, prohibits, by a ten per cent. tax, all specie-paying notes, and at the same time, by the grossest usurpation, makes its own irredeemable, depreciated, non-specie-paying notes a legal tender in payment of all private debts, cannot reasonably be credited (however loud may be its professions) with any burning desire either for "specie payments," or for "honest money."

Perhaps we may conclude that any privileged money whatever, whether issued by a government or by individuals, is necessarily a dishonest money; just as a privileged man is necessarily a dishonest man; and just as any other privileged thing is necessarily a dishonest thing. For this reason we may perhaps conclude that a government that constantly cries out for "honest money," when it all the while means and maintains, and insists

upon maintaining, a privileged money, acts the part only of a blockhead or a cheat.

Perhaps we may conclude that, when the fraudulent pretences by which the monopoly of money has been thus far maintained, and the fraudulent purposes for which it has been maintained, have been so fully demonstrated that they can no longer be concealed or denied, and after the effects of the monopoly have been to impoverish the country to an amount at least twenty times greater than the whole amount of the privileged money,—perhaps we may conclude that, after all these results, the responsibility of the authors of the monopoly is not to be evaded, nor their motives justified, by any such mock freedom in banking as is offered to us, provided we will use only government bonds as banking capital, and come under all such regulations and conditions as the government may prescribe, and thus give up all right to bank upon any portion of the thirty thousand millions of other property which we have (or once had, and may have again); at least twenty thousand millions of which are better banking capital than any government bonds can be; and which we have a perfect right to use as banking capital, without asking any permission of the government, or coming under any of its regulations or conditions.

Perhaps we may conclude that this attempt of the government to delude us into the idea that we can have perfect freedom in banking, while deprived of our right to use the twenty or thirty thousand millions of banking capital we already have, and while restricted to the contemptible amount of capital we can have, or can afford to have, under the system proposed by the government, is very much like a proposal to establish perfect freedom in farming by requiring men to give up all the farms they now have, and buy some of the government lands in Oregon or Alaska, and there come under all such regulations and conditions as the government may prescribe.

Perhaps we may conclude that the establishment of a monopoly of money is equivalent to the establishment of monopolies in all the businesses that are carried on by means of money,—to wit, all businesses that are carried on at all in civilized society; and that to establish such monopolies as these is equivalent to condemning all persons, except those holding the

monopolies, to the condition of tributaries, dependents, servants, paupers, beggars, or slaves. Perhaps we may conclude that the establishment of a monopoly of money is also equivalent to a prohibition upon all businesses, except such as the monopolists of money may choose to license. And perhaps we may conclude that, if government were to prohibit directly all businesses, except such as it should choose to license, and, by direct grants, were to make all these licensed businesses subjects of monopoly, its acts, in so doing, would be no more flagrant tyrannies, and no more flagrant violations of men's natural rights, than are its acts in establishing the single monopoly of money.

Perhaps, after we shall have been insulted and impoverished by a few more such cheats as the "specie payment" cheat, the "honest money" cheat, the "free banking" cheat, and all the other cheats to which the government has resorted, for the one sole purpose of maintaining that monopoly of money on which the last administration relied for its support, and which the present administration is evidently determined to maintain, we may conclude that it is time for the people to take the matter of money into their own hands, and assert their right to provide their own money, in their own way, free of all dictation or interference from the government.

Perhaps we may conclude that the right to live, and to provide ourselves with food, clothing, shelter, and all the other necessities and comforts of life, necessarily includes the right to provide ourselves with money; inasmuch as, in civilized life, money is the immediate and indispensable instrumentality for procuring all these things. Hence we may perhaps conclude that a people who surrender their natural right to provide themselves with money, practically surrender their right to provide for their own subsistence; and that a government that demands such a surrender, or attempts to take from them that right, and give it as a monopoly to a few, is as necessarily and as plainly the mere instrument of that few, as it would be if it were to require the people to surrender their right to follow their occupations as farmers, mechanics, and merchants, and give all these occupations as monopolies into the hands of the same few to whom they now give the monopoly of money.

Perhaps we may conclude that we want no special laws whatever, either of license, prohibition, or regulation, on the subject of banking; that bankers, like other men, should be free to make their own contracts, and then, like other men, be compelled to fulfil them; and that their private property, like the private property of all other men, should be holden to pay their debts.

Perhaps we may conclude that it is the natural right of every man, who has a dollar's worth of property that can be taken by legal process and applied to the payment of a promissory note, to offer his note for that amount in the market; and that it is the natural right of every body that pleases, to accept that note in exchange for other property; and that it is also a natural right of every subsequent holder of that note to offer it again in the market, and exchange it for other property with whomsoever may choose to accept it.

And since, in this way, it is not only theoretically possible, but absolutely practicable, that, to say the least, a very large amount of the material property of the country should be represented by promissory notes, and thus made to aid in furnishing a solvent and legitimate currency; and since nobody can be required to accept such a currency unless he pleases; and since nobody who chooses to accept it can either say that he is wronged, or be said to wrong any body else, by accepting it,—perhaps we may conclude that such a currency as this—if the people, or any portion of them, prefer it to any other that is offered them—can not rightfully be prohibited.

Perhaps we may conclude that no considerable accumulations of coin are necessary to maintain specie payments; that, where banking is free, and the private property of the bankers is holden for the debts of the banks, the business of banking naturally and necessarily falls into the hands of men of known wealth, whose notes challenge the scrutiny, and command the confidence, of the whole community; that, as these men, if permitted to do it, are always ready to supply the market with the greatest amount of notes that can be kept in circulation, the public have no temptation to accept any doubtful notes, and doubtful notes can consequently get no circulation; that, when the public are thus satisfied of the solvency of the notes they hold, they prefer them to coin, and the bankers rarely have any occasion to redeem them other-



wise than by receiving them in payment of the notes they discount; that, as all the bank notes issued are wanted to pay the notes discounted, and are, at short intervals after their issue,—say in two, three, or four months, on an average,—returned to the banks in payment of notes discounted, the bankers, as a general rule, have no need to provide for any other redemption; and that, consequently, coin, unless in very small amounts, is merely dead capital, for which the bankers have no use whatever.

And, if the practicability or utility of this system should be doubted, perhaps we may refer the doubters to the example of Scotland, where, for eighty years,—from 1765 to 1845,—all the banks of Scotland, with two or three exceptions, stood upon the principle of the individual liability of their stockholders; enjoying perfect freedom in the issue of their notes, subject only to these restrictions, namely, that they should issue no notes below one pound, and none except those made payable on demand.<sup>1</sup> The result was that Scotland had the best system of banks, or at least the best association of banks, for solvency, stability, and utility, that was ever known in Europe.<sup>2</sup> During all that period of eighty years, while the banks of England were failing by the hundreds, and many of them proving utterly rotten, and while all that did not prove rotten repeatedly suspended specie payments,—at one time for more than twenty years,—*the banks of Scotland never suspended specie payments, and their notes were always equal to coin.* And, by introducing manufactures, they raised Scotland, within that period, from a miserable poverty-stricken condition (the effect of her cold climate and barren soil) to a condition of prosperity and wealth second to that of no other people in Europe. These facts, and others that cannot here be enumerated at length, demonstrate that, where banks rest upon the individual liability of stockholders, *or upon any other basis that gives to the public an absolute guarantee of the solvency of the banks*, banking may be made perfectly free, and the amount of currency as great as can be kept in circulation, *and yet that it will always be equal to coin.* And they prove also that all the

<sup>1</sup> The first of these restrictions only impaired the usefulness of the banks, without adding any thing to their solvency.

<sup>2</sup> And better than any ever known in the United States, unless, possibly, those in Rhode Island and one or two other States.

arguments that are now used to justify restraints upon banking, and limitations upon the amount of currency, in order to maintain specie payments, proceed wholly from gross ignorance or fraud.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps we may conclude that money is simply property that is cut up, or divided, into such pieces or parcels as are convenient and acceptable to be given and received in exchange for other property; and that any man who has any property whatever that can be cut up, or divided, into such pieces or parcels, has a perfect legal and moral right thus to cut it up, and then freely offer it in the market, in competition with all other money, and in exchange for any other commodity, that may there be offered in competition with, or in exchange for, it. Perhaps we may conclude that the simple fact of these pieces or parcels being called money, or not called money,—of their bearing the stamp or license of the government, or not bearing it,—has nothing to do with his right to offer them in the market, or to sell them, or lend them, or exchange them, on such terms as the parties to the contracts may mutually agree upon; that the simple facts that they are property,—property that is naturally vendible,—and that they are *his* property, entitle him to sell them, or lend them, to whomsoever may wish to buy, or to borrow, them; and to do all this on such terms as the parties, free of all interference from the government, may agree upon. And perhaps we may conclude that these pieces or parcels may as rightfully be bought, sold, and exchanged (if the parties so agree) by means of contracts on paper—notes, checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or whatever else—promising to deliver them on demand, or at times agreed on, as by actual delivery of the parcels themselves, at the time of the contract.

Perhaps we may conclude that, instead of Congress having the right, in General Butler's phrase, to "prohibit, by the severest penalties, every other person, corporation, or institution [than the government itself, or those whom it licenses] from issuing any

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<sup>1</sup> We can have a much better system even than the Scotch; better than the system of promissory notes; one that will furnish more money (if more can be used), and be more easy and convenient for the bankers and better for the public. But freedom to make experiments with any and all systems that men may choose to experiment with is what is necessary to give assurance, at all times, that we have the best possible system.

thing that might appear in the semblance of money," it has no such right whatever, nor any semblance of such a right; that it has no color of right in the matter, beyond the simple "power to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;" that, so far from their having any such right, it is one of the first and most sacred of all the duties of any and every government (that has any duties at all) to protect every man in his natural right to offer in the market every vendible or loanable commodity he has to sell, or to lend; and to sell it, or lend it, to any and every man who wishes to buy it, or borrow it; and that it is the duty of the government to protect him in his liberty to do this by any and every possible form of contract—whether check, note, draft, bill of exchange, or whatever else—that is naturally and intrinsically just and obligatory.

Perhaps we may conclude that it is as much the duty of government to protect each and every man, who has any thing deserving the name of money, or that men may choose to call money, in his right to sell or lend it to any and every other man who may choose to accept it as money, as it is to protect him in his right to sell or lend any other property whatever, which he may wish to sell or lend, and which other men may wish to buy or borrow.

Perhaps we may conclude that the simple fact that men may, or may not, choose to call any particular commodity money, makes no difference whatever in the nature, character, quality, or value of the commodity itself; and therefore cannot affect the right of men to buy, or sell, or lend, or borrow it; or to give it in exchange for any other property, on such terms as the parties (without fraud) may mutually agree upon.

Perhaps we may conclude that all men, who are presumed competent to make reasonable and obligatory contracts, must also be presumed to be just as competent to judge of the value of any money that may be offered them, as the men who offer it are to judge of the value of the commodities they are to receive in exchange for it.

Perhaps, in short, we may conclude that it is one of the natural rights of men to sell their property for such money, and as

much of it, as is offered to them for it, and as they choose to accept.

Perhaps we may also conclude that the idea of providing the people with money by prohibiting all money except such as the government itself may specially provide or license, is just as absurd, preposterous, and tyrannical as would be the idea of providing the people with food, clothing, or shelter, by prohibiting all food, clothing, or shelter, except such as the government itself may specially provide or license.

Perhaps we may conclude that, as it is with all other commodities, so it is with money, namely, that free competition in producing it and offering it in the market is the sure, and only sure, way of guaranteeing to us the greatest supply, the best article, and on the best terms; that, inasmuch as banking is but a very recent invention,—but one on which all industry and all other inventions depend mainly for their efficiency,—it is just as absurd to suppose that we have already attained perfection in it, as it would be to suppose we had attained perfection in any or all the other arts by which industry is carried on; that it is, therefore, just as absurd and suicidal to prohibit all new experiments and inventions in banking, as it would be to prohibit all new experiments and inventions in agriculture, mechanics, or any of the other arts of life; and that, to be consistent, those who would prohibit all new experiments and inventions in banking ought also to insist that the patent office be closed, and that all new experiments and inventions in any and every art and science whatsoever be prohibited.

Perhaps we may conclude that, however much money, or however many kinds of money, may be offered in the market, there is no danger that the holders will give any more of it in exchange for other men's property or labor, than such property or labor is worth; and that, therefore, there is no danger that the prices of either property or labor will ever be too high; or, what is the same thing, that property or labor will ever bring any more money than it is worth.

Perhaps we may conclude that it is time that those men who claim that gold and silver coins, by the monopoly now given to them as money, are kept at a price far above their true and

natural value as metals, and who claim that they should still be kept at that price by restrictions upon all other money, were taught that all honest and equitable commerce requires that each and every commodity that may be sold at all—whether it be called money, or by any other name—should be sold only at the price it will bear in free and open market, and subject to the free competition of every other commodity that may there be offered in competition with, or in exchange for, it; that the free and open market is as much the true and only test of the true and natural market value of every thing that can be called money, as it is of the true and natural market value of every thing that is exchanged for money.

Perhaps we may conclude that, since industry is an animal, so to speak, that feeds and lives on money; since its strength, activity, and growth depend mainly upon the amount of money that is furnished to it; since we as yet know of no limits to its increase in power, except the limits set by the money that is supplied to it; since, when it is fully supplied with money, it will create two, five, ten, a hundred, often thousands, sometimes millions, and even hundreds and thousands of millions, of dollars of wealth, for every dollar that it consumes,<sup>1</sup> but, when stinted or deprived of money, necessarily languishes or dies; and since, when it languishes or dies, mankind languish or die with it,—perhaps, in view of these facts, we may conclude that to stint or deprive it of money is not merely bad economy, but fatuity and suicide.<sup>2</sup>

And, finally, perhaps we may conclude that a government

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<sup>1</sup> The estimate in the text is no extravagance. Suppose we could ascertain the precise number of dollars and cents, or of pounds, shillings, and pence, expended by such men as Watt, and Arkwright, and Stephenson, and Morse, and Whitney, and Fulton, and Woodworth, and Hoe, and McCormick, and so many others, in making and perfecting their inventions,—what proportion would those figures bear to those that should even attempt to measure the immeasurable value of the inventions themselves? And what must we think of the folly, absurdity, and tyranny of that dearth of money which our monopolists of money would have maintained if they could; which would have made these inventions impossible; and which now withholds them from four-fifths, perhaps from nine-tenths, of mankind?

<sup>2</sup> We have all heard of the bumpkin who tried an experiment to ascertain upon how little food his horse could be made to subsist. His experiment succeeded to his entire satisfaction, until, from some cause he could not understand, his horse happened to die. Stupid as he was, he may possibly have suspected that it was from a want of food; for we do not hear that he ever tried the experiment again. But our financial bumpkins (or something worse) persist in trying the same experiment over and over again. The industry upon which they try it invariably dies; but they learn no wisdom, or caution (or honesty) from the results.

that sacrifices a million of lives to maintain its power, and then uses that power to trample in the dust all the natural rights of the survivors, and to cheat, plunder, and starve them, for the mere profit of the holders of eight hundred millions of money, is not a government that should be tolerated for any great length of time.

LYSANDER SPOONER.

## CURRENT LITERATURE.

- 1.—*Harold: a Drama.* By ALFRED TENNYSON. Author's Edition, from advance sheets. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co. 1877. pp. 170.

THE first business of any one who criticises this new poem of Mr. Tennyson's is to notice the absence of any introductory matter to report to the reader the precise historical value of the personages, and to clear up some allusions. Without this no poem of the kind can straightly tell its own story. We have heard women object to Shakspeare's plays because they are forced to pause, in mid enjoyment of scenes and passages, to hunt for explanatory notes or turn up the pages of a glossary. It is worrisome to the feelings. Everybody knows concisely that Count William of Normandy invaded England, beat the Saxon King Harold at Hastings, introduced Norman laws and manners into the country, and gradually obliterated all its local and provincial differences. But a great many people will begin to read this play without any distinct recollection of the parts which the personages played, or of their respective relations. The impression will be nebulous, unless the memory is first refreshed. We doubt if even the average Englishman is adequately posted in all the details which the play involves. The critic must turn annalist to begin with, and offend American intelligence by urging upon it a preliminary sketch; for the play really requires it.

Edward the Confessor was of Anglo-Saxon origin, the surviving son of Ethelred the Unready. So that he descended from the old stock of English kings. But he had spent a great part of his life in Normandy, becoming there well inoculated with Norman habits and methods. During his reign, 1041-1066, he encouraged Norman nobles to settle in England; gave them lands, castles, official posts; and patronized the Franco-Norman manners, much to the disgust of his Saxon Earls, one of whom, the proud Godwin, Harold's father, blazed into open resistance, and really checked the tendency. Edward spoke Norman, and used a Norman seal. The whole drift of thought and inclination



had thus for some time, in spite of native prejudice, been tending from France toward England, and the Conquest had by no means an *impromptu* character. Edward was so fond of Count William of Normandy that he promised to him the successorship to the throne in default of issue. The Count was an illegitimate son of Robert, fourth Duke of Normandy, and Arletta, a tanner's daughter, with whom he became enamored as she was washing clothes in the stream below his castle.

The Anglo-Saxon rule had been slowly weakening. Ethelred was nicknamed Unready because he never came to time when the Northmen invaded his domains, ran up the rivers, and harried the towns. He resorted to the plan of a massacre to thin out the Danes, who had slowly grown into possession of Northumbria, and had also mingled considerably with the Saxons. Danes and Northmen, incensed at such perfidy, came down upon him with powerful expeditions: he taxed his subjects to buy them off with money, when he should have bled them in the nobler way. He died in 1016, leaving the realm in miserable plight.

Edmund, 1016-1017, an illegitimate son, fought the Danes bravely, challenged Canute to single combat, and, on the whole, conducted himself respectably. To put an end to bloodshed, he consented to a division of England, leaving to Canute and his Danes the North. Shortly after this he was murdered, probably at Canute's instigation. About this time a Saxon peasant, named Godwin, made a notable figure of himself by carving power and fortune out of obscurity, and becoming the father of Harold.

Canute,—he who so delicately dampened his courtiers' flatteries by letting the tide wet him knee-high,—became king of all England, 1017-1035. He was succeeded by Harold Harefoot, his second son, 1035-1042, a despicable, unkingly fellow, who worked ill for the realm. His successor was Canute's third son, the Hardicanute, who reigned only two years; for he was mighty in drink, and was struck by apoplexy at a wedding, with the beaker in his hand.

Then came the weak-minded Confessor, a man dazed by omens, and devoted only to prayers and the chase. The ambitious Godwin, who aspired to the kingship, made it very hot and miserable for him.

Now when the play opens, Tostig, one of Godwin's sons,—a very irascible and sudden kind of man, whose fits of spleen were not healthy for bystanders,—was Earl of that part of Northern England which the Danes chiefly peopled. He bore no good-will to his brother Harold, whom the Confessor, on his death-bed, had named—so people averred—to be his successor. Unfortunately, some time before

that, Harold, cruising one day in the Channel, was wrecked on the French coast, misled by false lights of some fishermen. Count William took advantage of this stroke of luck, succored Harold, brought him to court, and dined and wined him into taking an oath to respect the Confessor's original selection of himself as his successor. So the Confessor, before dying, made Archbishop Stigand absolve Harold for the necessary breaking of that oath taken in Normandy. Thus, and by the acclaim of the people, Harold was raised to the throne. The Confessor's appointment was subject to the vote of the Witenagemote, National Assembly of Wise Men: it was cast for Harold, and to all appearance there was a Saxon king of England.

But Tostig had been cherishing a secret preference for the kingship. Why not he, as well as that other son of Godwin? This explosive brother had once been condemned to death by the Confessor, but, at Harold's intercession, the sentence was commuted to banishment. Tostig imagined that the apparent favor was a diplomatic trick: a brother's life saved, and at the same time judiciously disposed of. So Tostig was not dearly in love with Harold. Hardly was the Confessor's pious breath exhaled, when he sailed over to Sweden, and proposed invasion of England, partition of the realm, and profitable raiding, to King Sweyn. But he was not the verdant swain that should pull Tostig's piping hot chestnuts out of the fire. Then Tostig betook himself to Harold Hardrade of Norway: a hard raider was he indeed, seven feet high, very sweeping and persuasive with the axe. He saw a good thing in it, and presumed he could manage Tostig afterwards. Two hundred Viking vessels sailed, filled with freebooting gentlemen of the olden time, when thievery at the sword's point was meritorious. No Tweedism for such scrupulous Christians; but let every man be bidden to stand and defend himself, or then and there deliver: certainly that was not pilfering, but rather a system of exchange and distribution. These cruisers of a peculiar commerce slipped into the English rivers, went ravaging and readjusting property up the Humber, took York: and there the seven feet of Harold were proclaimed king of Tostig's old Earldom. A highly creditable beginning! Now it only remained for the amiable brother to move southward and "try confusions" with the king of England.

It is quite time that Harold, satisfactorily king by popular vote and approval, should file a demurrer against these irregular proceedings. This he does, reporting it in great force at Stamford Bridge, seven miles east of York, on September 20, 1066. By a stratagem, pre-

tending that he fled, he lured the Danes out of their palisades and line of shields, then turned upon them in the open field. Great was the slaughter. An arrow went slithering through the Norse giant's neck, and the great artery emptied seven feet of kingdom into that space of earth. Tostig's pique and turbulence was also quenched for ever. The genteel, piratical keels made what haste they could out of the river.

If Harold felt any inclination to drop a tear or two over Tostig, he had short time for it. A tired and splashed horseman comes stumping into the banquet of victory, arrests Harold's cup at his lips with the tidings that Count William, on the route to be styled Conqueror, had landed at Pevensey to pick up the Confessor's little gift, and to settle with Harold that matter of the oath. The Count did not venture into the interior, but, with his fleet for a base, went ravaging right and left, in order to compel Harold to come down to him. Of course Harold broke up at Stamford Bridge, and drew his forces down toward the Sussex coast; he went, probably, by that famous Gathelin, or Watling Street, the old Roman road built by Vitellianus, who was called by Britons *Guetalin*. But, before starting, Harold yielded to the popular desire among all parties at the North that he should effect a union and pacification by marrying their favorite Queen, Aldwyth, Welsh widow of king Griffyth, whom Harold himself had killed in an expedition to reduce the mountaineers.

Strange and brief wooing, but not so fierce as that between Gloster in Richard III. and Lady Anne, daughter-in-law of the Henry VI. who was done to death by Gloster. Harold could always control and adapt himself to situations, and he possessed, with a relish for humor, the quality which the French call *bonhomie*. We suspect Aldwyth was not quite clear in her mind what should be the upshot of the marriage, whether love or vengeance. Sometimes she thought that, in spite of the Welsh experience, she loved him, or might do so if she could become Queen of England. Her jealousy of other women appears early in the play, where she secretly observes an interview between Harold and Edith. But the marriage seemed to her—as it did to him—to be a comfortable diplomatic arrangement: so, with no time to squander in honeymooning, they march southward to open the first page of the Domesday Book of England.

Senlac, which is pronounced ominously in the Confessor's dream (p. 97) Sanguelac, Bloody Lake, is near Hastings in Essex, sixty miles south-east of London. There, on the ridge of Battle, the Saxons drove their palisades, and stood in a long row of imperturbable shields.

A gentleman named Hasting, of predatory sympathies, had made

this coast of England particularly unpleasant during the reign of Alfred. He came to England in 891, and devoted the next six years to the demolition of Alfred, but was demolished instead at this very place that was settled by him and called after his name: probably upon Senlac ridge, which was called Battle after the defeat of Harold. Battle Abbey is in the neighborhood, founded by the Conqueror. Now the travail of England shall consecrate these spots, and the Abbey shall long preserve the roll of Norman valor.

Harold counted upon being reinforced by Queen Aldwyth's two brothers with troops out of Northumbria. They do not appear, waiting judiciously, at the instance of the Queen herself, to see if Harold is victorious. Harold understands the half-way love of the Queen (p. 138), and, diving through her practices, wishes to part from her. But she remains jealously near him, because Edith is there.

The battle of Hastings was fought October 16, 1066. At first it went desperately against Count William: his foot was routed twice, two or three horses were killed under him, his knights could not break through the parapet of shields. As long as Harold's men stood there, according to strict orders issued by him, the Anglo-Saxon rule was safe. But at length William repeated Harold's stratagem at Stamford; as if by some irony of fate, the Saxons rushed out to pursue, and were cut down by the mailed horsemen.

Who is this Edith, who wanders by night over the field, scanning the corpses by lanthorn-light? She was a fair ward of the thin-blooded Confessor, who put her into Waltham Abbey to prevent Harold from marrying her. Harold loves her in secret: some say he is secretly married to her; some say another thing. Now she and the Queen, all jealousies quenched in the Bloody Lake of the day, meet in this tender search for their Harold's body. The corpses are so maimed, the faces so slashed, that recognition cannot be reached that way. But Edith identifies the body of her lover by that mark upon his shoulder, which, in a certain moment—not of hate—her own teeth had inflicted.

The Brunanburg alluded to on p. 140 was a place near Lincoln, where King Athelstan the Saxon utterly discomfited Northumbrian Dane Anlaf (Olaf) and his Scotch mercenaries, who were bringing things to a dangerous pass for England. This was in 938: some say in 940.

Now the gentle reader can take up the poem; and we make Mr. Tennyson a present of this sketch for his next edition.

The narrative plainly furnishes the poet with many points that crave a picturesque treatment, and he has not neglected them. The

first scene describes the dismay of the people about the palace at the appearance of a comet. We know that a very extraordinary one was observed about the time of the Confessor's illness, and was as usual credited with an evil disposition. Leofwin and Harold mark their natures with a rationalistic vein. They banter the comet and the bystanders. If it really announces the wrath of Heaven, Leofwin says, the wrath of Heaven has three tails, the devil only one. Harold says, in quite the Shakspearean humor,—

"The worst that follows  
Things that seem jerk'd out of the common rut  
Of Nature is the hot religious fool,  
Who, seeing war in heaven, for heaven's credit  
Makes it on earth."

So when the Confessor relates his vision that the seven sleepers in the cave at Ephesus had turned from right to left, Harold remarks that they might as well turn from left to right and go to sleep again.

The scene at the palace of Bayeux in Normandy, that was afterward so famous for its historical tapestries, is dramatic, and also theatrically effective. Count William has the wrecked Harold in his power, but treats him considerably in order to secure his voice in England when the time for the successorship to the Confessor shall arrive. The incident and all the intrigue of the conversation are admirably sustained toward the climax of the moment when Harold is induced to swear upon the ark that contains relics of saints. So could the scene of the Confessor's dying be made effective: he dozes while people confer and plot around his couch, occasionally waking,—now to relate his bodeful visions, now to extort from Harold a promise to have nothing to do with Edith,—and suddenly dies with the cry of the Bloody Lake upon his lips.

The sleep of Harold on the eve of the battle of Hastings, during which are visions and speeches of the Confessor, of Harold's two brothers,—Tostig, and another left in a Norman dungeon as a hostage,—and of Norman saints, is too palpable an imitation of similar scenes in Shakspeare. Harold wakes, calling for a battle-axe instead of a horse: but his monologue finely reviews the motives of his past actions. The agitated conversation between Edith and old Stigand while the battle is raging outside, and he reports from his place of vantage its wavering fortunes; the chanting by the canons of Waltham of Latin hymns that reflect the color of his reports and become a refrain to them; and the old man's cry when the arrow predicted by the

Confessor pierces Harold,—might all be made very effective. So also the midnight search of the two reconciled women for the body of Harold.

On the whole, the play is far more dramatic than Mr. Tennyson's "Queen Mary," more evenly sustained, richer with pleasant and vigorous lines and quotable passages. When Mr. Tennyson speaks of an abyss as "undescendible," he probably refers to an abyss so low in its mind—or in his—that it can descend no farther: but the word is not likely to be of use in literature, for it knocks the bottom out of every thing. To "Molochize," that is, to sacrifice children to clear heaven of the comet, is better. The general style is one of absolute simplicity.

There are also two or three distinct characters. They are persons: they not only act and speak historically, but they account for the history. The traits contrast with each other in the way that is most competent to evolve the play. Harold is not only a man who is fated to occupy the transition-epoch of his country's history, but exactly the kind of man who sums up the drift of it and makes it possible. He must needs live just at this time to contribute a personality to change the face of England. The times work upon the basis of his mental and emotional disposition, and create a character which is at once demonic and human,—that is, composed of the unconscious Will of powers that move through the conscious mixture of the man. His frank hatred of priestly cant, contempt for the papal threatenings which espouse the cause of Count William, his brave reliance on his own Anglo-Saxons, his light raillery of fears that are born of superstition or of the gathering of pregnant events,—all these traits are touched with a hand so clear and light that they seem autobiographical. The poet rescues the man from the stinginess of historical analysis, and constructs the Harold who ought to and must have lived.

Edith's sad dream is "a gnat that vext thy pillow. Had I been by, I would have spoiled his horn." There is a touch of Ophelia in the tone of Edith, when she sings of lovers drowned long ago in the "cruel river Swale" (p. 98). When was that sung? inquires Harold. And Edith replies, "Here to the nightingales." To which Harold freely answers, "Their anthems of no church, how sweet they are!" And, when Harold learns that the Pope has blessed Count William and sent to him a precious hair of Peter, he breaks into derisive laughter. To Edith, the sound of it was strange and ghastly: but Harold says, No,—"This was old human laughter in old Rome before a pope was born." Edith's songs are excellently soft and low; her love is timid, but deep as the tenderest opaline sky, deep to the heart's deepest,

least-fathomed space. We feel the private woe that is involved with the pathos of a great determining moment of a country's destiny. We follow it from the midnight search into the unavailing seclusion of Waltham Abbey.

The play swarms with quotable lines. In the mouth of Irving, Booth, Barrett, they would lighten up and charm along the most protracted of the scenes. Plainly, Mr. Tennyson has at length succeeded in writing a play.

J. W.

- 2.—*Talks about Labor, and concerning the Evolution of Justice between the Laborers and the Capitalists.* By J. N. LARNED. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1876. pp. 162.

WE may say, at once, of this little work, that it is a thoroughly good book—for its purpose, and so far as it goes. It almost disarms criticism by the modesty of its pretensions, while it enhances our estimate of its value, almost at every page, by the solidity and excellence of its achievement. It is one of a class of publications which is now coming forward to meet the demand that is growing rapidly, in the public mind, for an intelligible as well as a scientific solution of the labor question. Twenty or thirty years ago, works of a similar *animus* were published by Josiah Warren and those of his school of thought, which completely subsoiled the domain of political economy, and investigated and settled for ever, upon a thoroughly scientific basis, the fundamental questions of commercial equity. The work now under review, like others of its class, does not at all reach so profound and final a conclusion of the subject. It simply approximates it. It talks, through its whole length, about equity, with no attempt at a definition of equity itself. Such a definition, in terse, exact, scientific terms, would perhaps fall under the author's meaning when he repudiates the idea that he has for presentation "any copyrighted or patented formula whatever,"—a bit of ungenerous and captious "slang," which mars the introduction, and which, at least, in so far as it applies to more exact and weighty treatises on the subject, might better have been omitted.

But, for its purposes, the book, so to speak, would not be so good, if it were better. It is an apt and excellent adaptation to the present inquiring stage of public interest in a great subject. It is



neither too learned nor too shallow ; and it is full of really valuable contributions to that great rising science of sociological ethics, which sub-transcends the realm of ideas heretofore occupied by Political Economy. The author has also exactly grasped the limits of the range of inquiry he is engaged in. "I have," he says (or he puts the statement in the mouth of one of the locutors, the book being cast in the form of dialogue),—"I have no quarrel to make with political economy, as I said last night. I only contend that there is a larger social philosophy—an ethical economy, so to speak—which embraces political economy and extends far outside of it, and into the wider domain of which we have got to carry such questions as this."

A few other extracts will show, at once, the vigorous style, the accurate thought, and the bold, progressive genius and drift of the author:—

"It (the labor question) has become already *the* question above all other questions in social importance, and we have not another problem in the world to-day that is pressing upon us so sternly for an equitable solution as that one which is involved in the perpetual contention between capitalists and laborers."

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"This labor question of to-day succeeds the slavery question of yesterday, inevitably, by the nature of things. Having determined that one man may not *own* the labor of another man, how can we help going on to inquire about and ascertain the just terms on which the labor of one may be *used* by another? It is plainly, to my mind, the sequent step—the next proceeding in the inquisition of human rights which we are forced to enter upon, whether willingly or not. Our civilization, as we call it, is, more than any thing else, an evolution of the sentiment of justice among men, and almost every other fruit of civilization, in its moral aspect, is incident to that or developed out of it. This results so from the kneading and moulding of men into organic social masses—a process which tends steadily to press out the savage egotism or selfishness which saturates the isolated human being. Now, that sentiment of justice, or sensibility to injustice, in society, which has only to-day gathered enlightenment enough to abhor a legal system of servitude which it tolerated yesterday, cannot have reached yet the end of its education in that direction, but rather the beginning of new teachings that are larger and more exact. Just as surely as it has recognized the hideous oppression of law which made one man the master by ownership of another, just so surely it is going to take cognizance now of the oppression of those circumstances in the social state which give to one an overmastering power over his fellow.

"This movement of education among men to a truer apprehension of justice and right, in place of conventional notions which confuse the moral sense, is not an eccentric one: it follows logical paths to its several ends, and can be traced like the construction of so many syllogisms in human history. In fact, the slow judicial action of society, sifting out rights from wrongs by clumsy methods and tardy forms of procedure, and so establishing equity between its members, is almost all there is of history that is worth a serious study."

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"When the slave went out of court a triumphant suitor, the laborer for hire came in and took his place; for when the great chancery court of civilization pronounced against the possession by one man of the labor of another, through mastery, or force, or operation of law, it bound itself to go further in the matter and to investigate the equity of the terms under which one man, in any other way, may possess the fruits of another's labor; the equity, that is, of the division to be made between him who toils and him who possesses the tools and the materials with which and on which the toil is expended. The trial of this question is on. Its hearing has begun. It cannot be arrested by any injunction, nor by any change of venue, nor by any stopping of the ears nor shutting of the eyes. It will go on and on, to the end, whether that be this century or the next one."

On the fifty-second and fifty-third pages of his book, Mr. Larned sums up the various methods by which capital is accumulated in individual hands. This he does under five heads. The first covers immediate production, or the legitimate savings of the producer from his own industry; the fourth is by inheritance; and the last is acquisition "by actual, unquestionable fraud." The two remaining modes are thus stated: "2. Capital which accrues to those who have the faculty to organize and direct with efficiency the productive labor of others; or the faculty to make large, economical combinations in the exchanging of the products of labor between different parts of the world; or the ingenious faculty which improves the implements and processes of productive industry; or the enterprising, sagacious faculty that conceives and carries out great public works, which result in wider and more intimate relations between the diverse industries of the world. 3. Capital that is gotten into possession by what we call speculation, which is either mere gambling or a shrewd catching of opportunities in trade, produced very often by public calamities, or by disturbances of industry and commerce that are adverse to the public weal."

It was at this point that the writer might, with great advantage, have stated the true law of equity. Failing of it, he has failed to point out the *instrument* or *method* by which the true industrial chieftains (those who have preëminent faculties, under the first of these two heads), and the mere speculators (under the second of them), secure alike their undue advantage over the ordinary or commonplace laborer. That instrument or method is embraced in the single word *profit*, by which should then be signified *something over and above equivalents*. This would bring us directly to the demand for a definition of equivalency in trade, or in the exchange of labor and its products, and so to the nut of the whole matter. When it shall be known and taught to the public that profit-making, now regarded as entirely innocent and even praiseworthy, is essentially wicked, as much so in kind as slave-holding,

and of the same quality; and when a public conscience shall have been created on that basis, justice will be done to the laborer, and not earlier. Commerce without profit-making may be effected in several ways,—coöperative, communistic, etc.; but, as the simplest and most perfect method, by the mere adoption of *Cost as the Limit of Price*; with, in all other respects, the utmost individual freedom—free competition without profit-making, which would turn the competition wholly into the channel of excellence in the performance. Of course, people will wonder, for a while, how commerce and work of all kinds could be done without the stimulus of profit-making; just as Southerners could not conceive how negroes could be induced to work without the stimulus of flogging. But the fog will clear up after a while, and people will understand the matter very well, and wonder how it could ever have been inconceivable.

To escape the hell we are in, of free competition and profit-making, now crushing the life out of the laborer, we are tendered the opposite hell of arbitrary intervention forcefully conforming the private conduct of individuals to the despotic will of somebody other than the individual—a despot or the despotic majority—and crushing the life out of free enterprise, as the alternative.

The heaven that lies between these two extremes is simple equity—the exchange of products absolutely without profit (which is only another name for swindling), with equal and fair play to all; to those who direct and organize, and those who exchange, on the same terms as to those who labor directly in production—simply according to the number of hours and the severity of the work, with no allowance whatever made at this point on the ground of superior abilities.

By this means the autonomy of the utmost individualism is reconciled with all the extended efficiency and coöperation of the compactest communism. The other substitute for the present system, which now commands most attention, and which was just alluded to as despotic intervention in the labor question, is the quasi-military organization of all the great industries,—first devised by St. Simon, and now revived by the Social Democracy of Germany, an already powerful and growing party, and represented in a smaller way under the lead of Mr. Joel Densmore, a real thinker of the people, in this country.

If capitalists would be good enough and wise enough and just enough to inaugurate the Equity System while they have the power remaining in their hands, they would bridge over the chasm, and conduct the world at once to its stage of industrial harmony. But this they probably will not do. They will act as the slaveholders did, and meet the slaveholders' retribution. The rising wave of the Social

Democracy, now no bigger than a man's hand in this country, already somewhat swollen in Germany, will probably overwhelm them as the war did the slaveholders. The masses, the common laborers, have the power already in their own hands; and they, or their leaders and "next friends" acting for them, have only "to get the hang" of using the power: and they are already experimenting on the subject. *They* will have neither the wisdom nor the patience to inaugurate a system of simple equity. Force and stringency will be their method; and so very likely the world must have a baptism into the ruder theory and practice of the Social Democracy, before Scientific Equity will be attained to. This last must, however, be the outcome; the perfect method, which shall be the *truth* between the conflicting false, or, at least, imperfect methods. The several methods of compelling men to do right, before they voluntarily choose the right, have their various degrees of advantage; but they all have the disadvantage of not being right. The right is that the right should be voluntarily and lovingly accepted purely because it is right, and with no wish or desire for an unjust personal advantage.

But though equity, on the basis of trade, yields no compensation to superior faculties, or capacity to bless others, this is not the whole story. The love of equal justice is not our only mental faculty. It is only a *basis* of harmonious adjustment among men. After it is secured, there is free play for gratitude, admiration, loyalty, and other higher faculties of the human make-up. There is a natural and truly admirable tendency in the minds of men to admire and reward the benefactions of social chieftains in the form of voluntary tribute. If this sentiment endowed a great inventor with a million of dollars, no injustice or disharmony would result. It is all otherwise when the million dollars is extorted as an advantage. So, in the future, when equity shall prevail, great organizers and leaders of industry may receive, as tribute, a portion of what they now levy as profit. Equity will distribute the wealth to all, according to the burden borne, with the impartiality of a scientific and rigorous law; but one of the blessings of the proximate equality of possession, on this basis, will be the freedom immediately to destroy the balance again, on the other basis of our higher sentiments. What is slaveholding and swindling when taken as profit (the denial of equity), will be admirable and alike honorable to both parties when given as tribute by the great masses benefited to their few eminent benefactors; and the great leaders of industry will come some day to trust themselves lovingly and entirely to those better impulses of the race.

S. P. A.

- 3.—*Memoir of Sir Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford, with notices of his Daughter.* By GEORGE E. ELLIS. Published, in connection with an edition of Rumford's complete works, by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston. Boston: Estes & Lauriat. 8vo. pp. 68o.

THIS volume was prepared four or five years ago, at the expense of the American Academy, and is now offered for sale, we are told, at a price barely covering the costs of republication. It is, in fact, a very generous gift to the public from the Academy, as well as a very handsome monument to the ingenious and bountiful Count. Of the editor's work it would be difficult to speak too highly. For the points of industry, thoroughness, good taste, and literary skill, and, above all, a determination to do its subject perfect justice, neither less nor more, the book is a model. Where he has erred in judgment,—if he has,—it is in a direction which will win him the thanks of nine-tenths of his readers, and the reproaches—if there are any such—only of those who have to pay the bills. We have two capital portraits of the handsome Count, one of his daughter, engravings of his birthplace, two monuments, and half a dozen Rumford medals, facsimiles of autograph and seal, and even of the three amusing but inartistic drawings that adorn his daughter's manuscript journal. Every hint of information or scrap of correspondence that can illustrate the memoir seems to be gathered up with patience absolutely untiring; the very dates are given of the London newspapers that chronicle the details of some special enterprise; and the good luck that has attended the biographer, in the chance discovery of records, the falling in with letters, the dedication of monuments, or the allusions of the press, seems of a piece with that extraordinary run of luck which distinguished the career of Count Rumford above almost any ever recorded in biography.

Indeed, the outline of that career makes a story of romance which no judicious writer of fiction could ever venture on. A Yankee boy, ingenious, shifty, restless, vexatious beyond the average; with no capital but his wits and his handsome figure; by turns woodchopper, merchant's clerk, country school-master, and, above all, experimenter,—finds himself at nineteen married to a widow of not far from twice his age, of comfortable fortune, and a social standing of the very best. A bridal journey brings this young fortune-hunter to the notice of a royal governor of the colony, who at once gives him a major's commission, and makes him a conspicuous mark of militia envy. As popular feeling warms to revolutionary heat, he finds himself in such

danger from suspected disloyalty that he takes flight from wife and friends, whom he never sees again, and, after hovering a few weeks about the scenes of Cambridge, Concord, and Bunker's Hill, escapes—apparently in a fit of irritation and disgust at failing of a commission in Washington's army—into the British lines during the siege of Boston; bears to England the news of the surrender, and at once finds himself a trusted and favored servant of the Government, the associate of ministers and peers, and an officer of high rank in the British army; travels on the continent after the war is over, and with equal suddenness becomes the most trusted and influential adviser at the court of Bavaria; carries out a dozen plans of economy and reform, sets on foot the most radical and successful scheme ever devised for the cure of beggary, and is made a "Count of the Holy Roman Empire," with a generous pension for life, which passes to his daughter; afterwards avails himself of a few weeks' leisure in England to build up a "Royal Institution" with the prompt and liberal aid of science, rank, and wealth; and, a few years later still, resides in Paris, with a great fortune at his command, husband of one of the famous and brilliant queens of French society; his own scientific career, meanwhile, splendid alike in discoveries that gave his own name glory, and inventions that have added unspeakably to the daily comfort of the humblest of mankind.

The great merit of this biography is that it does full justice, down to the last details, to this extraordinary and shining career, and at the same time with unsparing hand shows where the cloud and the pain lay upon it. The most brilliant of adventurers, the most ingenious of contrivers, among the most painstaking and successful philanthropists that ever lived, Count Rumford seems borne along his path by that most imperious destiny which is the nature of the man himself. With that bright hemisphere of science and refinement beckoning to him from the east, "a born courtier" too as his biographer calls him, it was in the fitness of things that his curious and restless genius should not be cramped by the round of camp service, or wasted in the harder and ruder life of a New Hampshire village. Kindly and amiable to the marrow of his bones, he would quarrel with nobody if he could help it; and even seems to have felt at intervals as if his wonderful European experience was a long exile, visited by many a yearning to see his native land, his mother, and his child: of any such tenderness to his wife no evidence appears. This kindly temper, with some natural vanity (for he was then only a grown-up boy), made him as ready to court the flattering notice of a British governor as careful to keep the good will of his townspeople. Their rude fervor could not pardon

his apparent halting between the two opinions which were death and life to them. He seems to have been sincerely astonished at the sudden obloquy that drove him out of town, and to have protested quite honestly that he was no way "inimical" to the American cause. But patriotic suspicion kept him from the service he professed to seek; at an informal trial he barely escaped judgment as being little better than a spy; and he probably had few compunctions, and more of a home-feeling, when he had once adroitly crossed the line. For this, and for his service a few years later as a sort of recruiting officer of the British army near New York, he seems to have felt that he had never been quite pardoned; and when, now rich and famous, he craved to see New England again, and to build a home of his own on the beautiful border of Menotonay (Spy Pond), he still hesitated, and was anxious lest he should not make his peace with his old neighbors, whose suspicions he had proved so just. What he forfeited, too, of family affection and honor—for he lapsed too easily into foreign ways, and was not true to the simpler moralities and faith of his New England home-training—is shown in the restless and rather dreary life led by his daughter, whom he had left an infant and did not see for more than twenty years; whom he wished as a companion and comfort, though for many years together he could not offer her a home; who shared something of her father's talent, and a good deal of his restless, wandering way; who seems to have brought an excellent ability and genuine kindness of heart to a result pitifully out of proportion to the splendid opportunities he had made for her. The brilliant discoverer, the honored philanthropist, the flattered guest and favorite of three royal cities and of the first nobility of Europe, complains like a spoilt child of his domestic infelicities in his second marriage. To bolt the gates of an evening against his wife's invited guests, and leave her—sought as she was by the choice society of Paris—to hold converse with her visitors across the garden wall, was an odd performance for the accomplished courtier and the eminent man of science: as if all the suns of foreign favor could not ripen the shifty country boy into a real gentleman! The domestic side of his life thus seems, in several views of it, undignified and disappointing—even if not, perhaps, positively unhappy; and it is on this side, after all, that most of a man's happiness is staked. Where Benjamin Thompson sinned, Count Rumford smarted under the rod.

But a man's clear right is to be judged by his best, and not his worst. How kind-hearted he was, how patient, how wise, how generous, how truly philanthropic and humane, how untiring in industry for the good that seemed to him most important to the general hap-



piness of men, it is for his biography to show. There are two things which remain, the distinct and permanent monuments of his fame. In pure science, as one result from an infinity of ingenious, fruitful, and valuable researches, he may be said to be the real discoverer of the mechanical theory of heat; to have established and confirmed by experiment the proposition—more valuable than almost any theoretical one that can be named of the last century—that *heat is a mode of motion*, which has been argued and illustrated within these fifteen years almost as if it were a new discovery; and to have approached quite nearly to declaring the precise mechanical equivalent of heat, which was fully established by still more detailed experiment some twenty years later. This one among his innumerable services in that line is what sets his place and rank in the lists of physical science.

The grand experiment in what may be called the science of Charity, or in dealing practically with the gravest of all problems in social science, is what gave Count Rumford his strongest immediate claim to the gratitude of men. It is this, and not his skill in physical research, that is most conspicuous on his monument at Munich, where the experiment was made.<sup>1</sup> No one could possibly have imagined the good fortune that made it not merely a success, but a possibility. The absolute confidence of a king to whom Sir Benjamin Thompson was but an officer on leave of the British army, almost a stranger, with some dim prestige of science across the ocean, commended only by his personal address and his winning gifts; the curious, self-confident skill, the clear, prompt, resolute, swiftly-ordered action, that put in operation all the details of an intricate machine perfectly adjusted from the start; the coöperation he found in the habit of subordination in the people, the disciplined skill of his helpers, the tractable and willing temper of the subjects of his experiment,—all these were needed to make it what it appears at first sight to have been, the most completely successful effort yet seen to deal with the beggary of a populous city. The problems of pauperism are as various as they are painful. The conditions of wealth, the causes of destitution, are entangled even to this day in a chaos of dispute. The underlying question of population itself, the law of its increase or decay, comes in still further to complicate the matter, when we try to form a judgment that will hold under a variety of circumstances and times. A scientific knowledge how to deal with it cannot be had by theory; most likely, only by

<sup>1</sup> "To him who rooted out the most disgraceful public evils, Idleness and Mendicity: who gave to the Poor relief, occupation, and good morals, and to the Youth of the Fatherland so many Schools of Instruction." Erected in 1795 (Biography, pp. 196, 197).

long, difficult, and often disappointing experiment. It is Count Rumford's chief claim to honor that the one experiment put wholly in his hands, among a foreign people, still remains, for intelligence, instructiveness, and success, among the most valuable, as it is one of the most interesting, of all that have ever been tried.

J. H. A.

4.—*Three Memorial Poems.* By JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co.

THESE "Three Memorial Poems" are the "Ode read at Concord, April 19, 1875," upon the one hundredth anniversary of the fight at Concord Bridge; "Under the Old Elm," commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the taking command of the American Army by Washington under the ancient tree still standing in Cambridge; and "An Ode for the Fourth of July, 1876."

We confess that we are always shy of *occasional* poems. By that we mean verses written to participate in and dignify some celebration of greater or less moment. They are commonly written to order, or we might almost, in view of the ordinary results, borrow a legal phrase, and say, "with *malice* aforethought." "Go to, now, let us write a poem" was never a good midwife to genius, nor brought into the world any very noble offspring of the Muse. With this preface, we are bound in frankness to say that, to our mind, this little volume of Lowell falls in with the rule, though containing passages that are notable exceptions. Especially the poem "Under the Old Elm" does not seem to us a work of merit at all equal to Lowell's genius or fame. In fact, if it were not Lowell's, and written with so much honest purpose and moral earnestness, we should not hesitate to call it very ordinary. Every one will read it once; no one will read it a second time. It will be laid down with the reflection that Lowell is a very skilful writer, and has toiled through a set task very successfully, barring considerable obscurity of expression which makes difficult reading, and is apt to belong to toilsome writing, if it must at the same time be stately. Of course, being from so true a poet as Lowell, it could not escape happy and strong expressions; but we do not include among these the "manly queen" with which the poem ends, and which we think neither pleasing, forcible, nor poetical. The line that most prints itself on our memory is,—

"The habitual full-dress of his well bred mind."

Also,—

"That energetic passion of repose."

The foregoing general remarks apply to the "Ode for the Fourth of July, 1876." But it is more pleasing to us, and has more passages that the reader will linger over. By very far the finest of the three is the "Ode read at Concord;" and it is, if not great or magnificent, a beautiful apostrophe to Liberty, and has many passages of poetic grace and strength. It is fresh, often glowing, vitalizing, and full of faith in, and love for, the temperate zone of freedom. Among happy and strong verses, we mark

"that era-parting bridge  
O'er which, with footfall still as dew,  
The Old Time passed into the New."

"She, a world-wandering orphan then,  
So mighty now!"

"Freedom, O fairest of all  
The daughters of Time and Thought!"

To our mind, the noblest number in the Ode is the following:—

IV.

"Whiter than moonshine upon snow  
Her raiment is, but round the hem  
Crimson stained: and, as to and fro  
Her sandals flash, we see on them  
And on her instep, veined with blue,  
Flecks of crimson, on those fair feet,  
High-arched, Diana-like, and fleet,  
Fit for no grosser stain than dew;  
O, call them rather christs than stains,  
Sacred and from heroic veins!  
For, in the glory-guarded pass,  
Her haughty and far-shining head  
She bowed to shrive Leonidas  
With his imperishable dead;  
Her, too, Morgarten saw,  
Where the Swiss lion fleshed his icy paw;  
She followed Cromwell's quenchless star  
Where the grim Puritan tread  
Shook Marston, Naseby, and Dunbar:  
Yea, on her feet are dearer dyes  
Yet fresh, nor looked on with untearful eyes."

J. V. B.

5.—*The Papacy and the Civil Power.* By R. W. THOMPSON. New York: Harper & Bros. 1876.

SINCE the definition of the Infallibility of the Pope by the Vatican Council, fear has arisen in many minds that a clash may some day come between the allegiance due by a Roman Catholic citizen to the State, and his obedience to the Pope. In England, Mr. Gladstone has given the leading expression of this fear, and, in this country, Mr. Thompson, in the book before us, has devoted some seven hundred pages to proving the danger to which our institutions are liable from the power of the Roman Catholic Church. We are glad to see discussion of the matter, for, if there is good reason to fear such results, every Catholic citizen ought to know precisely where it lies, that he may understandingly judge for himself to which authority he will yield; and, if there is not, a rather wide-spread prejudice should be removed.

Mr. Thompson admits in his preface that he began and prosecuted his work from the Protestant standpoint, and this is apparent throughout the book. His argument is that of a lawyer who presents his side as strongly as possible, and is not above a little abuse of his opponent, to whom he leaves any thing that can be said on the other side, rather than of a judge who is to weigh the arguments on both sides, and dispassionately decide. That the Catholic Church has many sins on its shoulders we will admit, but, as a lawyer, Mr. Thompson should know that these are not evidence that a man cannot be a good citizen and a good Catholic. Such facts rather tend to confuse the mind and create a prejudice, while in no wise bearing on the only point to which his book is devoted,—the relation of the Catholic Church to civil government.

At the beginning of his second chapter Mr. Thompson lays it down as an axiom among the friends of free government, that "error ceases to be dangerous when reason is left free to combat it," while the opposite of this, as he claims, is maintained by the advocates of Imperialism,—“that the public mind and conscience are enlightened only in proportion as they are submissive to some superior governing power, sufficiently strong to hold them in obedience.” Protestantism he considers the result of the former of these views; decrepitude, decay, and disruption the natural fruit of the other. From this he proceeds to show—what we presume no one doubts—that the teaching of the Catholic Church is that all good members of it must accept without question all matters of faith laid down by the head of the Church,

and not attempt to reason on them; and argues that hence our political institutions are doomed to "decrepitude, decay, and disruption," unless something can be done to check the increase in the membership of the Catholic Church. But it seems to us that there is a grave fault in his argument. Reason is as free in this country as is possible. Whenever it is not, it is the fault of the individual. The Catholic Church, to be sure, exacts absolute belief in its tenets; but so do most of the Orthodox Protestant Churches. Any member of any church has a right to reason for himself, and, if he cannot accept any dogma, can decide for himself. If the Roman Catholics, who at present are less than one-sixth of the population of the country, can obtain sufficient converts from the remaining five-sixths to give them a majority, and allow them, as Mr. Thompson seems to fear, to put the State into the hands of the Pope, and this while the mass of the reason and intelligence of the country is left free to oppose them, it will be a bold man who will dare to assert that the truth is not with them. Nor do we see any reason to believe that the increase of Catholics in this country by immigration will give them such relative numerical power as could enable them, even if they wished, to take the State into the arms of the Church. And, if Mr. Thompson's "decrepitude, decay, and disruption" theory is correct, we do not see why it should not act first on the Roman Catholics themselves. But their church seems to have lasted pretty well, and to be on a tolerably firm basis still, in spite of this enervating influence.

A good deal of space is devoted to proof that the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Pope, as a dogma of the church, dates from the Vatican Council. But it was expressly recognized in the Bull *Unam Sanctam*, published by Boniface VIII. in 1302, and was recognized by the majority of Catholics before the Vatican Council as a necessary result of the Apostolic succession. The Vatican Council simply defined this infallibility to prevent any schism in the church. The infallibility of the Pope is only of acts *ex cathedra*,—i. e., in regard to matters of faith and belief; and, although the Pope himself is the final judge of what matters are *ex cathedra*, we cannot see any more danger in this than in the belief of good Protestants that they are absolutely bound by the authority of the Bible. The Catholic looks to the Pope as his highest and most absolute guide; the Protestant to his Bible. The Pope assumes no authority over those who do not admit it by being members of his church. In many cases in the past he has assumed authority over temporal rulers, but over Catholic rulers only; who, as Catholics, were rightly subject to him so long as they remained in

the Catholic Church. And no good citizen will admit that he is absolutely subject to the *civil* authorities against his conscience. Thus, at the time of the Fugitive Slave Law, many men, in all other respects most excellent citizens, did all in their power to defeat the operation of that law. Civil allegiance must always be limited by the conscience, or we make the State infallible.

The remedy that Mr. Thompson suggests for what he considers a most alarming state of affairs, is that the American people "maintain at every hazard, and in the face of all consequences, their right to enact their own laws, to preserve their own constitutions, and to regulate their own affairs according to their own sovereign will, and without foreign dictation; perpetuate their popular form of government as the rightful inheritance of their children; resist to the last the divine right of kings or popes to rule over them; firmly refuse to permit the canon laws of the Roman Catholic, or of any other, church to take the place of those of their own enacting; and teach the Roman hierarchy, and all others who shall willingly become subservient to the schemes of the Pope, that, while citizens of the United States, they can enjoy unimpaired all the rights of citizenship secured to themselves; but that, in order to this, they must render the same obedience to all existing laws which others are required to render; and that they can enjoy no exclusive privileges, whether civil or ecclesiastical, which shall put it in their power to violate the principle of American liberty, to impose unwilling restraint upon a single conscience, or to endanger the existence of a single fundamental principle upon which they have erected their civil and religious freedom."

Mr. Thompson allows his feelings to influence his use of language occasionally. Thus, although he complains of "Protestantism and Infidelity" as an offensive title, a few pages further on he speaks of "letting the car of Papacy with Jesuit conductors roll unresistingly over us." Again: "Its (the Papacy's) adroit training of its subjects in the school of dissimulation shows how completely the practice of falsehood may be systematized into a science." The word "enthused," which occurs on page 110, is one which we were hardly prepared to expect in a work of the kind. Mr. Thompson's fidelity to American institutions and his own religious belief is shown in such passages as this:—

"The Protestant institutions of the United States yet exist. The foundation stones remain solidly planted. The flag of the nation floats over all its territory. No star is missing from its folds. Does it not seem that God is on our side?—that if our Protestantism is infidelity and heresy, and Roman Catholicism the only true religion, instead of Protestantism advancing and the Papacy going down into the grave, the very reverse order of things would have transpired? With these evidences of Provi-

dential guardianship, we may confidently hope for protection from papal and imperial aggression, unless we shall become indifferent to our destiny, forget our manhood, and fail in our duty to the institutions with which we have been blessed."

C. A.

6.—*The Teachings of Providence: or, New Lessons on Old Subjects.*

By REV. J. B. GROSS. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

THIS work of 457 pages is divided into four books, each book subdivided into chapters, and these again into paragraphs. Book I. treats of "Human Creeds and the Gospel in Conflict, or the Meritoriousness of Good Works," and is a discussion of the old question of faith or works. Book II. is "A Critical Investigation of the Dogma of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of the Son of God." Book III. treats of "Christ as the Sole Saviour," and is a discussion of the received or so-called Orthodox Tenets of the Doom of Man and the Scheme of Salvation. Book IV. discusses critically "The Sheol or Hades of the Bible." The general scope and purpose of the work may be epitomized in the author's own words (p. 280): "I hesitate not to say that the eminently auspicious spirit of the Christian religion, as it emanated from the chaste lips of Christ, lies ignobly smothered under the crushing weight of a vile and heterogeneous mass of absurd and oppressive creeds," etc. A great deal of the space is taken up with a discussion of Biblical and especially New Testament doctrine or interpretation; but the author appears, nevertheless, to take chiefly a critical and historical interest in that matter, and to occupy a position of pure rationalism. Thus he declares Jesus to be exclusively upon a natural plane in his life and teaching, and says (p. 205): "It follows conclusively from the results of the preceding investigations of the subject, that St. Paul labored under a most egregious as well as decidedly pernicious mistake, or at least unfortunately indorsed it, when he promulgated the astounding doctrine in the early Christian Church that death was introduced into the world through Adam's sin. I will only add that when science and religion come in conflict, facts must decide and truth will prevail!" It is apparent throughout that the author has little belief in miracles (though it is no part of his plan to discuss the supernatural in general), and his view of retribution and salvation is a purely spiritual one: "Strive to live agreeably to the nature of things as God has ordained them, and you will do well; for you will be in delightful and saving relationship with



the laws of Creation," etc. (p. 276). This recalls to mind Wollaston, who gave it as a rule for a truly religious life "to acknowledge things to be what they are," and conducts perhaps to Kant's doctrine of the absolute claim of truth, whereby a departure from veracity, at any time, under any circumstances, or for any reason, can be nothing but a pernicious evil. The intention of the author in the present work is worthy of all praise. We cannot understand his undertaking the work, however. The whole subject is so remote from our present mental and moral position, that it requires an effort to breathe even a little while in the intolerable atmosphere. We should as soon think of sitting down seriously to discuss Valentinian Gnosticism, or the Hindu cosmogony, or witchcraft, or perpetual motion, or whatever else is most effete and by-gone, as to spend an instant over the doctrines known as evangelical religion. Possibly there may be a constituency requiring such a book as this; indeed, no doubt there must be. But we incline to think that the best way now to treat common Orthodoxy, so-called, is simply to let it alone, and go on "to fresh fields and pastures new" so open to the sunlight on all sides that the old black and bitter theology will slink away from the illumination. It was in this way that miracles were disposed of. No argument ever banished witchcraft or the miracles of the Saints. They simply vanished when men began to understand inductive science, and to contemplate the idea of order. It is not the least of the evils of this discussion that it seems impossible to carry it on with good nature. "Hyper-pious and contemptible twaddle," "ridiculous dogma," "grotesque notions," "fanatical article," "diseased or vicious imagination," "puerile and sensuous trinitarian idolatry," "conceited shibboleth-worshippers," "conceited sticklers," "idolatrous and blasphemous doctrines," "infamous abusers of common-sense," "astounding folly," "frightful blasphemy," "profane twaddle,"—are a few of the handsome expressions applied in this book to those who dissent from the author. We submit to Mr. Gross that this is not the proper way to conduct an argument; it suggests irresistibly that he is himself still in the bonds as bound with them. It is the old angry, vindictive, and arrogant tone of the ecclesiastic; and, for aught we can see, one kind is as good as another, and all are bad. In saying, as we have, that the author's intention is praiseworthy, we must candidly confess our opinion that we have pretty nearly exhausted his virtues in the present work. As to literary execution, the punctuation is extraordinary and perplexing to the last degree; and there is throughout a somewhat pedantic inflation of manner, which sometimes tumbles over into pedantic ignorance,—as when the author speaks of "dogmaticians" (p. 18),

meaning dogmatists. The argument is frequently quite puerile,—as when it is contended that hell-flames cannot be sulphurous, because, sulphur fumes not being respirable, the ghosts could not live in them, and, not being capable of supporting combustion, the flames would go out; or when it is asserted that the dogma of the Incarnation produces a demi-god after the pattern of the Greek myths; or when the tenet of the “only-begotten Son” is argued through a whole chapter upon the basis of the reproductive laws observed in animals and plants. In spite of the good purpose of the author, we must think the book a remarkably poor one; even to those who may be in a state of mind to profit by a discussion of the subject-matter, we should recommend a very different kind of work.

J. V. B.

7.—*The Jericho Road: a Story of Western Life.* By JOHN HABBERTON. Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Co. 1877.

THIS is a story of a boy who went West to earn money to support his mother, and fell among thieves. Lem Pankett, the hero, first appears on a Mississippi steamboat, where he finds his father among the “roustabouts.” His father is killed in an attempt to shoot a dam to save lock-charges, and Lem is left alone in Mt. Zion. Here he falls in with Squire Barkum, who gives him much work, much scriptural exhortation, and little pay. After many trials, he is seized by the regulators, who are about to hang him for horse stealing, when the actual thief appears and saves him. Lem is then used as a tool by counterfeiters, and finally arrested for passing his money. The book closes with his death just after his trial and acquittal, when he suddenly becomes a hero and is treated to a magnificent funeral; after which the Priests and Levites of Mt. Zion become more Samaritan-like.

The book is written as a satire on the outward profession of religion which is willing to give freely of texts from the Bible, and thinks its whole duty is then done. Squire Barkum is the representative of this class, and is particularly apt at fitting quotations from the Bible to his own case. The scene after the Doctor has warned him that Lem is likely to die on his hands from over-work is especially good:—

“He stepped into his back room, where, in his capacity of secretary of the County Bible Society, he kept the Society’s property, and took down a Bible. He opened it at random, as was his habit when troubled in mind and in search of consolation, and his eye fell upon the following passage:—

"Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance, and to temperance patience, and to patience godliness, and to godliness brotherly kindness, and to brotherly kindness charity."

"The Squire hurriedly shut the book. 'That sounds just like Peter,' said he, 'puttin' brotherly kindness an' charity above faith an' godliness. If he wasn't an inspired writer, I should say he was in the habit of goin' off half-cocked an' gettin' things wrong side before. I wonder how it come to open just at that place?'"

"The Squire again allowed the Bible to open at random, and his eye fell upon this passage:—

"'But thine eye and thine heart are not but for thy covetousness, and for to shed innocent blood, and for oppression——'"

"The Squire closed the book abruptly. '*That's* Jeremiah,' said he. 'I always *did* wonder why Jeremiah was for ever down in the dumps, an' abusin' the Lord's chosen people. 'Pears to me my humble efforts to seek the source of ev'ry consolation ain't much blest to-day; but I'll try again.'

"The book opened and the Squire read:—

"'And Nathan said unto David, "Thou art the man."'"

"The Squire tossed the holy book across the room with such energy that it went through a window.

"'Of course Nathan said so,' said he, 'an' very good reason he had for sayin' it, too; but I don't see what that's got to do with me. I should think I'd been given over to the adversary to be tempted, an' that he'd just stuck his finger in the Bible at these places. But I've no business to get mad over it,—"*resist the devil an' he'll flee from you.*" An' its wrong to treat God's holy word with such disrespect, an' I deserve the punishment I've got for it—them window lights cost nine cents apiece by the box.'

"The Squire went into the yard, reverently picked up the book, and again seated himself. This time he chanced upon the verse reading,—

"'So, then, every one of us shall give an account of himself to God.'

"The Squire mused. '*That's* good clear sense,' said he: "who wrote that? Paul!—I might have knowed it—Paul always had a level head. I don't know what would have become of the church, if it wasn't for Paul. "Every one shall give an account of *himself* to God:" if that means any thing, it means that Lem has to be responsible for his own condition; and so, of course, it means that I haven't got any thing to do with it. I wish the doctor was here now—I'd just like to see him get around Paul with his new-fangled notions. I wonder if the doctor's really sound in the faith himself? He got past the examinin' committee more on his face an' good manners than on his evidences, I really do believe.'"

The description of the Methodist meeting is very well done, and the account of the reaction in Lem, on finding that those who were so friendly to him then were none the more willing to help him in a more tangible way, is really pathetic. The passage in which one of the counterfeits, after acknowledging himself a miserable sinner according to the approved phraseology, says, "There's one comfort; however great the debt is, Jesus paid it all," illustrates the kind of religious cant against which the book is aimed. It is relentless in its sarcastic treat-

ment of cant and scriptural hypocrisy, and a good deal of fun is worked in. Although there is a lack of polish to it, it has decided elements of popularity, and passes away an hour or two very pleasantly. We hope that the times when the lessons it teaches are needed are nearly gone.

C. A.

## CHIPS FROM MY STUDIO.

HERE is philosophy and solace for the souls it will content :—

What I don't see  
Don't trouble me;  
And what I see  
Might trouble me,  
Did I not know  
It must be so.

THE poet who furnished the above thus records his encounter with a critic :—

## CRITIC.

Idle oftentimes thou seemest,  
And, for acting, only dreamest;  
Thinking not, although not talking;  
Lying, when thou should'st be walking.

## POET.

Not so idle as I seemed !  
Know ye, then, of what I dreamed?  
I in purer realms was flying;  
Only left my bundle lying.

"WHERE there is no vision, the people perish," said the Hebrew prophet. There are plenty of people "up and doing." Who is dreaming? Where is the vision without which the people perish? "The outlook," we say. But let us confess the matter of "vision" in this country is none the clearest. The impatient radical clamors for "action." His impatient zeal is a radical defeat. Wait on the vision, and be still. Inevitable will be the earth's transformation. "I saw a new heaven and a new earth,"—the earth taking on the pattern of the sky,—wrote John at Patmos. A radical new sky,—after that, action.

AMERICAN affairs are encouraging. We are able to keep the faith. The die was cast, the choice made, in the beginning, for a wondrous human felicity as the outcome of all endeavor here. We cannot go back on that record; we cannot decline our task. 'Tis set in our hearts; it flows in our blood. We are not a race of individual free-wills that we can break away and piece-meal destroy our heritage. "The human race is one man who never dies, but is always advancing." We are coercive each with the other; traitor, no less than loyalist, points the way. That we have to-day accomplished is never a satisfaction. If we have no meaning to put into it beyond the mere appearance, the source of all cheer and courage is not touched. No sensible person judges a work half done. He will "call again," and see what has come of it. But the artist himself is not always sure what will come of it. He is working to an ideal he cannot, in advance of his trial-effort, always define. To express outwardly, in speech, form, color, that which he sees or feels with an inner sense, is the endeavor of his life. And this is his resource: fail often as he may, the vision itself, if he has wrought in sincerity, never fails; but, in each valley of despair, shines forth again to reassure him; puts new courage into the heart of him, and drives him on to more satisfying labors. So is it with the man who is the nation. How do affairs tally with his ideal? Out of each despair rises faith. He *cannot* be "disobedient to the heavenly vision." But whether success tend to permanence, depends on the sort of vision he has descried as "heavenly." The vision may be of the earth, earthy; then permanence were a curse. But we of America think we have seen a star in the very heaven of heavens.

PATIENCE is half the battle. Every thing seemingly goes wrong at first. But what if this wrong-right be part of the rightness? Patience is saving grace. There are no "royal roads," no "short cuts." The world must grow, as well as see and do. It must grow, that it may see and do with good result. Here in this land we have undertaken to grow, as it were, by a sort of universal experience; and 'tis a slow and, to those who do not heed the fact, disheartening process. Then, this universal experience is of universal liberty. We have launched our fate on the hazard of all men's freedom. Much faith does it take to compass this daring venture. But what we are to win, is to be won so, and only so. Saint and sinner are each factors. Cromwell found his "godly men" the most impractical rulers. Liberty to go wrong is

a persuasion to the right. Let all the people try it, and the end is a permanent advantage. 'Tis a long way round, but the shortest way home. To dwell blissfully in a Paradise they do not create, is not to fill up the measure of human destiny. Of such import is the fable of the exiles from Eden. Theirs proved a woeful bliss. Experience poisoned and killed it. Fruit from a garden ready tilled loses flavor. There is a tilling of the man to be done; and he is the man to do it. He may loiter on

"Till old experience do attain  
To something like prophetic strain,"—

then, as they advise one on the streets, he must and will "brace up," and put on some new style of behavior. Thus "old experience" is teaching by manifold accumulations of testimony at length, that all short cuts which sacrifice the principles of universal well-being through self-effort are ever pitfalls and snares. For example, we of this country, in our hundred years of desire to establish "Union," have been seeking by many a compromising short cut results we could be entitled to only by loyal living. Not through liberty, but without it, we sought our peace. "No such miserable motto as liberty first," said the great defender of Union. That was our treason long flaunted as noblest patriotism, and by no means now wholly forsworn. Yet, step by step, this rebellion has been forced to yield. Union, harmony, peace, are not to be taken by violence. Every gift of such sort laid on Union's altar has been spurned. "Thou fool! first go and be reconciled to thy brother." The Empire is peace! Not for America. Liberty is peace. The emphasis is changing from force to persuasion. Put no obstacle in the way. Be patient. It will take longer to convert men than to shoot them; but conversion abides; shooting does not stay. And then, conversion once in fashion, surprising results are possible.

If there has been a vast deal of "rough hewing" done in this world, there has also been a "divinity shaping our ends." In other words, the persistency of God in human affairs cannot be gainsaid. Sensible people demur to the idea that there is an outside providence watching and interfering when occasion requires. But it is sensible to assert that there is a providence in the deeps of human nature, out-working its perfect will, not spasmodically, but continuously. Man sums up in his being all the universe contains. There, within him, dwell the gods, the angels, and the kingdom of heaven. Mankind are



not many, but one soul. We wander away from this central soul, and meet as strangers, alien and enemy. But deep calls unto deep, and we awake at length to know each other as ourselves. All speech that does not call upon this oneness in our natures must be backed up by force. What comes of force? It dissipates at last the illusion that society can be fashioned from without; that perfection in human beings is possible by compression in iron moulds. It is a part of our growth that we must first have this damnation of outwardness. We "are given over to believe the lie." It inheres in the beginnings of individuality. Inflated with our selfishness, we think we have nothing in common. We do not know how to get hold of each other. We grasp at the visible, and think it is the substantial part, and that much is to be gained by pounding on that. We dump a load of this outwardness into the station-house, and think society is improved. Or we found a reform school like that at Westboro', and use "sweat tubs," and ply other tortures, till the boys call "Enough!" and say they will be good. The illusion vanishes. Flesh and blood slip away. We haven't got even a ghost of a soul to show for all our pains. Addressing each other as other than ourselves, is continuing conflict. Tired out at length with our wranglings and blood-spilling, we open our eyes suddenly to behold each in the eyes of his neighbor—himself! 'Tis no lone, exceptional voice that has cried out on supreme occasions, "Love neighbor as self." All experience, culminating, brings just this revelation. Men see, finally, they are not many, but one. And this is the dawn of society. Its terms are equality: but 'tis the equality of the many in the one. Recognize this, and we have manners,—to which there is nothing superior.

"Is it self-culture, self-assertion, self-respect? Is it unselfish self-hood? Or is it loss of self,—of self-conscious self-hood? I pass a man in the narrow street. What have I done? I have, without thought of self, without thought of the man, graciously given him the right of way. It was the spontaneity of my manners that lent them their charm. This is not a special culture. I did it not to perfect myself, nor the other man; nor to accommodate him. No doubt he was accommodated. But my motive was not that. I had no motive. It was my salute to the Universe. Wholly unpremeditated, 'twas a right and beautiful thing to do. Was that not enough? No praise for me. I was not there for blame or praise. How could there be praise or blame? Our meeting and passing was the rhythm and music of life. What of him I met? Was he grateful in his heart toward me? Possibly. Why? Not, I

trust, because of my courtesy to him. I had done nothing for *him*. Not that he was my friend had I turned aside; else, the next man I met, not my friend, had received quite other treatment. No; he was nothing to me. There was not only the lack of self-reference on my part; there was also no self-assertion on his part. Neither of us thrust self in the way. With no thought of the act, we waived self, and permitted the tryst of God. Not that he received favor, but that the universe was justified, did he feel pleasure. It was the spontaneity of life."

In this wise I had been talking to my friend, when he interposed:

"What we want is perfection. A little common sense settles the whole question. If you would perfect yourself, you must wisely labor with that end in view."

I began to say, "Common sense is not always wise. We need often a sense that is *un*-common. And pray don't mistake that for *non*-sense;" but he claimed the floor, and thus proceeded:—

"Don't suppose I advise one to cut his own throat in order to achieve the perfection of self, as he would be doing if he did the thing in a purely selfish manner. Mind you, I say, *wisely* labor, &c. You must clearly see that self cannot be made secure at the cost or sacrifice of others: nay more, self-culture is not to be obtained by any amount of labor bestowed exclusively on self. It is not merely that you refrain from despoiling others. Your case demands other treatment than this even. It positively enjoins upon you that you bestow your labor in great degree on your fellow-men to the neglect of self. Why? The reasons are two at least. First, the labor you bestow on others reacts on self, and indirectly does more for you than you could do directly. The rule is: Serving others serves self better than self-serving. Secondly, while you are serving others, and others are serving you, the gain, as you clearly see, must all be on your side. Thus, losing life, you find it. So you see it is no cutting your throat I advise, as would be the case were you to cut yourself off from reciprocal human sympathy by exclusive devotion to your own self-culture. No: go out into the world, and toil for your race, and you shall find yourself growing into that perfection you so much desire. And, as this achievement becomes universal, just in that degree shall come on earth the long-prophesied millennial glory."

With this deliverance, my friend departed. He did not care for my reply; nor did I much care to make reply. His common sense was by far too headstrong for my mood. He must be left to the ameliorations of time and the new birth. But to myself I continued what I had to say somewhat in this wise.

At the risk of being over-precise, I will say there are three planes of being. The first and second my friend has described well enough. The third he does not in his philosophy apparently suspect. In his life, many a sally of his out and away from self-seeking, has apprised me anew of the fact that one's self and one's philosophy are not always, if ever, the same. This third and highest plane, then, is what? In one word, I shall answer, *spontaneity*—the free human life. Not reflection, nor calculation, nor plan, nor purpose, enters into it at all: but wholly the delight of being in the presence of beauty and truth: and this quite irrespective of any private or public advantage. My friend would assert this in his love of a poem, in his admiration of a work of sculpture, or in standing before the glory of a sunset. But that there is this same poetry in human life; that, in truth, one's life may be itself a poem; and *is*, whenever it attains its divine expression,—is not to his mind so clear. Or will he say, "A *perfect* human life is a poem." I am not so sure of that. The finite human life can have no perfection, but is, as the old theology has long asserted it to be, "filthy rags," when the All-perfect infinite dawns on the soul. I say one's *life*—not one's mere existence—may be a poem. There is no more poetry in your moral mechanism than in other mechanics. He who loses himself finds life, and his life is poetry.

Thus it is: the manifest of *life* is spontaneity. Hence, no ulterior ends; doing one thing that somewhat else may happen; casting bread on the waters where some eddy may return it again with increase. In and for its own sake is the beautiful thought entertained, and the beautiful deed done. Culture is the liberation of self from rules and laws.

"Can rules or tutors educate  
The semi-god whom we await,"

into this free, flowing, self-losing life?

Is the "color line" vanishing? The new President seems to have set himself honestly enough to the task of wiping it out. Perhaps he feels, however, as well as Lincoln, that he has before him "a vast, big job." If it be *his* "job," he undoubtedly has. But, if the white Southerners have really taken hold to help, and do not mean to wipe out the "colored man" as well, the mere politician who is hanging his fortune on that "line" can probably be disposed of. But no political bargaining is going to do it. That must fail as absolutely as has the application of force. The "thou shalt not" of the army, though a

temporary protection to the negro, has proved no successful missionary. But the moment the President intimates a withdrawal of force, there appears to be a Southern ear that will listen to humane counsels. In short, the point of *conversion* has possibly been reached. Time will show. "I see a new light breaking in the North," exclaims a recognized leader of Southern sentiment. If the new light is breaking also in the South, the color line will certainly disappear. But it must be confessed that there are a good many "ifs" in the way. The old-time abolitionist, who can draw from the well-preserved storehouse of his memory a recollection of how things were in other days, cannot easily believe the Southern planter will ever voluntarily do that which is right. Does he vote in the Senate for Douglas?—That is his cunning. He will give a colored marshal to the District of Columbia—give him no more interference from Washington in the South's "local affairs." We are so little accustomed to throwing responsibility upon the wrong doers by taking them at their word, putting them on their honor, that it is a puzzling question to decide off-hand. Nevertheless, something of the sort seems likely to come. What is remarkable, however, in this controversy, is the unconscious shifting to ground new and dangerous to political pretensions,—a movement on which pretty much the whole country seems thoroughly bent. It is announced "that a government that cannot stand except by force does not deserve to stand." This is applied to South Carolina and Louisiana. But, if for these States, then for others, and for all States, it is good doctrine,—even for the United States. Let Mr. Tilden set up in opposition to Mr. Hayes. If he can collect the taxes by a voluntary act on the part of the people, and Mr. Hayes cannot, why, Hayes must go with Chamberlain and Packard. If, more than that, the people will voluntarily pay taxes to none of them—neither to Tilden nor Hayes, Nichols nor Packard,—then all parties must abandon their pretensions, and leave the people free to get on with less governing. It is evident, however, things are not to be carried that far. The consistency, the logic of the situation is not to be urged. One may see simply the drift of the time to some more enlightened system of affairs than that built on force.

THE Boston University Year-Book for 1876 contains an essay by William F. Warren, President of the University, entitled, "Tax Exemption the Road to Tax Abolition." This essay is endorsed by the full board of the Council in these words: "In the present issue large space is given to the discussion of one of the most important

topics now agitating the public mind. In place of the further extension of taxation advocated by many, the essay proposes a far more imposing reform, the general abolition of all compulsory taxes. It is hoped that the comparative novelty of the proposition may not deter practical men from a thoughtful study of the paper. Just ideals are ever serviceable, however slow the world's approach to them." This essay, emanating from the very heart of so large and influential a denomination of Christians as the Methodists, goes far to silence the fears of those who look for a general Christian uprising to rivet yet other chains on American liberty. Few professing liberals have yet reached the liberal ground of this clear-headed Christian. "Tax abolition" is a step far in advance of the State secularized, yet built of taxes forced from unwilling pockets. In the Free State the institutions will rest on free offerings. The right of refusing support to a government is a safeguard the free citizen cannot surrender. The government so established will stand on good behavior. To this radical discussion of affairs the public is to be invited more and more in the coming years. A few paragraphs from Mr. Warren's discourse will serve to draw attention to, and help, it is hoped, to create a demand for its issue in some more popular form :—

"The abolition of compulsory taxation is more than a beautiful ideal. It is an incontestable fact, that the whole social and political progress of the world is in this direction.

"Take up the history of any State which has fought its way out of despotism into liberty, and it will be found that greater progress has already been made toward the true goal than yet remains to be made.

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"Note the steps of this historic progress. First, compulsory exactions, levied by one despotic will, without so much as formal consultation with the governed. Next, the one despotic will is limited by a class of privileged subordinates, too powerful to be disregarded; these must be trusted to vote the due supplies for King and State. Next, the privileged class must either abdicate, or share their power with representatives of the million, and thenceforth tax-laying is the free public act of a majority of national representatives. One step more completes the grand transition from impositions willed by no citizen to tribute willed by all. Once none voted these obligatory subsidies of the State, now vast majorities of nations spontaneously assume their payment; in some fair future why not all? particularly if each citizen can in some measure be free to select the public use to which his contribution shall apply.

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"In our own day a French writer upon imposts, M. de Girardin, catches a glimpse of this ideal method, and exclaims, 'Voluntary taxation, it is the State stimulated, it is the State economical, it is the State republican and democratic.'

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"To the believer in that better day there is another fact which seems to usher in almost the realization of his faith. In several of the smaller political jurisdictions of

Europe the historic tax-gatherer has been found superfluous. For five years it was the good fortune of the present writer to be domiciled in one of these communities. Incredible as it may seem to believers in the necessity of a legal enforcement of taxes by pains and penalties, he was for that period, by law and by usage, in the strictest sense of the term, his own assessor and his own tax-gatherer. In common with the other citizens, he was invited, without sworn statement or declaration, to make such contribution to the public charges as seemed to himself just and equal. That sum, uncounted by any official, unknown to any but himself, he was asked to drop with his own hand into a strong public chest; on doing which his name was checked off the list of contributors, his duty done. Not soon can he forget the sense of dignity and honor and chivalrous generosity which this trustful bearing of the government inspired. Every citizen felt a noble pride in such immunity from prying assessors and rude constables. Every annual call of the authorities on that community was honored to the full.

Other years have passed. The great German Empire has swallowed up that old, yet young and courageous "Free City" and State. It has absorbed one other sovereignty in which it is said that like liberties obtained. Let us hope it has not substituted taxation by the needle-gun, for taxation by conscience. In any case, however, the experiment has been tried, tried for years and found successful. A State supported solely by the voluntary tribute of its subjects has been proved by trial to be possible. Alluding to such experiments in Switzerland and Germany, one of the soberest publicists of France, Pellegrino Rossi, declares, "When people have already passed from the old to this new method, it is too late to swear that taxes shall be eternal."

THE New Orthodoxy, which here in New England has been gathering strength within evangelical limits for the last quarter of a century, flames up of late in divers ways, until it is fair to be encouraged with the thought that the fires of a more liberal faith are to be lighted on every hill. Doomed we may be to disappointment, but this much seems clear. The children of to-day breathe a new atmosphere. If any one doubts, let him imagine the amazement that would sit on the face of Jonathan Edwards,—to say nothing of one Michael Wigglesworth,—were they to revisit the scenes of earth. Here is the Rev. Joseph Cook at Tremont Temple. Say he is but a clever lawyer making special pleas for the old doctrines, if you will. More important it is to notice the entire change of base to which he is certainly leading a very large representative orthodoxy. He has fallen in love with Science: no more mystery. He will surrender Orthodoxy before reason. Immortality is revealed under his microscope. God is a syllogism; Christ as easily explained as a rainbow. The aforetime mysterious trinity is analyzable by finite reason. Endless misery is in "the nature of things." And so on; the old creeds are all thrust out to take their chances for life or death on the boards of rational strife. The early Bibliolatrists would have fled in dismay. Welcome to the new

light, break where or how it will! In this connection it may be pertinent to quote Mr. Murray. In a sermon on the Bible, abounding in waywardness from Orthodoxy, is to be found this sentence: "Even the ox and the ass could teach some Christians. For, if the Bible may be compared to a field, it may be said with truth that they begin at Genesis and eat their way clear across to Revelations,—stubble and grass, bitter and sweet, useful and useless alike."

JOSEPH COOK thinks that "Massachusetts law ought to be made in Massachusetts, and not on the Tiber." What he means to say is that Massachusetts should decide the sort of religious education she will enforce in the prisons and common schools, without reference to Papal ideas. American law shall be supreme here, and not Roman canon law. It seems that within Charlestown prison, where a majority of the convicts are Romish, there is a Protestant chaplain, and the Protestant Bible is circulated. Against this the Roman Church in some form or other has entered her protest. Now, says Mr. Cook, who disclaims energetically having one drop of sectarian blood in his veins,—

"All who are there are wards of the State. They are not under the care of any denomination. Massachusetts is the preacher to those convicts. Massachusetts directs their moral culture. Massachusetts is not denominational. It has been the opinion of Massachusetts that she had the right to manage the instruction of those convicts according to her own ideas. Massachusetts was so narrow, so benighted, so sectarian, as to suppose that she possessed the right to appoint a chaplain over there, and to instruct him to teach nothing denominational, but to put the Bible into the hands of the convicts; to organize, if you please, a Sunday school, not sectarian at all, but in the hands of all denominations; to hold devotional meetings, and thus train these convicts into preparation for a life of freedom, treating them in all ways as a wise parent would treat an erring child. Massachusetts thought she had a right to do that, and that is what she did."

Mr. Cook's remarks were received by the vast audience in Tremont Temple with "loud and long-continued applause," which shows with what rapture a purely partisan statement, addressed, as is claimed, to more intelligence than was ever gathered in New England before, can be entertained. Mr. Cook maintains that "every thing in this country must go by count of heads and clack of tongues." Suppose it possible that some day in our State Romish heads shall outnumber Protestant heads. Then will the law made on the Tiber have become American law, and rule here. If, in that day, in the prison "under the shadow of Bunker Hill," the majority are Protestants, will Mr. Cook repeat his triumphant strain, "Massachusetts is the preacher



to these convicts ; Massachusetts is not denominational" ? The probabilities are, if he has not then—to borrow his own favorite phrase—"gone hence," that he will clamor far more vehemently than does now the disaffected Romanist for religious teaching and a Bible of the convicts' own choosing. The State Romish will be as much the State, as the State Protestant is. Or suppose, under the impetus to rational thought given by the Monday Lectureship, the State turn infidel, and for chaplain—if prisons are then extant—select some *savant* of science. Will not the State still be "undenominational" ? Or will Mr. Cook then insist that science taught as a substitute for religious training is equivalent to denominational bias ? There is nothing he more values than clear ideas and utmost fairness. Let him say, then, that the State which labors only to satisfy all Protestant sects is still denominational. It is denominational as regards the Romish sect ; were Roman and Protestant united as one Christian body, it would still be denominational as regards Jews, Infidels, Free Religionists, etc. It is sectarian or denominational for any one of these opposing parties to establish religious or non-religious instruction in prison or school.

Mr. Cook would have law made in Massachusetts, and not on the Tiber. But whence comes the kind of American law in which he delights ? Is it of American soil ? No ; it is transplanted from Judæa ; it is Judæan law. Well, it might as well come from the Tiber as from the Jordan, if it is to ride rough-shod over the consciences of men. American law, whatever else may be said of it, is pledged not to do that.

THE discussion of the school question betrays the virus in the blood of American politics. The security which the idea of maintaining a majority vote offers is that to whose shelter all parties flee. The Catholic, perhaps, is more thoroughly consistent. He proposes education on the same principle that he proposes religion ; namely, that of Authority. He does not profess to support freedom. Freedom to do right, he may say ; that is, right as Mother Church conceives it. Individual freedom apart from this restriction is not in the Catholic's programme. Hence education, in his view, is education in those things the Church has sealed with her approval. All else is denounced as error with evil and corrupting influence, or as absolutely wrong and vicious. The Catholic is consistent. He says there is authority for the individual, and tells you where it is. He also declares that this authority has its basis in the *right of things*, and not in the will of men.

Revolution, or the vote of the majority, does not affect it. The priest is but the mouthpiece of the everlasting right. Here may be the assumption; but it carries with it a consolation not found in the mere reflection that one's neighbors are strongest. Gov. Rice, speaking before the Episcopal Church Congress, said that sectarianism, and not religion, was at the bottom of all our public school difficulties. Religion, as defined by Jesus Christ, was *love*. No one could object to that. Put love in the schools, and leave sectarian teaching out. But what is love? Even Gov. Rice defined it as love to *God* as well as man. Well, but what is God? "The author of all we see that is beautiful and good," responds the Governor. But that will not satisfy all who will be interested in the schools. "God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," says one; "God is the other side of the moon," says another; "God is nothing: there is no god," quoth yet another. Thus sectarian views creep in, in spite of the simplicity to which religion is reduced by His Excellency.

AGAIN, the schools can be made entirely secular, and thus, in the opinion of many of our most earnest liberal thinkers, the sectarian rock can be escaped. But liberal teachers cannot discard morality; and immediately we hear of natural morality and Christian morality. The latter says to the ingenuous youth, "Turn your other cheek, and let your enraged companion strike that also." "Not a bit of it," says natural morality; "hit back, and defend yourself." Now it is plain that right here, even on these little hooks, hang all the law and the prophets. Shall the liberal pay taxes to have his boy taught the vile doctrine of tame submission to injury? He ought not, he says, to be taxed for a religion he does not believe; no more for a morality; especially when that morality is so intimate a part of his religious faith. On the other hand, shall the Christian pay taxes to have his child indoctrinated in—speaking more accurately, perhaps I should say encouraged in developing—the natural depravity of his young untutored blood? However tamely he may submit to be physically buffeted about and shorn of his birthright, he has no disposition to yield to any liberal usurpation of this sort,—not while there are left to him two such peaceful weapons as the ballot and the bayonet. This is but a sample. Sects in morals can be multiplied indefinitely. In short, compulsory taxation, in whatever shape, is an unwitting confession of the homely old truth that men differ.

THE refusal of the authorities of Philadelphia to allow the memory of Thomas Paine its just celebration in Independence Hall, by the placing there, as a fit recognition of his services to the country in the early days "which tried men's souls," a simple portrait bust, may be regarded as by no means a final decision. Times change. People grow wiser, if not better. The religious opinions of Paine, though, if uttered in our day, they would cause hardly a ripple on the surface of popular opinion, were, at the time of his bold, unreserved criticism of the Bible and Christian assumptions, sufficient to arouse most deadly and venomous animosity. The man whose political career had won him unbounded popularity sank suddenly beneath the tumultuous waves of a bigotry and hatred more fierce than ever forced the tortures of the Inquisition. But the pith of his protest outlives the storm, and his character is destined to receive ample vindication. The following unique tribute was spoken by Walt Whitman at the recent anniversary of Paine's birthday in Philadelphia. It should put an end to the old slanders :—

"Some thirty-five years ago, in New York city, at Tammany Hall, of which place I was then a frequenter, I happened to become quite well acquainted with Thomas Paine's perhaps most intimate chum, and certainly in later years very frequent companion, a remarkably fine old man, Col. Fellows, who may yet be remembered by some stray relicts of that period and spot. At one of our interviews he gave me a minute account of Paine's sickness and death. In short, from these talks I was and am satisfied that my old friend, with his marked advantages, had mentally, morally, and emotionally gauged the author of "Common Sense," and, besides giving me a good portrait of his appearance and manners, had taken the true measure, not only of his exterior, but interior character. Paine's practical demeanor, and much of his theoretical belief, was a mixture of the French and English schools of a century ago, and the best of both. Like most old-fashioned people, he drank a glass or two every day; but was no tippler, nor intemperate, let alone being a drunkard. He lived simply and economically, but quite well,—was always cheery and courteous, perhaps occasionally a little blunt, having very positive opinions upon politics, religion, and so forth. That he labored well and wisely for the States, in the trying period of their parturition, and in the seeds of their character, there seems to me no question. I dare not say how much of what our Union is owning and enjoying to-day,—its independence, its ardent belief in, and substantial practice of, radical human rights, and the severance of its government from all ecclesiastical and superstitious dominion,—I dare not say how much of all this is owing to Thomas Paine, but I am inclined to think a good portion of it decidedly is. But I was not going either into an analysis or eulogium of the man. I wanted to carry you back a generation or two, and give you by indirection a moment's glance; and also to ventilate a very earnest and, I believe, authentic opinion, nay, conviction, of that time, the fruit of the interviews I have mentioned, and of questioning and cross-questioning, clinched by my best information since,—that Thomas Paine had a noble personality, as exhibited in presence, face, voice, dress, manner, and what may be called his atmosphere and magnetism, especially in the later years of his life. I am sure of it. Of the foul and foolish fictions

yet told about the circumstances of his disease, the absolute fact is that he lived a good life, after its kind: he died calmly and philosophically, as became him. He served the embryo Union with most precious service,—a service that every man, woman, and child in our thirty-eight States is to some extent receiving the benefit of to-day; and I, for one, here cheerfully and reverently throw my pebble on the cairn of his memory. As we all know, the season demands—or rather, will it ever be out of season?—that America learn to better dwell on her choicest possession, the legacy of her good and faithful men; that she will preserve their fame, if unquestioned; or, if need be, that she fail not to dissipate what clouds have intruded on that fame, and burnish it newer, truer, and brighter continually."

MR. PETER BAYNE produced some year or so ago a very remarkable study of Walt Whitman's poems, which was printed in the "Contemporary Review," and has since been reprinted in several American periodicals. As showing the color of this criticism which Mr. Bayne submits to the moral world—he is a moralist of the pure type—several of the illustrations he has plucked from "Leaves of Grass" are here set forth with a touch of his grimly earnest accompanying comments. Whitman, in the eye of his critic, is guilty of "extravagant conceit." The following is submitted in evidence:—

"I conn'd old times;

I sat studying at the feet of the great masters:

Now, if eligible, O that the great masters might return and study me!"

"Much good would it do them!" exclaims Peter Bayne. Walt innocently remarks,—

"Oxen that rattle the yoke and chain, or halt in the leafy shade! what is that you express in your eyes?

It seems to me more than all the print I have read in my life."

Whereupon Bayne: "Whitman's eulogists tell us he reads Shakspeare, Homer, and the Bible. Can they pretend to believe it to be anything but fantastic affectation to say that there is more in the eyes of oxen than in these?" 'Tis doubtful if Whitman ever had a critic in grimmer earnest. Once more. Says Whitman,—

"I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contain'd;

I stand and look at them long and long,

They do not sweat and whine about their condition;

They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins;

They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God;

Not one is dissatisfied—not one is demented with the mania of owning things;

Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago;

Not one is respectable or industrious over the whole earth."

Mr. Bayne is simply disgusted. He refers us to those industrious creatures, "the bee and the ant," and declares that Whitman's statements are neither "accurate nor sagacious." And then, with all gravity, he continues: "They are a confused echo, extravagantly absurd, of teachings which he has not understood,"—by which he means simply to say that our "barbaric" poet is an ignorant Darwinian.

But I cannot go with Mr. Bayne when he denounces Whitman for his religion. He says: "His extravagance in his pious tone is almost equally offensive." Indeed, I think Mr. Bayne gets a trifle mixed when he touches this phase of things. He has been so stirred up and shocked by the poet's line in praise of the "brutes"—

"They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God"—

that he has lost his way. Mr. Bayne loves to hear such discussions; or, at least, he thinks they ought to occur among *human* beings. So, when Whitman continues,—

"I say that the real and permanent grandeur of These States must be their Religion; Otherwise there is no real and permanent grandeur :  
(Nor character, nor life worthy the name, without Religion ;  
Nor land, nor man, nor woman, without Religion),"—

Mr. Bayne (with a perversity I cannot explain) observes: "This is just as silly as to praise pigs and foxes for not worshipping God." Mr. Bayne is fully persuaded that Whitman has "no maxim which he more energetically enforces than this,—'Reverence nothing.'" He says of Whitman, "With a flourish of his pen he accounts for and effaces all gods," and quotes as follows:—

"Magnifying and applying come I,  
Outbidding at the start the old cautious hucksters,  
Taking myself the exact dimensions of Jehovah;  
Lithographing Kronos, Zeus his son, and Hercules his grandson;  
Buying drafts of Osiris, Isis, Belus, Brahma, Buddha,  
In my portfolio placing Manito loose, Allah on a leaf, the crucifix engraved,  
With Odin, and the hideous Mexitli, and every idol and image;  
Taking them all for what they are worth, and not a cent more ;

\* \* \* \* \*  
What do you suppose I would intimate to you in a hundred ways, but that man  
or woman is as good as God?

And that there is no God any more divine than Yourself?"

To conclude: I cannot, in perusing any of the above quotations, quite enter into Mr. Bayne's perturbed state of feeling. What do I care if Whitman "professes to 'inaugurate' a religion of which the one duty, the sole worship, is to be the 'dear love of comrades,'" or if he

does "speak with the authority of a founder of a new church"? This is a free land. I can still worship as I please. Says Whitman, as Mr. Bayne quotes him:—

"No dainty dolce affettuoso I;  
Bearded, sun-burnt, gray-neck'd, forbidding, I have arrived,  
To be wrestled with as I pass, for the solid prizes of the universe;  
For such I afford whoever can persevere to win them."

"These last two lines," says Mr. Bayne, "either mean nothing at all, or they announce that Whitman is a god." It may be so; but then Mr. Bayne has already quoted our poet to the effect that we are *all* gods. One thing offsets another. I am content. And so at last is Mr. Bayne; for he has found in Whitman's own words—"most reasonable of all his prophecies"—that which ought to satisfy him surely. Here is the "philosophical resignation" he is able at last to reach. All along he has desired to "cast his [Whitman's] works away," and now at last Whitman yields him comfort:—

"I bequeathe myself to the dirt;  
If you want me again, look for me under your boot-soles."

This, Mr. Bayne thinks, will do. And so think I. But if any one would further judge, and for himself, the "Leaves of Grass," since Mr. Bayne's critique, are to be found at all our most enterprising American book stores.

I HAVE been permitted to look over a portion of the manuscript of Samuel Johnson's forthcoming work on China. This volume will give us as full an account of Chinese civilization as his work published a few years since did of Indian. Starting from the characteristics of the Chinese mind, and recognizing its remarkable difference from the Hindu, it traces these peculiar traits to their grounds in human nature, and their relation to Universal ideas and principles, through an elaborate study of Chinese civilization in its productive elements, its structures of government and education, its rationalistic teachers, its religious and philosophical beliefs, and in especial relation to their bearings on the great problems—social, commercial, political, philosophical, and religious—of the present time. It is a contribution to the practical reconstruction of religion and philosophy on a larger basis than those special claims and symbols which are now yielding to the growing faith in science and the sympathies of races and creeds. One of the most interesting features is the connection of

Chinese philosophy with the principles of evolution, as developed in our Western Science. The author is a firm believer in evolution, but affirms also the infinite element, which, as Cosmical Mind, is essential to every step in the evolutionary process. The questions of civil service reform, of moral and intellectual tests for official functions; the failure of the missionaries in the work of converting China, and their success as physicians, surgeons, and translators of Chinese Scriptures for the uses of comparative religion; the history of the opium war and of European intercourse with China; the problem of Californian immigration; the special function of the Chinese in modern civilization; and the picture drawn of the industrial and social achievements of this hitherto uncomprehended people,—are all treated with great thoroughness.

The profound philosophy of Lao-tsé forms a pendant to the mechanical and institutional methods of Chinese culture, and its individualism is shown to be a reaction to noble personal principles and aims. Three new extended chapters on Buddhism are added to those in the former volume, explaining its philosophical evolution as a whole, and its special relation to China. Every great monument of the rational literature in all its branches, which has exerted important influence on the nation, is here analyzed, and referred to its place in the vast civilization of three thousand years; and ample extracts are given from them all. Ancestral worships, Patriarchalism, Fetichism, Chinese Theism, the national poetry in all its forms, and the evolution of language through all its stages, with special reference to the written signs of this remarkable literature, are each the subject of a chapter of philosophical inquiry.

The labor and extent of research to which the work bears witness, is perhaps at first the most noticeable fact about it. But the most important is certainly its contribution of original philosophical and religious thought to a subject which covers all the speculative and social aspects of our time. The timeliness of a work like this must also be felt,—coming, as it does, in the present state of our relations with a people whose character and history are likely to have so important an influence in shaping our own destiny.

CHATTEL slavery was one phase of the labor problem. The blacks emancipated rose to the level of the white race, so far as the law could affect them. Still remains the far more difficult problem of finding out and satisfying the just demands of labor,—not for one race, but for all, white as well as black. This new agitation passes out of the polit-



ical arena. Just so fast as the people come to perceive its true import, they will discover that it prophesies and proclaims a new moral growth, quickened by a new intelligence. It will be natural, however, for the poor, sharing the prevailing distemper, to seek first a political salvation. But escape from the luring but unreal might of the ballot will be their first great deliverance. Their remedy lies beyond and above all that legislation can do for them. Instead of a new labor party, a new labor college or institute will better serve their cause. The grievance is great, and not easily borne. But the sooner the complaining laborer is able to state his case, and intelligently show the nature of the injustice that keeps him down, spite of all his efforts to rise, the sooner will come the relief he is bound to have. Now, to a very great extent, the poor who work hard,—the “industrious poor,” as they are frequently referred to by leading sympathetic journals,—know they ought to fare better than they do; yet they propose only to seize the first opportunity to mount into fortune that will inevitably send others to the hard fate they themselves have escaped from. I do not mean this is a deliberate purpose on their part; but simply that it is the necessary effect of the system they, with the rest of the world, still maintain. They are out; they would be in. There is no proposition going to show how *all* may go in. Coöperation is talked of, and serious attempts to put it in practice have been numerous. But no coöperative enterprise has yet found it possible to include universal interests. A class effort is fostered. The outcome cannot be prosperity for all.

Confess that the problem is difficult. Yet why should we hesitate to say that the goal to be *striven* for is the *annihilation of poverty*? I know a smile creeps over the face of the incredulous. They will say, “The poor ye have with you always.” Armed with this old-time text, as though it were a justification rather than irony deep and reproaching, they will discourse of wise management, temperance, economy, etc. But it needs only a straightforward glance into the real facts of the case to perceive that rich and poor do not divide on any such line of merit and demerit: on the one side, all the sobriety, wisdom, and frugality the world contains; on the other, a woeful display of the lack of all these factors of success. Grant all that may be said in behalf of temperance, mother-wit, thriftiness, and whatever else is good for a man,—does it follow that all people thus armed could abolish their poverty, and still keep up the same money-getting conflict? Where there is conflict, there is a certainty that somebody will be pushed to the wall. Equal chances to join in a strife against each other for the necessities and comforts of life,—is that the solution we are to be content with?

Let us hope for better things. There is a sentiment of mutualism predominant throughout the world to-day as sentiment, that cannot pass away, but must be translated intelligently into the accepted laws of society. Society includes the world, not a part only. How to pass over into this new state in which the welfare of all shall find ample support, is the profound problem. There can be no peace until universal industry is heartily encouraged by being equitably rewarded. The late Josiah Warren pointed out, to my mind, the new adjustment the enlightened moral sense of mankind will ultimately accept. I can only here refer to one illustration, but it is one on which hangs a revolution. Reduced to its simplest terms, the new rule he proposed may be thus stated: *Price regulated by cost or damage to one's self, not by benefits conferred on others.* All of the civility of life now runs upon this principle. But when people "do business," and *mean* business, they regulate their conduct by exactly reversing it; their inflexible motto becomes: "Pay me according to the benefit you receive." Now it needs no argument to show that simply conferring favor upon others lays no basis for charge. "No trouble," we say. But just in proportion as it becomes trouble, involving time and labor, it squares with our sense of right to demand, if we choose, equivalents in return. All Mr. Warren asked was the application of this simple rule to the world's business. Test the matter of rent, interest, profit, in this way, and see the result. Rent would assume this equitable shape,—it would cover "wear and tear," sacrifice, and risk; enough to keep the owner in possession of capital invested. As for interest on money, the lender might find the damage done him so slight that he would waive all charge; or, on the other hand, he might make the loan at great inconvenience, in which case he would ask an equivalent. In either case—in all cases—his price would be modulated by the actual loss he sustained. As for profits, the idea would vanish in the effort to render unto all the full measure of their labor. Each would add to his capital by his own labor, not from the earnings of others. The claim of capital to increase without labor would be surrendered. For the moment it ceased making demands on labor for conferring benefits, it would have of itself no cumulative resource. The capitalist, in the present sense of the word, would disappear. All being laborers, each would have only the capital he was able to save up from his own earnings, unless enriched by voluntary gift from others. There would be as much of these saved earnings, or capital, as now: only it would not, as now, be gathered into few hands. By a natural, equitable distribution, secured by this rule of receiving compensation equivalent to sacrifice, capitalists, in the new sense, would arise by the million. The

war between labor and capital would end. A harmony of interests would develop ways and means for all great enterprises of mutual concern.

This may be a dream. But, if it be a dream of Equity, it will in due time pass into the life-blood of the people, and circulate, with every strong heart-beat, the blessedness of a peace the world has never yet known.

A CORDIAL greeting to "The Radical Review!" My friend, just gone from my studio, felt that the "Nineteenth Century," or some other less provocative title, would be preferable. But wherefore the "nineteenth," or any other century, that sailing under its partisan banner would be wisest! Not to reflect the passing time, the day's doings, to be newsy with "current events," as I gather and surmise, is to be the business of the new Quarterly. News it shall bring; news from the unseen—news from that which is not and is to be. To make history, not to write it: out of invisible truth newly to summon the social worth peoples and prophets long have waited for—be that the burden of its life. What word more fitting to describe this high intent than that chosen? No light and frivolous task; no mere addition to the ranks of aspirants for new or fine literature; but serious purpose and consecration; yet no lack of good cheer. There are those who love to paint "your genuine radical" grim, sour, void of patience. Never a graver mistake. Who sees the invisible shore, and sees how all tides and blowing breezes, as well as all thought and work, are thitherward driving,—can he turn sour-hearted?

I like full well the editor's purpose not only to "welcome all subjects pertaining to human welfare," but to hear differing views of the same subject. Let editor, contributors, and readers make this welcome "hearty and hot." Emphasize it. Let the old spirit depart. A margin of doubt as to one's own orthodoxy may prove no bad road to health. Wisdom is not born of conceit. No one is more unfree in mind than he whose politics, religion, philosophy, science, or whatsoever else, has so captured him that he can give patient audience only to his own thinking. It is not always the ignorant who are most ignorant and enslaved. Scholarship can fetter as well as liberate. "A little knowledge is dangerous," runs the proverb. But I have known cases when *much* knowledge has proven equally disastrous,—where the "light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world" has been put out, or bartered for the light that cometh from behind over the shoulder. Man's eyes are set in the front of his head. He could have

been given no stronger hint that he was born for a forward, upward look. The true scholar will take his cue from this circumstance, and learn he is to see towards the future, as well as store his mind with the past. Wordsworth has these suggestive lines, worthy a place in the memory of all :—

“Whether we be young or old,  
Our destiny, our being's heart and home,  
Is with infinitude, and only there;  
With hope it is, hope that can never die,  
Effort, and expectation, and desire,  
And something evermore about to be.  
Under such banners militant the soul  
Seeks for no trophies, struggles for no spoils  
That may attest her prowess, blest in thoughts  
That are their own perfection and reward,  
Strong in herself and in beatitude  
That hides her, like the mighty flood of Nile  
Poured from his fount of Abyssinian clouds  
To fertilize the whole Egyptian plain.”

SIDNEY H. MORSE.